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In the field of lexical semantics, there have been many suggestions as
to how the meaning of sentences and utterances should be represented.
Such theories typically make use of traditional logic frameworks, and the
various words that appear in sentences, acting as subjects or objects, for
instance, are mapped from the syntax to proposed semantic structures.
When such structures share common rules and an overall framework, they
can be related to each other in various ways. This can then be used to
capture an important concept in both traditional logic, and in semantics;
the notion of inference, a process that involves arriving at new truth
conclusions based on given truth premises. This thesis will focus on the
meaning of verbs and the entailment relations that might occur between
them. It will be looking at three specific ways of representing the semantics
of verbal situations, and how they capture specific entailment phenomena.
The idea will be to compare the three frameworks, and to arrive at what
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The Goal of this Thesis
The name of this thesis is Verbal Inference, so the focus will be on the
relationship between sentences that make use of specific verbs and different
arguments to these verbs. The concept of verbal inference involves
examining given sentences, and establishing what other sentences are also
true, based on the meaning behind the initial sentences. In other words,
a sentence describing a situation might entail, or logically lead to, other
sentences describing similar situations.
Although there are many different ways of representing semantics, as
mentioned, this thesis will focus on three theories in particular, and how
each deals with the notion of verbal inference. Naturally, these three
ways of representation all focus on verbal situations, and how verbs can
be given specific logic structures, or lexical entries. The three theories are
the conceptual structure representation proposed by Ray Jackendoff, the
underlying event formulas employed by Terence Parsons, and the semantic
structures provided by the VerbNet lexical database, which bases most of
its structure on the verb classes given by Beth Levin.
The main goal of this thesis will be to go through various entailment
phenomena, or situations involving different sentences which may be
related to each other by means of entailment. Each example will examine
how the three semantic theories structure and cope with the given
entailment phenomenon. In the end, a conclusive overview will be given,
which will summarize the various differences and similarities between the
three representations, as well as what their strengths and weaknesses are
with regards to verbal inference. The idea is to arrive at which of the
theories are the best at capturing specific entailments.
Before examining the entailment examples, these first chapters will
provide a basic overview of necessary linguistic terms and concepts, as
well as a quite thorough introduction for each of the three semantic
representations. So, chapter 2 will provide the basics needed, including
a more formal definition of the important terms inference and entailment,
while chapters 3, 4 and 5 will introduce the semantic structures provided
by Jackendoff, Parsons and VerbNet, respectively. Chapter 6 will explain
the thesis’ planning process, while chapters 7 through 13 will examine
specific entailment examples. Chapter 14 will offer a conclusive overview
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of the strengths and weaknesses of each framework. Finally, chapter 15 will




As mentioned, this chapter will present some important terms and
concepts that will be used quite frequently in this thesis. These are, in other
words, necessary to understand in order to fully apprehend the different
semantic representations that will be presented in the coming chapters.
The concepts include, most importantly, the actual definition of a word
(specifically verbs) in section 2.1, the various ways these are related to each
other (section 2.1.1), the arguments, or participants that occupy a situation
(section 2.2), and the definition of verbal inference and semantic entailment
(section 2.3).
2.1 Lexemes and Senses
When modelling the semantics of words, it’s important to know that the
idea of a word can actually have many different definitions. In a lexicon, a
word is typically listed with a proposed definition, and this representation
is traditionally called a lexeme. The graphical form often used to represent
a lexeme is called a lemma, which acts as the headword of the given
lexeme. Furthermore, mapping from a word form to the lemma is called
lemmatization. For example, the verb lemma read would represent all word
forms possible under that lemma, like reads, reading etc., and lemmatizing
those forms would yield the same lemma [16, p. 645].
A word by itself may mean many different things. These meanings can
be called senses and they represent the concepts a word realizes given the
context. For example, the verb drill might be associated with the activity
of making a hole using a tool, or to the activity involving a strict form of
training. The different senses a word can have are traditionally listed under
a chosen lemma entry in a lexicon, making up a lexeme [16, p. 646]. The
example in (1), for instance, shows how the two possible verb senses of drill
could be listed in a lexicon [12, p. 467]. Note that the whole structure is the
actual lexeme and the name drill is the lemma used to represent the lexeme.
(1) drill:
a. Verb1: to make a hole in something, using a drill.
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b. Verb2: to teach somebody to do something by making them repeat it a
lot of times.
2.1.1 Relations between Senses
Different senses are related to one another in a variety of ways. When
a lemma can have different senses that are totally, or almost totally,
unrelated then that lemma is typically listed several times in the lexicon;
one representation for each of the unrelated senses. Such unrelated senses
are called homonyms. The word bank, for example, traditionally has at
least two lexemes in a lexicon, one for when the word is connected to the
notion of banks along a river, for instance, and one for when the meaning
is connected to a kind of building. It must be said, though, that deciding
whether senses are homonyms may be very hard, since the distinctions
between them might not be that easily defined. Because of this, different
dictionaries may choose to represent senses in distinctive ways, which may
differ among them.
The two related terms homophones and homographs both denote relations
among lemmas instead of senses. Homophones are pronounced the same
way but written differently, as in two and too, while homographs are pro-
nounced differently, but written the same, as in the two pronunciations of
the word bass. These similarities have typically come about coincidentally,
as it just so happens that the same word was used to describe two different
meanings. This idea also applies to homonyms.
The senses listed in a single lexeme are semantically related, so the
term polysemy is used instead of homonymy. As an illustration, take the
sentences in (2) and (3) below.
(2) John deposited money to the bank.
(3) John gave blood to the bank.
Here, the bank has two different senses, meaning a bank that stores
either money or blood, respectively. But they are still semantically related,
both denoting a building that stores something. Because of this, the two
senses are listed in the same lexeme, meaning that there is a polysemy
relation between them.
A subtype of polysemy, called metonymy, occurs when one aspect of a
concept refers to another aspect of the same concept. This aspect may also
represent the whole concept. It is possible, for example, to say sentence (4)
instead of sentence (5). In sentence (4), Stephen King represents the concept
of the books written by Stephen King, which is the concept in sentence (5).
(4) He loves reading Stephen King.
(5) He loves reading books written by Stephen King.
The term synonymy is used for the relation between senses that
represent the exact (or close to exact) same meaning. Typical examples
are the word pairs couch and sofa, and car and automobile. However,
there will probably never exist completely true synonyms, where the two
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words stand for the exact same meaning in all contexts. This is because
there is always some small difference between the given senses, however
insignificant, and in the way each can operate according to the given
context.
Related to synonymy is the term antonymy which deals with the
opposite meanings of senses. There are three specific kinds of antonymy.
It can be completely discrete, as in the relation between the words dead and
alive or on and off etc., where there is no middle ground between the two
meanings. It’s not possible, for instance, to say that something is almost off,
or almost alive. When there is a middle ground, on the other hand, as in the
relationship between the adjectives hot and cold, small and large and so forth,
they are defined according to a gradable scale. You could, for instance, say
that something can become hotter or colder. Finally, antonyms may also
be reversives where there is movement in either one direction or the other.
Examples include up and down, and rise and fall.
Another relation that is useful, which only applies to nouns, is
hyponymy, which involves senses that have subclasses, or subsenses. These
act as further specifications where all properties of a given sense is
inherited to some other, lower sense. The noun dog, for instance, can be a
subsense of animal in that it specifies what kind of animal it is. Dog is then
a hyponym of animal, and animal is the hypernym, or superordinate sense,
of dog. Related senses and subsenses may be organized in a taxonomy, a
tree-like structure that can show the hyponymy relations among them.
A relation called troponymy is basically the same as hyponymy, except
that it applies to verbs. It denotes a relation in which a verb sense is said to
specify in which manner the action of another, related verb sense is done.
For example, sprinting is a certain type of running. So, sprint is, in other
words, a troponym of run [18].
Another noun relation called meronymy, not to be confused with
metonymy, is the term used when senses are part of other senses. This
relation is also called the part-whole relation. For example, finger is a
meronym of hand because it is a part of it. Hand, in turn, is the holonym
of finger in this case [16, p. 646-651].
Finally, the entailment relation may also occur between verb senses
where one sense is said to lead to or infer another sense. In other words,
if one sense of a word is true then it might also be that some other sense
is also true. For example, when a person snores it is logically entailed that
the person is also sleeping, hence snore entails sleep [19, p. 40]. This kind
of relation is very much related to semantic entailment, which is of course
the main topic of this thesis. As mentioned, section 2.3 will explain this
important concept, and the notion of verbal inference, in more detail.
2.2 Thematic Roles
A category of particular importance is the notion of thematic roles, a
concept that gained particular relevance ever since Jeffrey Gruber [11] and
Charles J. Fillmore [10] began focusing on it. When you look at different
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verbs and their arguments it is easy to see that they share many similarities.
For example, in sentences (6) and (7) below, it is apparent that Mary acts as
both an "opener" and a "closer"; she opens the door in sentence (6), but closes
it in sentence (7).
(6) Mary opened the door.
(7) Mary closed the door.
These are very specific roles, different for each verb. When roles are
this specified they are sometimes also called deep roles [16, p. 654]. But
they are, in fact, very similar, because they both denote someone acting
deliberately in causing a situation (opening/closing the door). This more
general role is typically called an Agent or Actor, and this is but one example
in the large list of thematic roles that have been proposed in the linguistic
literature. Other examples of roles are Experiencer, where an entity does
not have control over what is happening, Theme, which acts as the thing
directly affected by an action, and Instrument, which is the thing used in
the action [16, p. 654-655] [26, p. 153-155] [3, p. 472]. So, in other words,
all situations, which are represented using sentences, describe a number of
participants acting in various ways according to one another.
Most theories adress the situations denoted by sentences as events
[16, p. 597], though some also use the term eventualities [25, p. 20-21],
which covers both active situations where something happens (events) and
states, which are just static representations of certain circumstances. Note
that eventualities can be further divided into the types accomplishment,
achievement and process, though these will be explained in more detail in
section 4.4.
Verbs may denote any eventuality (an event or a state), and the
participants in such eventualities are labeled using the thematic roles. The
theories that will be presented deal with events and states in different ways,
so their exact definitions and use will be explained in more detail in the
coming chapters. For now, though, the sentences in (8) show two examples
of eventualities, where sentence (8a) is a state and sentence (8b) is an event.
(8) a. The earth is round.
b. He throws the ball.
The three approaches to semantic representation also deal with parti-
cipants slightly differently, though they all use thematic roles to refer to
them. As such, each theory uses different rules for defining the thematic
roles and for the specifics involved linking them with the arguments in the
syntax. The lists of thematic roles therefore vary a bit among them, though
the most important ones, such as those mentioned above, are all shared.
All three would, for instance, say that both the earth and the ball, in sentence
(8), at least have the thematic role of Theme.
In spite of these differences, some universal rules apply when dealing
with thematic roles. All verb arguments, that is the syntactic constituents
that operate according to the verb (such as the subject and object), are
typically given a unique thematic role. So, there are, for instance, typically
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no more than one Agent in an event; if one participant occupies a role then
no other participant can also have that role. Furthermore, participants are
typically never given more than one role label. In other words, a participant
is never both a Theme and an Agent, for instance. However, in the coming
chapters we will see some examples where these rules are slightly altered,
particularly in Jackendoff’s and Parsons’ theories (chapters 3 and 4).
One interesting alternative method to a listing of various thematic roles
is to use even more generalized semantic roles. Here, the roles only express
their rough meaning, each having some heuristic features that define the
role. These generalized roles cover sets of more specific roles. For example,
a generalized Agent, sometimes called a Proto-Agent [8], would represent
all roles that have Agent-like qualities. The likelihood that an argument is
labeled with a generalized role depends on which features the argument
exhibits. Consider, for instance, the sentence in (9).
(9) David threw the ball.
Here, David is the cause of the ball being thrown and he is also doing it
intentionally, all features that are typical of a Proto-Agent. Since no other
arguments have more Proto-Agent features in the example, David is labeled
as the Proto-Agent [16, p. 657]. This alternative is not used by any of the
semantic theories that will be exploring, however.
2.3 Inference and Entailment
The term inference involves arriving at or deducing other facts based on
some already established information. Basically, given truths may lead to
other truths, if they are logically entailed, and inference is then the act
of finding such truths. In other words, Jurafsky and Martin [16, p. 585]
define inference as the "ability to draw valid conclusions based on the
meaning representation of inputs and [the system’s] store of background
knowledge."
Furthermore, entailment, or logical consequence, is the term used
to denote a relationship between structures of meaning, which can be
anything from sentences to logical formulas. Such relations say that
statements may lead to, or follow, other statements, because they share the
same truths [2]. So, if entailment means that there exists paths from one
set of truths to other truths, then inference is the procedure used to travel
those paths. Note that the entailment relation between words, mentioned
in section 2.1.1, is just a specific kind of the overall concept of entailment.
Sentences that make use of verbs in accordance with both obligatory
and non-obligatory arguments, may entail, or lead to, other sentences
which use the same verb or a different verb altogether. Verbal inference
then involves deducing the bridge between such related sentences. Fur-
thermore, semantic entailment is the name of the actual entailment relation
that happens between the meanings of different sentences, or utterances
[3, p. 18-23]. To give another definition, semantic entailment is said to be
"the problem of determining if the meaning of a given sentence entails that
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of another" [27, p. 1]. To give some introductory examples, consider the
sentences in (10), (11) and (12).
(10) a. Jack threw a ball.
b. Jack threw something.
(11) a. Mary ate a sandwich.
b. Mary ate.
(12) a. Brutus killed Caesar.
b. Caesar died.
From sentence (10a) we know that Jack threw a specific thing, namely
a ball, but in sentence (10b) we only know that he threw something, not
specifically what it was. The fact that Jack threw something is true in both
sentence (10a) and sentence (10b); if Jack threw a ball then it is also true that
Jack threw something. However, the fact that Jack threw a ball is only a fact
in sentence (10a), not in sentence (10b), as the latter might involve some
other object having being thrown. Because of this, we say that sentence
(10a) implies, or entails, sentence (10b), but not vice versa. However,
because this entailment example concerns the relationship between nouns,
not verbs or different verbal constructions, the issue will not be explored in
detail in this thesis. It’s mentioned here only because it serves as an notable
example of semantic entailment.
In a similar fashion to the sentences in (10), sentence (11a) entails
sentence (11b), even though one argument is missing in the latter (it is
intransitive, whereas sentence (11a) is transitive). The sentence in (11b),
on the other hand, does not entail sentence (11a), which is also similar to
the sentence relations in (10). In other words, if Mary ate a sandwich it is
true that Mary also ate, but if Mary only ate then it might not be true that
the eating involved a sandwich.
The sentence in 12a) entails sentence (12b), but not vice versa, because
if Caesar was killed then he also died, but if Caesar died then it might
not be the case that he was killed (he might have died from some other
cause). This is an example of inference happening between verbs that do
not share the same lemma (the opposite case was true for the examples in
(10) and (11)). As seen, the word entail is what will be used the most when
describing inference instances, where one eventuality leads to (or entails)
one or multiple eventualities.
Note that, in the above examples, the sentence pairs all describe events
that take place at the same time. In example (10), for instance, this was
an event of throwing, only it was referred to slightly differently in the
two given sentences. If we say that sentence (10a) entails sentence (10b),
then they are basically the same event, taking place at the same given time.
There might, however, also be sentences that entail events that happened
at some other time. An example of this can be seen in example (13),
where there are two separate events; an event of marrying and an event
of divorcing.
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(13) a. John married Carrie.
b. John divorced Carrie.
These are not happening at the same instant, but rather at two separate
points in time. The sentence in (13b) should entail sentence (13a) because
one cannot divorce someone unless you already married that someone. In
other words, the event in sentence (13b) can’t happen unless the event in
sentence (13a) also happened prior to it, so there is an entailment relation
between them. Some of the entailment examples that will be explored will
examine verbs that may refer to different kinds of events, though are still
related in meaning.
So, the problem that semanticists face is to establish a solid logical
framework that represents semantic meaning, which also captures all
kinds of verbal entailment phenomena. The next chapter will present
Jackendoff’s suggested system, while the following two chapters will each







Conceptual structure [...] is a part of thought. It is the locus for the
understanding of linguistic utterances in context, incorporating pragmatic
considerations and "world knowledge"; it is cognitive structure in terms of
which reasoning and planning take place."
— Ray Jackendoff, [13, p. 123]
Ray Jackendoff’s theory of conceptual semantics is a decompositional
theory of meaning, aiming to provide a linking between syntax and se-
mantics. It employs simple primitive components describing fundamental
semantic concepts, or mental representations, which users of a language
can understand when they are expressing them. The meaning of a word or
a sentence can, as the theory emphasizes, be represented as a conceptual
structure, ranging from being just a simple primitive to being a complex
conjunct involving the embedding of several semantic components. The
whole meaning of the structure then depends on the individual meaning
of each component.
When discussing Jackendoff, the focus will be on how his theory is
presented in Jackendoff [15], because it is the most all-encompassing,
presenting the clearest version of the theory, and the biggest number of
definitions of specific verbs available in a single work. However, some
of the additions in later revisions (such as Jackendoff [13]) will also be
presented.
The conceptual structures are used in order to describe inferences such
as the ones occurring with sentences (14), where if the case is true that
George killed a dragon, then that dragon ended up dying. This inference
can be paraphrased as the schema shown in sentence (14c), where X and Y
can be substituted for any entity [26, p. 278-279].
(14) a. George killed the dragon.
b. The dragon died.
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c. X killed Y entails Y died.
In other words, if X killed Y then it is certain (entailed) that Y died. This
particular pattern can also be applied to a multitude of other verb pairs,
such as lift and rise, give and receive and persuade and believe, shown in (15).
(15) a. X lifted Y entails Y rose.
b. X gave Z to Y entails Y received Z.
c. X persuaded Y that P entails Y came to believe P (where P is a
proposal).
There is an apparent similarity between these schemas, as they all
involve X doing something that leads to something happening to Y. In
order to capture this, Jackendoff proposes the more general schema shown
in (16).
(16) X causes E to occur entails E occurs (where E is an event).
In other words, there is, as can be seen by the symbol E, a common
semantic element or concept known as an event, which should be part
of a theory of semantic representation. Another semantic element that is
present in this schema is the term cause, and that component should also be
encoded into a semantic structural theory.
The two common elements event and cause are only examples of the
many primitive semantic components that lies underneath the meaning
of sentences, in the so-called deep structures [4]. Jackendoff’s conceptual
theory aims to provide a list of such universal elements, each categorized
as a specific type. Here, event was an example of what is referred to as a
universal category, or semantic concept, while cause is instead a semantic
function, taking semantic concepts as arguments and producing another
semantic concept. These different components, plus two others, will be
explained in more detail in section 3.2, but first, the actual formation of a
conceptual structure, i. e. the specific notation used by Jackendoff, will be
introduced.
The simplest conceptual structure is just a single semantic concept
representing some mental representation, let’s say a party. The standard
notation involves using enclosed square brackets to indicate a semantic
concept and labeling it with the specific semantic concept type, in this case
an event. The final structure is shown in (17). Notice that the semantic
concept type is in lower case letters, while the semantic function giving the
concept is in all uppercase letters.
(17) [event PARTY]
In other words, PARTY is a semantic function that takes no arguments
and returns an event, a semantic concept. So in this case, PARTY acts just
as the name of a specific type of event, without having any inner structure.
Rather than complex, it is instead an unanalyzed atomic component. A
semantic concept might also not even have an inner function, being just an
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empty structure, but with the concept label still showing. An example is
[thing ], which constitutes just an unspecified thing.
Next, let’s look at a slightly more complex example, involving the
multiple argument-taking function CAUSE. When semantic functions
take arguments, these are enclosed inside parentheses and separated by
commas. CAUSE takes two arguments; the causer, which can be a thing
or an event, and the effect, which must be an event. So, for example,
the conceptual structure for the (slightly constructed) sentence shown in
(18a) would have the structure shown in (18b) [15, p. 43]. Notice that the
arguments to CAUSE are also in themselves semantic concepts, so they are
also enclosed in square brackets.
(18) a. Kim caused a party to happen.
b. [event CAUSE ([thing KIM], [event PARTY])]
So, the whole meaning can be summarized as such: there is a causing
event which has an inner structure involving the causer Kim, which is a
thing, and the effect party, which is an event.
As we have seen, the semantic structures that Jackendoff employs
consist of semantic concepts (universal categories) and semantic functions,
where the latter maps between the former. The semantic functions might
also have certain semantic features applied, which are often specific for
each function. CAUSE, for example, might have a feature involving
success; whether the event successfully completes or not. Another
important notion is the nature of what semantic field is in effect, something
which constitutes the applied meaning of a structure, and might also
specify which types the semantic functions can take as arguments. In
the following sections, these four theoretic components, namely semantic
concepts, functions, fields and features, will be explained in more detail.
Also, section 3.8 will introduce an alternative form of the structures
provided by Jackendoff’s theory.
3.2 Semantic Concepts and Semantic Functions
In addition to the semantic concepts already mentioned, namely event
and thing, Jackendoff operates with a few others as well. Some of these
include states, paths, places, properties, manners and times, where events
and states are the most basic concept types [15, p. 43] [26, p. 279]. All
of them can be combined in various ways to yield a large number of
different conceptual structures. As such, a single complex structure might
contain a number of concepts which have a different type than the overall
structure. When it comes to which syntactic constituents can represent
which semantic concepts, it seems noun phrases can express almost any
of them, while prepositional phrases can express both places, paths and
properties. Furthermore, a whole sentence may express either an event or
a state.
As mentioned, the semantic functions map between semantic concepts.
Section 3.2.1 will go through the most important of them, which Jackendoff
13
categorizes into three groups. These are basic functions, aspectual
functions and causative functions.
Each function will have the pattern <FUNCTION> (argument-01,
argument-02, ... argument-N)→<Semantic Concept>, where N is the number
of arguments the function takes,<FUNCTION> is the name of the function
in question, and <Semantic Concept> is the name of the concept the
function maps to. If an argument can be of different types then those types
are shown together, divided by the / symbol. The functions are shown
with an explanation in the b. sections, and an example in the c. sections.
The examples first show the surface sentence, followed by the conceptual
structure (after the→ symbol).
3.2.1 Basic Functions
The following basic functions either map to states, events or paths, and
include BE, STAY, GO, EXT, ORIENT, MOVE, CONF, FROM and TO [15, p.
43].
(19) a. BE (thing, place)→ state
b. A thing is in a certain place.
c. John is at home. →
[event BE ([thing JOHN], [place AT ([thing HOME])])]
(20) a. STAY (thing, place)→ event
b. A thing stays in a certain place.
c. John remains at home. →
[event STAY ([thing JOHN], [place AT ([thing HOME])])]
Notice the use of the function AT in examples (19c) and (20c) which
maps to a place. The use of place functions such as this, plus property
functions, will be explained in section 3.2.4. The two functions above is
similar in the sense that the thing involved (the first argument to both) does
not undergo any change. Instead, it is just at a given place in pattern (19)
and stays (does not leave) this place in pattern (20). The only difference,
really, is that BE maps to a state, while STAY maps to an event.
(21) a. GO (thing, path)→ event
b. A thing goes on a locative path.
c. John went away. → [event GO ([thing JOHN], [path AWAY])]
(22) a. EXT (thing, path)→ state
b. This is similar to GO, but instead, different parts of the thing
occupy different parts of the path, all at once. A different way
of saying it is that the thing extends across the path.
c. The road goes across the river. →
[event EXT ([thing ROAD], [path ACROSS ([thing RIVER])])]
(23) a. ORIENT (thing, path)→ state
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b. A thing is oriented along a path, but it neither travels nor
occupies it.
c. The sign points across the river. →
[event ORIENT ([thing SIGN], [path ACROSS ([thing RIVER])])]
The functions in (21), (22) and (23) above all involve a thing and its
relation to some path. The difference between them is that GO constitutes
an event where the thing actively moves along the path, while EXT and
ORIENT are instead states saying something about the thing’s position
according to the path.
(24) a. MOVE (thing)→ event
b. A simple function expressing the event of a thing moving.
c. Debbie danced. → [event MOVE ([thing DEBBIE])]
(25) a. CONF (thing)→ state
b. Similar to MOVE, this function instead expresses a state where
the thing is in a certain position.
c. Sally sat still. → [event CONF ([thing SALLY])]
The functions MOVE and CONF [15, p. 89-91] are similar to each other
in that they involve a thing’s movement, or not, and without a known path.
As such, they are similar to the functions GO and BE, respectively, except
that the second argument, the path, is removed.
Patterns (26) and (27) below show examples of functions that map to
paths, rather than events or states. A multitude of other path functions are
also available, such as TOWARD, AWAY-FROM and VIA [15, p. 46-47].
(26) a. FROM (thing/place)→ path
b. This specifies a path starting from some thing or some place. It
effectively expresses the thematic role Source.
c. Max traveled from England. →
[event GO ([thing MAX], [path FROM ([place ENGLAND])])]
(27) a. TO (thing/place)→ path
b. This specifies a path that endswhen it’s at some thing or some
place. It expresses the thematic role Goal.
c. Max traveled to Spain. →
[event GO ([thing MAX], [path TO ([place SPAIN])])]
3.2.2 Aspectual Functions
Next we have the aspectual functions. These express two different aspects
one can have on a situation, namely inchoative and perfective aspects.
Jackendoff [15] only had one of these, namely INCH [15, p. 75], but later
revisions to the theory added to function PERF [13, p. 364], which is
actually sort of the opposite of INCH. Both are explained in patterns (28)
and (29).
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(28) a. INCH (state)→ event
b. Expressing the inchoative, this function takes a state end returns
an event, effectively giving the event of that state coming about.
c. John ended up at home. →
[event INCH ([state BE ([thing JOHN],
[place AT ([thing HOME])])])]
(29) a. PERF (event)→ state
b. The opposite of INCH, this function expresses the perfective,
taking an event and returning a state. It essentially gives the
state of the event being completed.
c. Mary has gone into the house. →
[event PERF ([event GO ([thing MARY],
[place IN ([thing HOUSE])])])]
3.2.3 Causative Functions
The causative functions all express events involving a cause and an effect.
Jackendoff [15] only used the standard CAUSE function, but later revisions
[13, p. 364] added the functions LET and HELP as well. All three are shown
below.
(30) a. CAUSE (thing/event, event)→ event
b. A thing or an event causes another event, which can be
called the effect. Note that Jackendoff [13, p. 364] has an
alternative version of this function with three arguments, with
the additional being another thing. This version should be used
if a Patient is known in the event (the new thing argument).
The same principle for this alternative version is also applied
to the LET function below. This chapter will return to the issue
of thematic roles in relation to conceptual structures in section
3.6.
c. The wind made it rain. →
[event CAUSE ([thing WIND], [event RAIN])]
(31) a. LET (thing/event, event)→ event
b. This function is very similar to CAUSE, but it involves verbs
such as allow and let, where the causer indirectly makes an effect
come about by allowing or letting it happen.
c. Mary allowed the party to happen. →
[event LET ([thing MARY], [event PARTY])]
(32) a. HELP (thing, thing, place)→ event
b. Also similar to CAUSE, this function relates to events where the
first argument helps, aids or assists in making the effect happen.
As such, the event may not finish. Notice that this function only
has a three argument version, as opposed to CAUSE and LET.
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c. Beth assisted Harry in washing the dishes. →
[event HELP ([thing BETH], [thing HARRY],
[event WASH ([thing DISHES])])]
3.2.4 Other Functions that Map to Semantic Concepts
Many different functions may map to the other semantic concepts men-
tioned. Place functions typically take a thing as an argument and expresses
some location according to this thing. Examples include IN, which ex-
presses the place inside some thing, AT, which expresses the location at the
thing, and AT-END-OF, which specifies the place at the end of the thing.
Property functions can be basically any adjective, and the functions typ-
ically take no arguments. Examples include GREEN, BIG and HEALTHY.
Time functions relate to time adjuncts, such as at noon and on Monday. These
functions also typically take no arguments, and other examples are TUES-
DAY and YESTERDAY.
3.2.5 Modifying Functions
For these kind of functions the main purpose is to convert from one
state or event into another state or event, making that initial concept a
conceptual restrictive modifier of the whole structure. Because of this
special behaviour the notation will exclude the name of the semantic
concept marker for these functions, since they are the same as the overall
structure. The functions are added into a conceptual structure, adding
further information, using the notation [<MODIFYING-FUNCTION>
[event/state]]. The most important modifying function is perhaps BY [15,
p. 96], explained in pattern (33).
(33) a. [BY [event/state]]
b. This expresses the means by which an event happens, where, for
instance, someone does an event by means of some other event.
c. John went into the room by going through the window. →
[event GO ([thing JOHN],
[path TO ([place IN ([thing ROOM])])])
[BY [event GO ([thing JOHN],
[path VIA ([thing WINDOW])])]]]
Other restrictive modifying functions include FROM, FOR, WITH and
EXCH [15, p. 98-99], which will be explained only briefly as their pattern is
very similar to the BY function shown in (33). The function FROM defines
the cause of some event usually expressed in syntax with words like because
and from. FOR can show the goal or purpose an event is supposed to reach,
for instance an event or state someone wishes to happen by doing some
initial event. Next, WITH may express the state of something during an
event. It is referred to by Jackendoff as "the subordinating function of
accompaniment." Finally, EXCH expresses exchange, where the value of
the main clause in a sentence corresponds to the value of a subordinating
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clause. Example sentences for the modifier functions mentioned are shown
in (34).
(34) a. FROM: John turned yellow from eating carrots.
b. FOR: Bill obtained the book (in order) to give it to Harry.
c. WITH: Bill entered the room with a smile.
d. EXCH: Bill gave Harold $5 for mowing the lawn.
3.3 Semantic Fields
Up until now, all the functions covered have been in the locative field,
meaning that they’ve all centered around the spacial movement or
configuration of some thing. But Jackendoff also proposes three additional
fields, namely the temporal, identificational and possessional fields [15, p. 26,
135] [26, p. 282]. Essentially, the fields are used to represent subcategories
of the semantic concepts. So, for instance, instead of just states we have
locative states, possessive states and so on. The temporal field involves
time, the identificational involves properties and the possessional involves
ownership.
The semantic fields may constrain (or decide) the type of the arguments
that the functions can take. For example, as seen, the locative BE function
must have as its second argument a physical place or location. The fields
are shown in the notation as subscripts to the semantic functions; LOC for
locative, IDENT for identificational, POSS for possessive and TEMP for
temporal. So, the simple BE and GO functions explained earlier should
actually have had the LOC subscript added, resulting in BELOC and GOLOC.
Examples (35) and (36) show structures using the three additional fields
for the functions BE and GO (for examples of the locative use, see patterns
(19) and (21).
(35) a. The party is on Saturday. →
[state BETEMP ([thing PARTY], [place AT ([time SATURDAY])])]
b. The theatre is full. →
[state BEIDENT ([thing THEATRE],
[place AT ([property FULL])])]
c. This book belongs to John. →
[state BEPOSS ([thing BOOK],
[place AT ([thing JOHN])])]
(36) a. The party has been moved to Saturday. →
[event GOTEMP ([thing PARTY],
[path TO ([place AT ([time SATURDAY])])])]
b. Mary went from being depressed to being happy. →
[event GOIDENT ([thing MARY],
[path FROM ([place AT
([property DEPRESSED])]),
TO ([place AT ([property HAPPY])])])]
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c. The prize went to Kate. →
[event GOPOSS ([thing PRIZE],
[path TO ([place AT ([thing KATE])])])]
Notice that the field subscript is only applied to the outer most function,
which implies that the field also counts for the inner structure. As such, the
inner functions (AT, for instance) could also have the subscript added, but
it is removed since the existence of it in the surrounding function makes
it all-encompassing. Notice also that the nature of the arguments differ
depending on which field is used. For instance, in example (35a) the place
function AT takes a time argument, but in example (35b) it takes a property
argument.
3.4 Semantic Features
This chapter has already mentioned that CAUSE may have additional
features attached to specify further meaning to the function. Such semantic
features are added to functions as superscripts. If there are more than
one feature, they will be separated by commas. Jackendoff proposes three
possible features to the CAUSE function, specifying whether the effect is
successful, using +, or not, using -, or if it is undetermined, using U [15, p.
132]. A feature is also proposed to capture whether the Agent (or causer)
moves along in the effect or not. If it does the feature entrain (with the
superscript E) is added, and if not the feature launch (using the superscript
L) is added [15, p. 138]. The examples in (37) show how the two features
can be used. Note that Jackendoff originally added entrain and launch as
subscripts to the function, but this author feels it is more appropriate to add
them as superscripts. This is also the case with most of the other semantic
features mentioned below.
(37) a. Bill dragged the car down the road. →
[event CAUSE+,E ([thing BILL],
[event GO ([thing CAR],
[path DOWN ([thing ROAD])])])]
b. Bill threw the ball into the field. →
[event CAUSE+,L ([thing BILL],
[event GO ([thing BALL],
[path FROM ([thing BILL])
TO ([place IN ([thing FIELD])])])])]
In example (37a), Bill successfully makes the car go down the road, and
he follows, or takes part, in the effect. Bill also successfully makes the ball
go into the field in example (37b), but he does not take part in the effect (he
does not end up in the field as well). Notice also the use of both FROM and
TO as path functions in (37b). This is an example of a conjunctive structure
of several functions that produces just one semantic concept.
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The distributive feature is used for place functions to distinguish
between a distributive meaning (with the +D superscript) and non-
distributive meaning (with the -D superscript) [15, p. 104]. Compare the
two phrases shown in (38a) and (38b). The former is non-distributive, while
the latter is distributive.
(38) a. On the floor. → [place ON−D ([thing FLOOR])]
b. All over the floor. → [place ON+D ([thing FLOOR])]
A contact feature can be applied to multiple semantic functions and
implies contact between things or places [15, p. 107-108]. If there is contact
the superscript +C is used, and -C is used to imply no contact. A subfeature
called attachment is also used [15, p. 112-113]. This says that things or places
are attached to each other, or not, using +A or -A, respectively. Since it is
a subfeature of contact, the existence of the attachment feature also implies
contact. Examples of structures using the contact and attachment features
are shown in (44), using the BELOC function.
(39) a. Harry is touching Bill on the nose. →
[state BE+CLOC ([thing HARRY],
[place AT ([thing BILL])])
[place ON ([thing NOSE])]]
b. The gum is stuck to the table. →
[state BE+ALOC ([thing GUM],
[place AT ([thing TABLE])])
Jackendoff [14] develops two additional features, namely boundedness
and internal structure. These are most relevant for nouns, represented by
the semantic concept thing, but might also be applied to verbs, represented
by states or events. Boundedness implies that a thing has clear boundaries,
while unboundedness implies the opposite. The symbol +B is used for the
former, while -B is used for the latter. Furthermore, an internal structure
(shown as +I or -I) says that if a thing is divided into smaller parts, then
those parts are also instances of that same thing [26, p. 283-286]. The two
semantic features result in four different types of things, shown in (40). The
word and structure shown in (40e) act as an example.
(40) a. +B and +I : Groups, such as a commitee and a government.
b. +B and -I : Individuals, such as a banana and the car.
c. -B and +I : Aggregates, such as bananas and cars.
d. -B and -I : Substances, such as water and oxygen.
e. Banana→ [thing BANANA+B,−I]
The two features also describe different types of events. The bounded
feature represents whether the event is telic or atelic (has a natural end
point or not), while the internal structure feature represents whether the
event is iterative or not. The list in (41) shows how this results in four
different types of events, plus a structure example [26, p. 123-125].
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(41) a. +B and +I : Telic, iterative event, such as The light flashed until
dawn.
b. +B and -I : Telic, non-iterative event, such as John ran to the shop.
c. -B and +I : Atelic, iterative event, such as The light was flashing.
d. -B and -I : Atelic, non-iterative, such as John ran.
e. The light flashed→ [event LIGHT-FLASHED+B,−I]
3.5 Combinatory Functions
The following functions are given semantic concepts, with specific se-
mantic features, as arguments and produce the same type of concepts, but
change the nature of the features. Often, they require the arguments to
have specific values for their semantic features. The functions are mostly
used for things, but might also be used for the other categories, especially
events. There are two kinds of combinatory functions, namely including
functions and extracting functions [26, p. 286-288].
3.5.1 Including Functions
These functions add the whole argument to the construction, effectively
"including" it in the structure. They are the functions PL, COMP and CONT,
shown below. Note that <SC> stands for any semantic concept, but for
these functions it is usually either a thing or an event. The value at the
right side of the → symbol constitutes the concept that is returned by the
function.
(42) a. PL (<SC>+B,−I)→ <SC>−B,+I
b. The plural form of the given semantic concept. It takes a
bounded argument without an internal structure and produces
an unbounded argument that has an internal structure.
c. Cars has the structure [thing PL−B,+I ([thing CAR+B,−I])]
(43) a. COMP (<SC>−B,−I)→ <SC>+B,−I
b. The concept produced is composed of the argument concept. This
argument must be unbounded and have no internal structure,
and the result is a concept that is bounded, but still without an
internal structure.
c. House of wood has the structure
[thing HOUSE COMP+B,−I ([thing WOOD−B,−I])]
(44) a. CONT (<SC>)→ <SC>
b. The concept produced contains the argument concept. There are
no requirements for semantic features and they are not changed.
c. Chicken curry has the structure
[thing CURRY CONT−B,−I ([thing CHICKEN−B,−I])]
21
3.5.2 Excluding Functions
These functions extract parts of the argument into the overall construction.
They include ELT, GR and PART, shown below.
(45) a. ELT (<SC>−B,+I)→ <SC>+B,−I
b. The concept produced is a specific element of the argument
concept. The function creates a bounded concept without an
internal structure from an unbounded concept with an internal
structure.
c. A grain of salt has the structure
[thing ELT+B,−I ([thing SALT−B,+I])]
(46) a. GR (<SC>−B,−I)→ <SC>+B,−I
b. This function is called the universal grinder. It is used for when
count nouns are used as mass nouns. Therefore, the argument
must be bounded, and the result is an unbounded concept.
c. Dog in the sentence There was dog all over the place has the
structure [thing GR−B,−I ([thing DOG+B,−I])]
(47) a. PART (<SC>)→ <SC>
b. This function takes an individual as argument and gives a part
of that individual, hence the semantic features remain the same.
c. The leg of the table has the structure
[thing LEG PART+B,−I ([thing TABLE+B,−I])]
3.6 Thematic Roles in Conceptual Structures
When talking about the participants (or roles) of a sentence, Jackendoff
uses both a thematic tier and an action tier that represent the thematic
and the action dimensions, respectively [15, p. 125-151]. The list of roles
are then divided under these two categories. The thematic tier includes
Agent, Theme, Goal, Source and Location, while the action tier includes Actor,
Experiencer, Patient, Beneficiary and Instrument.
The examples explored up until now have all had structures that
represent the thematic tier, but Jackendoff also includes functions that
represent the action tier. These are AFF, for affection, and REACT for
reaction. These functions act as supplements to the original structures and
shows the relationship between two things. As such, both take two things
as arguments.
The AFF and REACT functions have one semantic feature which
concerns volition. This can have a positive, negative or unknown value,
which is represented as the superscipts +, - and U (unknown), respectively.
The + superscipt says that the first argument affects or reacts to the second
argument intentionally, while - says the opposite.
The thematic roles are directly related to the arguments to the semantic
functions. The Theme is always the first argument to the GO, STAY, BE,
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ORIENT, EXT, MOVE and CONF functions. The Source and Goal, as we’ve
seen, relates to the path functions FROM and TO [15, p. 46-50]. The Agent
is the first argument to the CAUSE function, and the role Experiencer is any
argument to a state function that involves mental states [15, p. 262]. The
Instrument is typically an argument inside a BY function [15, p. 142]. Also,
the first argument to AFF is the Actor, while the second is the Patient if the
AFF function is not volitional, and the Beneficiary if it is [15, p. 128,133-
137]. These roles are reversed if the REACT function is used instead. Note
that Jackendoff believes that thematic roles should not be used directly in
semantic structures, but are rather "relational notions defined structurally
over conceptual structure" [15, p. 47].
3.7 Inference Rules
The main approach Jackendoff uses when it comes to verbal inference
phenomena involves the existence of structures inside other structures.
Essentially, a conceptual representation entails every structure that is
embedded inside it. Inferences involving causative and inchoative
sentences, an example of which can be seen in (48), are handled by this
principle.
(48) a. Brutus killed Caesar.
b. [event CAUSE+ ([thing BRUTUS],
[event INCH ([state BEIDENT ([thing CAESAR],
[place AT ([property DEAD])])])])]
c. Ceasar died.
d. [event INCH ([state BEIDENT ([thing CAESAR],
[place AT ([property DEAD])])])]
e. Ceasar is dead.
f. [state BEIDENT ([thing CAESAR],
[place AT ([property DEAD])])]
The structure for sentence (48c), seen in (48d), exists inside the structure
for sentence (48a), shown in (48b). Because of the use of the inchoative
event as an argument to the CAUSE function (it is the effect of the causative
event), structure (48b) entails structure (48d). Similarly, structure (48d)
entails structure (48f) because the state of Caesar being dead (the structure
of which is shown in (48f)) is embedded inside the inchoative event, being
used as an argument to the INCH function.
Conceptual structures employing conjuncted functions also entail the
structures where one or more of these functions are removed. This applies
to the structures seen in (49), for instance, where structure (49b) entails
structure (49d) because the latter is the same structure as the former, but
without the place-function.
(49) a. Jane danced at the club.
b. [event MOVE ([thing JANE]) [place AT ([thing CLUB])]]
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c. Jane danced.
d. [event MOVE ([thing JANE])]
In addition, more specified structures entail structures that leave one or
more arguments empty. For instance, the structure in (49d) would entail
a structure like [event MOVE ([thing ])], where the thing is unspecified. In
other words, an event where Jane moves also means that there is an event
where some thing moves.
So, in conclusion, semantic entailment in the theory of conceptual
structures is captured by the use of embedded structures, the existence (or
non-existence) of conjuncted functions, and the specificity of the semantic
concepts.
3.8 Flat Conceptual Structures
In order to compare Jackendoff’s conceptual structures to the two other
kinds of representation that will be presented in the following chapters,
there might be times when alternative forms for the structures will be
considered. Since Jackendoff’s theory focuses on embedded structures, this
alternative formation instead groups all the functions used side by side, in a
conjunctive manner. This results in structures that are much more similar to
the formulas used by the other theories, which are typically not embedded,
but conjunctive. So, when discussing various entailment examples, these
so called "flat" structures will sometimes be used, in order to better compare
the three different approaches.
The flat structures will basically consist of the same semantic functions
used in the regular embedded structures, but with some added functions
that constitute the nature of the arguments to the functions. Variables will
also be used for all semantic concepts that act as arguments, such as events
and things. The example in (50) serves as an illustration of how such flat
structures look like. The structure in (50b) shows the normal conceptual
structure for the sentence in (50a), while structure (50c) shows the flat
structure version. Notice that the latter consists of conjuncted functions
(separated by the symbol &) rather than being an embedded structure.
(50) a. Mike is at home.
b. Conceptual structure:
[state BELOC ([thing MIKE], [place AT ([thing HOME])])]
c. Flat conceptual structure:
[BELOC(s) & ARG1(s, t) & ARG2(s, p) & MIKE(t) & AT(p) &
ARG1(p, t2) & HOME(t2)]
The functions that are used include the BELOC, AT, MIKE and HOME
functions, which are also used in the normal conceptual structure. These
four functions all represent the nature of the various variables that operate
as their respective arguments. These variables therefore stand for all the
specific semantic concepts used in the structure, which include two things
(t and t2), a state s, and a place p. The semantic functions thereby say that
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the t variable is an instance of a MIKE, t2 is an instance of a HOME, p in an
instance of an AT place, and s is an instance of a locative BE state.
In addition, the flat structures make use of argument functions that
represent which variables certain other functions take. These are labeled
ARGNn, where n can be any number that represents the argument place
for the original function used in the normal conceptual structure. The first
argument to the ARG functions refers to the semantic concept that takes the
given argument, and the second argument is the the argument itself.
So, for instance, ARG1(s, t) in the example says that the first argument
to the BELOC function (which represents the state s) is the variable t. Notice
that a BELOC function takes two arguments, so in the flat structure the
functions ARG1 and ARG2 are used to specify these. Similarly, the HOME
function takes no arguments, so no argument function that uses t2 as its
first argument is present.
As a final comment on these flat structures, it should be understood
that all the variables used are introduced via existential quantifiers, which
indicate that they are available and present in the whole structure. Still, a
choice has been made not include the quantifiers, simply to make them
a bit more readable. Although the semantic representation that will be
introduced in chapter 5 also does not directly include such universal
quantifiers, the theory in chapter 4 will, on the other hand.
Note also that because of the conjunctive nature of the flat structures,
there might exist problems with the scope of certain functions, in accord-
ance with the quantified variables. So, the flat structures are only meant
as an additional illustration that can serve to make the capturing of entail-







"[S]imple sentences of English contain subatomic quantification over events
[and states]. [...] I call it an "underlying" quantification."
— Terence Parsons, [25]: IX
Terence Parsons theory of subatomic semantics is based on the idea of
underlying events and states. Essentially, behind every sentence there is
a hidden event or state and the sentence in question is simply the surface
realization of that kind of situation. The theory involves using formulas
built up by the conjunctions of predicates, functions and atomic semantic
terms, used in a framework of standard first order logic. According to
Parsons, verbs are defined as "kinds of actions or states" [25, p. 4], and
the existence of either of the two are examples of those kinds taking
place. Variables signifying either events or states are used as arguments
to semantic predicates and are thereby specifically defined. The version
of Parsons’ theory that this thesis will be focusing on is Parsons [25]. The
theory itself is based largely on the work of Donald Davidson, for instance
Davidson [5].
Because of the theory’s implementation of first order logic, typical for-
mulas expressing situations involve the use of quantifiers which introduce
variables for situations. The symbol e is used for some event, and the sym-
bol s for some state. The various participants of the situation are then iden-
tified. These may conform to the syntactic (or surface) structure of the situ-
ation, where participants are labeled as either the subject or as an object, or
to the semantic structure, where instead the proper thematic roles are used
as labels. The example in (51b) shows a very simple structure for the event
sentence in (51a), while structure (51d) represents the state sentence shown
in (51c), both utilizing the latter semantic approach. A syntactic approach
would involve using the predicates Subject and Object instead of Agent and
Theme.
(51) a. Brutus killed Caesar.
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b. (∃e) [Killing(e) & Agent(e, Brutus) & Theme(e, Caesar) & Cul(e,
before now)]
c. Caesar was happy.
d. (∃s) [Being-Happy(s) & Theme(s, Caesar) & Hold(s, before
now)]
Notice the use of the e and s symbols, which are first introduced by
the use of the existential quantifier. They are then used as arguments to the
predicates inside the actual formulas, which are inside square brackets. The
formulas themselves are flat conjuncts consisting of a number of semantic
predicates, a departure from the embedded structures used by Jackendoff
in chapter 3. The Killing predicate says that the situation in question is an
event of killing, where an Agent and a Theme is known to be participating.
The Being-Happy predicate, on the other hand, represents the fact that the
given state is a state of being happy.
The thematic role predicates all take two arguments (similar to most of
the other predicates that will be looked at later), where the first argument
constitutes the given event or state, and the second argument is typically a
constant atomic symbol. This symbol is most often the same as the syntactic
form that the participant uses in the surface structure (in this case Brutus
and Caesar). The use of thematic roles will be explained in more detail in
section 4.2.
The Cul and Hold predicates are used to represent tense, or when the
situations happens. In this case, both occurred before the present time.
This kind of representation will become a little more complex later on,
as Parsons instead opts for using time variables, similar to the use of the
e symbol, which are then related to time constants (such as now). The
difference between Cul and Hold will be exaplined later, as well, in section
4.4. So, the before now value used here is only a temporary method of
referring to the past.
To summarize the structures in (51), the Killing predicate represents the
type of verb used to identify the event, the Being-Happy represents the type
of adjective used to make the state, the Agent and Theme predicates the
thematic roles (participants) and the Cul and Hold predicates the tense of
the sentences. This kind of representation is more detailed compared to
a strictly logical representation, in which the structures might simply be
Kill(b, c) and Happy(c), where b stands for Brutus and c stands for Caesar.
The patterns in (52) show how predicates can be used to describe the
specific type a situation has. For predicates of events, the pattern in (52a) is
used. This implies that the noun form of the given verb, created by adding
-ing, is typically the preferred form of the predicate. States, on the other
hand, uses the pattern shown in (53), where the adjective is the one used in
the surface sentence.
(52) a. <Verb>-ing(e) - Example: Killing(e)
b. Being-<adjective>(s) - Example: Being-Happy(s)
Various other predicates and functions may be applied to capture
sentence meaning. The following sections will go into more detail
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regarding the capturing of participants (section 4.2), modifiers (section 4.3)
and the representation of tense (section 4.4). Section 4.5 will focus on the
issue of causative and inchoative sentences, while section 4.6 will look
into the way the progressive and perfect aspects are represented. Finally,
section 4.7 will explain the way the theory captures and maintains various
inference phenomena.
4.2 Thematic Roles
When specifying the participants of situations, the pattern <Thematic-
Role>(e/s, X) is used, where X can be any term that represents a particular
participant. Parsons uses the thematic roles Agent, Theme, Source, Goal,
Benefactive, Instrument, Performer and Experiencer for events, and Performer,
Experiencer and Theme, and possibly also Instrument, for states [25, pp. 73-
74].
The role of Performer might need some explanation. Parsons uses this
alternative to the role of Instrument for sentences where a participant,
which might appear to be the Instrument, really shouldn’t be labeled as
such. Consider the sentence The knife cut Paul’s leg, for instance. Here, it
is logical to assume that the knife is an Instrument, which is always used
or controlled by some Agent. But it might not be the case that someone
actually used the knife intentionally; Paul might have just stepped on the
knife and cut himself. Therefore, the role of Performer is more preferable
in this case, as it implies a participant which performs an action, but which
has no immediate agency and is not controlled by anything.
Parsons also proposes the use of combined thematic roles, specifically
the roles Agent-Theme, Performer-Theme and Experiencer-Theme. These three
are all alternatives to the Theme role, but which also have the additional
qualities of Agent, Performer or Experiencer. In addition, the role of Agent-
Performer constitutes a participant which is both an Agent and a Performer
[25, pp. 81-82]. If either of these combined roles appear in a situation, none
of the roles that make up the combination can also appear. For instance, if
there is an Agent-Theme present then no other participant can be an Agent
or a Theme, as the combined role occupies both of these role slots. This
essentially follows the view that a situation only allows one instance of
each of the thematic roles.
As a final illustration, the table below shows the entire list of roles, with
examples and explanations as to when they typically appear. The examples
have their respective roles labeled with a subscript, which is the first letter
of the given role.
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Thematic Role: Example and typical appearance:
Agent BrutusA killed Caesar.
Subject in causative sentences.
Theme (Patient) Brutus killed CaesarT.
Object in causative sentences;
Subject in copular sentences.
Source He travelled from NorwayS.
Indirect object; Argument in from- phrases.
Goal He travelled to FranceG.
Indirect object; Argument in to- phrases.
Benefactive He gave herB a gift.
Indirect object; Argument in for- phrases.
Experiencer She found the book.
Subject.
Instrument She wrote the letter with a penI .
Argument in with- phrases; Subject.
Performer The windP opened the door.
Subject; Non-agentive arguments in by-phrases.
Agent-Theme MaryAT runs.
Both Agent and Theme.
Performer-Theme The statuePT stood in the corner.
Both Performer and Theme.
Experiencer-Theme SheET hungers for his love.
Both Experiencer and Theme.
Agent-Performer The ballAP followed another one down the street.
Both Agent and Performer.
4.3 Modifier Predicates
A formula may have a multitude of different modifier predicates, which are
used to capture the meaning formed when adjuncts are used [25, pp. 40-
41]. Traditionally there are three types of adverb-like modifiers that can be
used in syntax. These are single-word adverbs, such as probably and gently,
prepositional phrases, such as in the garden, after six o’ clock and with a knife,
and subordinate clauses, which has a subordinating conjunction followed
by a clause. The first two can be mapped into an underlying event formula
by the use of modifier predicates, while the third one involves using two or
more event variables which are joined together in some way.
For a single-word adverb, a one-argument taking predicate suffices,
where the pattern is the one shown in (53a). The pattern seen in (53b),
on the other hand, shows what the second kind of modifier looks like,
which maps prepositional phrases. The only difference is the fact that
the predicate takes an additional argument (here X), which is the same
argument that is present in the given prepositional phrase.
(53) a. <Mod>(e/s) - Example: Slow(e) for a situation that is done
slowly.
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b. <Mod>(e/s, X) - Example: In(e, Garden) for the phrase in the
garden.
Adjectives modifying nouns, such as red in a red house, can be logically
understood as the conjunction of semantic predicates. Say, for instance,
that X is a red house, then you could also say that X is a house & X is red.
However, this approach does not work with phrases such as X is a clever
teacher, where it may not be the case that X is also generally clever (or a
clever human being).
Being clever is therefore understood, according to Parsons, as being
clever for an F, where F depends on the context, which would be teacher in
this case. The phrase X is a clever N then means that X is an N & X is clever
for an F. Most often, F is the same as N, but not always. This can be applied
to all adjectives. The sentence He is a tall basketball player, for example, can
be understood as He is a basketball player & he is tall for an F, where F might
just be a basketball player, or a basketball player in grade school or something
else [25, pp. 43-44].
Though this is an important matter, Parsons has decided to leave it in
the background, relying on the use of the simple patterns seen in (53) for
all kinds of verbal modifications. As such, whenever a state is involved
in a modifier predicate, the notion of an F should be understood as an
additional argument, even though it will not be shown directly in any
formula.
The pattern in (54) shows a final illustration of how modifiers are added
to formulas for situations. Note that α can be either an event or a state,
<AdvMod> can be any single-word adverb modifier, and <PrepMod> can
be any preposition introducing a prepositional phrase. Note that there
are also additional predicates which can take more than two arguments,
such as Between, which places the situation between two given entities.
However, the one- and two-argument taking predicates are the most
common.
(54) (∃α) [<AdvMod>(α) & <PrepMod>(α, X) & ...]
Parsons divides all adverbials into six different semantic categories
(regardless of how many arguments they take), depending on what field of
meaning they occupy. The categories include locative (In, Under etc.), motion
(Through, Between etc.), direction (Away, Down etc.), orientation (Crosswise,
Vertical etc.), and manner (Gently, Slowly etc.) adverbial predicates, plus
some other miscellaneous kinds (like In, as in in the back, for instance) [25,
pp. 269-270].
Note that many different adverbials appear in several categories. For
example, the predicate Here is either a locative, motion or direction
predicate, depending on the context. Note also that Parsons uses the
predicate With to refer to Instruments, labeling it as its own instrumental
category. In this thesis, on the other hand, the predicate Instrument will be
used instead to indicate the presence of an Instrument.
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4.4 Representing Time
When capturing the important meaning of tense, Parsons uses both
variables for points in time and intervals of time [25, pp. 167-170]. Both of
these are introduced in the same way as the event and state variables are,
using the existential quantifier. All situation types are related to some time
interval, typically labeled with the symbol I, which can have happened in
the past, the present or the future. To capture this distinction, a constant
symbol called now is used to represent the present time and the functions
<, > or = are used to relate the interval of time to the present time.
The point or points in time, which are typically labeled with the symbol
t, are usually said to be inside the interval of time, using the "element of"
relation ∈. This essentially says that the point in time is a member of the
entire set of time points which make up the interval of time. The interval of
time might also be constrained within certain time periods. For example,
if the time adverbial at noon is used, the fact that the interval of time is a
subset of the entire set of noons must be encoded. This is done by using the
subset symbol ⊆.
As an example of this approach to time, consider the sentence in (55a),
which has the formula shown in (55b). As can be seen by the function I
< now, the sentence is in the past tense. It also happened Yesterday at noon
which is captured by the two time interval constraints [25, pp. 208-222].
(55) a. Yesterday at noon, Nick ran.
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & I ⊆ Noons & I ⊆ Yesterday &
Agent-Theme(e, Nick) & Cul(e, t)]
Note that there is a difference between time interval modifiers (like I ⊆
Noons) and temporal modifiers of events (like At(a, Noon)). Basically, these
two uses represent two different meanings that can appear when a time
adverbial is used; one modifying the interval the event happens and the
other modifying the event itself.
The Cul predicate says that the event in question culminates at the given
time point, i. e. it finishes. The Hold predicate, on the other hand, represents
the fact that an event or state holds or is valid for a certain time [25,
pp. 23,25,171]. These two predicates are used to capture various situation
types, for which Parsons adopts the traditional four category approach
used by Zeno Vendler [29]. These are accomplishments, which last for a
certain amount of time and then finish (culminate), achievements, which
culminate instantaneously, states, which only hold for a given time, but do
not culminate, and finally processes, which also do not culminate but only
hold. The list in (56) shows the four types, together with the predicates
used, and some examples.
(56) a. Accomplishment: Hold and Cul. Example: Mary climbed the
mountain.
b. Achievement: Cul. Example: Mary reached the top of the mountain.
c. State: Hold. Example: John is hungry.
32
d. Process: Hold. Example: John runs.
Cul and Hold also have versions which take only one argument,
signifying simply that an event or state does culminate, or holds. Further, a
situation might be said to be within a specific frame which sets the context
in which the whole sentence should be understood. These frame adverbials
should then be put outside the whole formula, resulting in a structure that
looks something like this: Frame [(∃e)...]. An example is the phrase During
the war, which frames a situation within the context of some war. At noon
can also be used as a frame adverbial, so this is an example of a phrase that
can act as all the different types of time adverbials mentioned [25, pp. 211-
212].
As a final illustration of the way tense is captured in Parsons formulas,
consider the pattern shown in (57). The symbol α can be either an event or
a state. The <TemporalModifier> field can be any predicate that represents
a temporal adverbial modifying the event. Note that the text inside the
{} brackets constitute the possible values that can appear in the given
position, separated by commas. The Time-Constraint field stands for any
possible constraints on the interval of time, such as I ⊆ Noons [25, p. 209].
(57) Frame [(∃α)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I {<, >, =} now & Time-Constraint(I) &
{Cul, Hold}(α, t) & <TemporalModifier>(α) & ... ]]
4.5 Causatives and Inchoatives
Causative sentences have a general pattern where Some event happens that
causes some other event to happen [25, pp. 105-107]. To capture this relation
between events, Parsons uses a predicate called CAUSE, which takes two
arguments. These arguments are the two events being related to each
other. The CAUSE predicate greatly resembles Jackendoff’s function for
representing causatives, which, as we’ve seen, is also called CAUSE. The
formula in (58b) shows how Parsons represents the sentence seen in (58a)
[25, pp. 108-109].
(58) a. Mary flew the kite.
b. (∃e1)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e1, t) & Agent(e1, Mary) &
(∃e2)(∃t2) [t2 ∈ I & Cul(e2, t2) & Flying(e2) & Theme(e2, Kite) &
CAUSE(e1, e2)]]
Notice the use of two distinct event variables, both labeled using
a number subscript. The second event is introduced via an existential
quantifier within the scope of another quantifier, which introduces the first
event. The formula can be understood as there being an event, where Mary
is the Agent, which causes another event, where the kite is the Theme. Both
events take place within the same time interval, but at different points in
time. CAUSE(e1, e2) represents the fact that the first event causes the second
event.
Inchoative sentences involve, as we have seen with Jackendoff’s INCH
function, an event that brings about the existence of some state. As such,
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Parsons uses something called BECOME# which is, as opposed to CAUSE,
a function (or a predicate operator) rather than a predicate. This function
effectively maps predicates of states to predicates of events. Consider
example (59) as an illustration, where an inchoative sentence is given a
suitable formula.
(59) a. The door closed.
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Theme(e, Door) &
BECOME#(Closed)(e)]
In order to represent the fact that the formula leads to the existence
of a new state, Parsons uses something called meaning postulates [25,
p. 52]. These are essentially rules that state that some things are true if
certain elements are present within a given formula. Parsons proposes
the meaning postulate shown in (60) [25, p. 125], which says that if an
event formula contains a BECOME#(Closed)(e) function, a Theme X and it
culminates, then there exists a state of being closed, which holds and also
has that same X as its Theme. In other words, it captures the fact that if a
door closed then there was (or is) a state of that door being closed, and there
was a state of the door not being closed right before the event happened.
(60) BECOME#(Closed)(e) & Cul(e) & Theme(e, X)→
(∃s) [Being-Closed(s) & Hold(s) & Theme(s, X) &
¬PREVIOUSLY(Hold(s))]
The predicate ¬PREVIOUSLY says that the fact that s holds was not
true prior to the given time, since a closing event of a door cannot happen
unless the door was not closed prior to the event happening. To put it more
bluntly, the ¬PREVIOUSLY(Hold(s)) predicate involves the specifics shown
in (61) below [25, p. 119]. Note that the point in time, t, is included in this
formula.
(61) ¬PREVIOUSLY(Hold(s, t))→ ¬(∃t2) [t2 < t & Hold(s, t2)]
In other words, if a state did not hold prior to the time in question
(t), then there does not exist a point in time (t2) before t where the state
holds. Removing the ¬ symbol would obviously mean the opposite; that
there was a point in time before in which the state held. Assuming all
inchoative instances have meaning postulates similar to this one, the use
of BECOME# will always entail the existence of some new state, given the
right circumstances.
Any predicate modifying the event that acts as the argument to the
BECOME# function can be added. This has the effect of altering the nature
of the state that is produced. For example, if the word partway is added to
the sentence in (59a) the state that comes about is not just a state of being-
closed, but a state of being-partway-closed [25, p. 122].
Situations which are both causatives and inchoatives, such as the
sentence in (62a) involves the use of both the CAUSE predicate and the
BECOME# function. The formula for the sentence in (62a) is shown in (62b).
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It essentially consists of the structure in (59b), but it is embedded inside a
causative event formula, where Mary is the Agent.
(62) a. Mary closed the door.
b. (∃e1)(∃t1)(∃I) [t1 ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e1, t1) & Agent(e1, Mary)
& (∃e2)(∃t2) [t2 ∈ I & BECOME#(Closed)(e2) & Cul(e2, t2) &
Theme(e2, Door)]]
4.6 Progressive and Perfect Aspects
In this section, Parsons’ approach to the perfect and the progressive aspects
will be explained. Any situation that culminates results in a resultant
state. This state is different from the state that comes from inchoative
sentences, which are also called "target" states. This is because resultant
states are always permanent, while target states may only be temporary.
For example, the resultant state of a sentence like Paul threw the ball on the
roof is the state of the ball having been thrown on the roof, while the target
state is the state of the ball being on the roof. The perfect aspect thereby
involves this sort of resultant state, meaning that such a state comes into
being whenever a perfect sentence is used.
Similarly, progressive sentences involve an in-progress state, i. e. a state
of an event’s action taking place. If the sentence is in the present tense this
in-progress state holds at the current time. Past progressives, on the other
hand, would have held at some time prior to now. This principle of tense
also applies if the perfect form is used [25, pp. 233-236].
When representing the resultant state (R-state) and the in-progress state
(IP-state), Parsons uses two different functions that map from each event
or state into the given R-state or IP-state [25, pp. 259-260]. He calls these
functions simply r and p, but this thesis will use the more illustrative
symbols PERF and PROG instead. Both of these may be combined to
form perfect progressive sentences as well. The sentences and formulas in
(63) are some examples, where formula (63b) represents the present perfect
sentence in (63a), formula (63d) represents the present progressive sentence
in (63c), and formula (63f) represents the present perfect progressive
sentence in (63e) [25, pp. 234-236].
(63) a. Mary has run.
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I = now & Hold(PERF(e), t) &
Running(e) & Agent-Theme(e, Mary)]
c. Mary is running.
d. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I = now & Hold(PROG(e), t) &
Running(e) & Agent-Theme(e, Mary)]
e. Mary has been running.
f. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I = now & Hold(PERF(PROG(e)), t) &
Running(e) & Agent-Theme(e, Mary)]
Notice the use of embedded functions inside the Hold predicates.
Essentially, this produces states that hold at some time (as in Hold(s, t),
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where s is the event’s resultant or in-progress state). So, instead of using
Cul to say that the events culminate, we extract the events’ R- or IP-states
(using the PERF and PROG functions) and use Hold to say that they hold
at the time of t. The Theme of the event (Agent-Theme in this case) is also
always the same as the Theme of the event’s R- or IP-state. For the slightly
complex structure in (63f), the state in question is "the R-state of the IP-state
of e [which] holds now" [25, p. 236].
So, different kinds of aspects are captured by the use of the mentioned
functions. For simple active or passive sentences, none or them are used,
and the Cul or Hold predicates simply take the given event or state, plus
the time variable, as arguments. Perfect sentences uses the PERF function
inside the Hold predicate. Progressive sentences uses the PROG function in
the same way, and perfect progressive sentences uses a combination of the
two. Cul is never used if the sentence is perfect or progressive.
4.7 Inference Rules
Now that we have an understanding of the way Parsons structures his
semantic formulas, this section will look at the way verbal inference is
handled. The theory first of all follows the standard first order logic
approach to inference, whereby various kinds of rules proclaim that some
truths lead to other truths. For example, there’s the inference involving
conjunctions (which typical formulas in Parsons’ theory consist of) where
each predicate that is present inside a conjunctive formula is also true on
their own. This leads to the idea that a formula entails all other formulas
which are either the same, or consist of predicates which are all also
present in that initial formula. As an example of how this principle solves
entailments involved with modifiers, consider the examples in (64) which
show two sentences, each with their respective formulas below it.
(64) a. Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife.
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e,t) & Stabbing(e) &
Agent(e, Brutus) & Theme(e, Caesar) & Instrument(e, Knife)]
c. Brutus stabbed Caesar.
d. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e,t) & Stabbing(e) &
Agent(e, Brutus) & Theme(e, Caesar)]
The only difference between the sentence in (64a) and the one in (64c)
is the presence of the phrase with a knife. In both cases it is true that
Brutus stabbed Caesar, but in sentence (64a) we are given the additional
information that Brutus used a knife in the event. As such, sentence (64a)
entails sentence (64c), but not vice versa. This is captured in the formulas
by the inclusion (or exclusion) of the Instrument predicate [25, pp. 13-14].
The formula in (64d) has the exact same structure as the one in (64b), minus
the Instrument predicate, so formula (64b) correctly entails formula (64d).
In addition to the standard logic approach, Parsons also makes use
of several meaning postulates, which was explained in section 4.5. In
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that same section, the way entailments involved with causatives and
inchoatives are handled was also mentioned. Essentially, the formulas
shown in (59b) and (62b) solve the entailments shown in (65), which is a
typical example of this inference phenomenon. The→ symbol indicates the
entailment relation, so each sentence leads to the one that is right beneath
it.
(65) a. Mary closed the door→
b. The door closed→
c. The door is closed.
Formula (62b), which represents the sentence in (65a), entails formula
(59b), which represents the sentence in (65b), because it includes an
embedded event structure (using e2) which is exactly the same as the
formula in (59b). The entailment between sentences (65b) and (65c) is
captured by the use of the meaning postulate seen in (60), which creates
a state of the door being closed.
Parsons also argues that his theory captures various other kinds of
entailment phenomena, examples of which are shown in (66) [25, pp. 15-
19]. The example in (66a) shows an entailment phenomenon involved
with perception statements, where it is certain that Mary saw the stabbing
in the first sentence, but not necessarily in the second. The sentences in
(66b) show an example of the explicit versus implicit mentioning of events,
where the second sentence can also be implicitly thought of as a flight,
where this is explicitly mentioned in the first sentence. Finally, sentences
(66c) show the use of two different subjects; the first with an event, where
the Agent is Mary, and the other where the subject is a person, which is the
same Agent as in the event.
(66) a. Mary saw Brutus stab Caesar vs. Mary saw the stabbing of Caesar by
Brutus.
b. A flight over the Pole by a Norwegian vs. A Norwegian flew over the
Pole.
c. Mary’s singing broke the vase vs. Mary broke the vase.
So, in example (66a) the first sentence should entail the second, but not
vice versa, the sentences in (66b) should entail one another because they are
both events of flying, involving a Norwegian and the Pole as the location,
and in example (66c) the fact that Mary’s singing broke the vase should
entail the fact that Mary herself broke it.
This section will not go into detail as to how these phenomena are
handled in Parsons’ framework, as it is basically done using the same tools
mentioned up until now. In conclusion, Parsons uses standard logical rules





VerbNet: A Lexical Database
5.1 Overview
"VerbNet is the largest on-line verb lexicon currently available for English. It
is a hierarchical domain-independent, broad-coverage verb lexicon with
mappings to other lexical resources..."
— VerbNet Webpage, [23]
This chapter will introduce VerbNet, an important lexical database
which aims to capture and store knowledge of lexical semantics. It’s main
goal is to successfully represent the many meanings, or senses, that verbs
can have, and how they behave. VerbNet also tries to organize and relate
them all in a formal manner [23] [24] [28].
VerbNet categorizes verbs under an assortment of specialized verb
classes. These classes originated with the work of Beth Levin [17], who
devised them using different methods for differentiating verbs, for instance
the nature and number of the arguments they take. In addition, VerbNet
adds several new classes, as well as subclasses, to Levin’s initial ones,
resulting in a rich hierarchy of classes of varying specificity.
As of the newest edition, VerbNet has 274 first-level classes, covering
over 5200 different verb senses. It is valuable to understand the way
in which Levin brought about the initial classes, a topic that will be
investigated first (in section 5.2), before introducing the actual structure
and use of VerbNet in section 5.3. Finally, section 5.4 will explore three
other notable lexical databases which, similar to VerbNet, aim to represent
lexical semantics.
5.2 Verb Alternations and Verb Classes
Levin’s verb classes are defined based on an array of different verb altern-
ations (also called diathesis alternations), which are essentially different
ways that verbs can behave in syntax [17, p. 1-5]. Levin emphasizes how
effectively natural speakers of a language can understand and recognize
the behaviour of verb arguments in the given language. They know, for in-
stance, that the verb break can be both transitive and intransitive, having a
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causative meaning in the former, where the cause of the intransitive mean-
ing is explained, and an inchoative meaning in the latter, where the cause
is unknown. A verb like appear, on the other hand, can not be used in the
causative structure, though the inchoative is still possible. The sentences in
the table below illustrate this. Note that the * symbol means that the given
sentence is ungrammatical.
Intransitive (inchoative): Transitive (causative)
1. The window broke. The boy broke the window.
2. The rabbit appeared. *The magician appeared the rabbit.
Levin divides the various verb alternations into a few main categories.
Some of these categories include alternations involved with the transitiv-
ity of verbs [17, p. 25], the arguments within the verb phrase [17, p. 45],
"oblique" subject alternations, where a given subject may be replaced by
another noun phrase but still be part of the whole meaning (it is hidden
under the surface) [17, p. 79], alternations involved with reflexives (such
as himself ) [17, p. 84], and alternations involved with passive versus active
constructions [17, p. 85].
Analyzing the ways verbs are different, and similar, in a range of
possible alternations yields different patterns. Members that share patterns
have been shown to share similar meanings as well, which categorize them
in the same classes. To illustrate the idea, the four words break, cut, hit
and touch are useful. All of them can be transitive; they can all take
two arguments, a subject and an object, but they don’t have much else
in common. They differ in their participation in a variety of diathesis
alternations [17, p. 5-11].
Levin considers three such alternations for this example, namely middle
alternation, conative alternation and body-part possessor ascension alternation.
Middle alternation involves making the direct object the subject, removing
the original subject, and applying the verb. In addition, an adverb, such
as easily, is added at the end of the sentence. Conative alternation happens
when at is added just before the direct object. Finally, body-part possessor
ascension is when possessor objects, like Bill’s arm, have on the added in, as
in touch Bill on the arm. The following tables illustrate which alternations
are possible for the four verbs. Note that the → symbol does not mean
entailment here, but rather the transformation from one alternation to an-
other.
Normal use: Middle alternation:
1. Mary cut the bread. 1. The bread cuts easily.
2. Janet broke the vase. 2. Crystal vases break easily.
3. Terry touched the cat. 3. *Cats touch easily.
4. Carla hit the door. 4. *Door frames hit easily.
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Conative alternation:
1. Margaret cut at the bread.
2. *Janet broke at the vase.
3. *Terry touched at the cat.
4. Carla hit at the door.
Body-part possessor ascension alternation:
1. Margaret cut Bill’s arm. →Margaret cut Bill on the arm.
2. Janet broke Bill’s finger. → *Janet broke Bill on the finger.
3. Terry touched Bill’s shoulder. → Terry touched Bill on the shoulder.
4. Carla hit Bill’s back. → Carla hit Bill on the back.
In other words, only cut and break can be used in the middle alternation,
only cut and hit can be used in the conative alternation, and all except break
can be used in the body-part possessor ascension alternation. This results
in the following table, which reveal four different patterns.
Alternation: touch hit cut break
Middle: No No Yes Yes
Conative: No Yes Yes No
Body-part poss.: Yes Yes Yes No
These four patterns, one for each of the verbs, give rise to four different
classes, and verbs with similar meanings often share the same pattern.
For example, the verbs crack, rip and shatter are all related to break, and,
interestingly, they all share the same pattern. The same goes for a number
of verbs semantically related to the three other verbs in the study, as
well. So, verbs fall into the same classes based on shared components of
meaning.
The classes in VerbNet are based on this methodology. For instance, the
cut pattern has resulted in a class for verbs involving cutting [17, p. 156],
while the break pattern has resulted in a class involving breaking [17, p.
241].
5.3 The Structure of VerbNet
Each class in VerbNet has three distinct properties, or sections [28, p. 4,29]
[24], the first one being the actual verbs that are members of the class. This
list of verbs can be anything from very large to initially empty, the members
instead being introduced in subclasses. A verb’s membership in a given
class indicates a particular sense of that verb, so if a verb is a member
in many different classes, that constitutes several different senses of that
particular verb.
The second property are the thematic roles associated with the class,
usually consisting of roles covering the subject and an object [28, p. 30-
34]. VerbNet utilizes about 30 different thematic roles, some notable
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examples being Agent, Theme, Patient, Topic and Stimulus. Typically, each
verb argument is given a specific thematic role, though there are cases
where one role label may be applied to multiple participants. An example
occurs when the role of Agent is used in classes involving communication
between several entities. In a sentence like Susan chitchatted with Rachel,
VerbNet maintains that both Susan and Rachel are Agents, where the latter
is referred to as the Co-Agent.
The roles may have attached to them a large number of hierarchically
ordered selectional restrictions, which limit the types that can be used
within the roles [28, p. 35-36]. For example, an animate restriction (marked
as [+animate]) confines the role strictly for animate objects (humans,
animals etc.).
Finally, and most importantly, each class has a set of possible surface
realizations called frames, which show how the verbs can behave [28, p.
35-37]. Each frame is marked with a syntactic category string, like NP
V NP (the verb is preceded by a noun phrase and is followed by one as
well), which acts as the frame’s name. Further, a frame has an example
sentence, plus syntactic and semantic structures, the former showing the
behaviour of the thematic roles, possibly marked with restrictions, and the
latter describing the meaning of the sentence. The semantic structures use
a notation similar to Parsons’ approach (see chapter 4), where variables
for events, plus terms denoting participants, are used as arguments to
conjuncted predicates.
Section 5.3.3 will go into more detail regarding VerbNet’s semantic
structures, as these are the structures that will be used when analyzing
verbal entailment examples. However, section 5.3.1 will first go through
a verb class example, which will serve as an illustration of what the
individual classes look like in general, while section 5.3.2 will explain the
way all the verb classes are organized in a hierarchical manner.
5.3.1 A Verb Class Example
The verb class discover-84 (84 being the class number) has 13 members,
including, for instance, discover, figure out and guess. There are three
thematic roles, namely Agent, Theme and Source connected to this class.
While the Theme and Source have no selectional restrictions, the Agent
has two of them, namely +animate and +organization. These are organized
inside square brackets, like this [+ANIMATE | +ORGANIZATION], where
the | symbol (which separates the restrictions) means or. This means that
if an argument has any of the restrictive features it is allowed to act as
the given role. So for an argument to be allowed to act as the Agent in
this case it must either be an animate object or an organization (or both).
The selectional restrictions are organized in a hierarchy, where some main
categories (there are 36 unique values present) include concrete, time and
location [28, p. 36].
Furthermore, the class has six different frames, an example of which is
NP V that S. This frame involves a subordinate clause, which is introduced
by that. The structure in (67) shows the components in this frame, including
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the example sentence used and the syntactic and semantic structures.
(67) a. EXAMPLE: I discovered that it made sense.
b. SYNTAX: Agent V Theme <+THAT_COMP>
c. SEMANTICS: DISCOVER(DURING(E), Agent, Theme, ?Source)
The syntax shows the positions of the utilized roles in relation to the
verb, which conforms to the phrase pattern which makes up the name
of the frame (NP V that S). For the example sentence the Agent is I,
which is allowed (given the restrictions mentioned above) because this
participant is animate. The verb is discover, while the Theme is the whole
subordinate clause (including that). Notice the restriction applied on the
Theme, organized inside the < > brackets. The +THAT_COMP restriction
says that the given Theme must be a that-compliment clause. Such syntax
restrictions, which there are about 40 of in VerbNet, are also organized in a
hierarchy, similar to the selectional restrictions used on the thematic roles.
The semantic structure shows the meaning of the frame using predic-
ates that take a given number of arguments, separated by the conjunctive
& symbol. In this case there is only one predicate, namely DISCOVER,
which says that the event in question is an event of discovering. The ar-
guments inside the predicate constitute that during the event (specified by
the variable E) the Agent discovers the Theme. The Source from where
the discovery was made is unknown here, which is marked using the ?
symbol right before the role name. Note that DURING is a specific kind
of time function, rather than a predicate, which returns various stages of
the given event, in this case the "during" stage. Essentially, such time func-
tions denote when the predicate in question is true. Finally, notice that
predicates and functions are in all upper-case letters, while the arguments,
particularly the thematic roles, are in all lower-case letters, except for the
first letter. As mentioned, section 5.3.3 will explain the semantic structures
in more detail.
5.3.2 The Class Hierarchy
The classes in VerbNet are organized in a hierarchic structure, where each
class may have additional subclasses [28, p. 28-29]. These act as further
specialized versions of their superclasses, introducing new attributes, such
as member verbs, roles and frames, or modifying existing attributes. The
initial superclasses are specified with a specific class name and number,
while the subclasses have additional numbers attached which constitutes
the subclass number.
For example, the verb class run-51.3.2 has two subclasses, which are
labeled run-51.3.2-1 and run-51.3.2-2, respectively. The subclass run-51.3.2-
2 also has a subclass, which has the name run-51.3.2-2-1. Further, the
subclass run-51.3.2-2 has an additional Result role, as well as a number
of other member verbs and frames. So, while the superclass has member
verbs such as bolt and climb, the subclass has other members, such as glide
and race. Subclasses can make use of (they inherit) all frames and roles that
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are also present in superclasses. To illustrate this, the verb jump is used in
all examples in the class run-51.3.2, even though the verb is only introduced
in one of its subclasses. Also, the verb run is a member of the subclass run-
51.3.2-2-1, so it can make use of all the frames in the classes run-51.3.2-2 and
run-51.3.2.
Verb members are not inherited by subclasses, on the other hand, as
that would defeat the purpose of having subclasses in the first place. As
an example, the verb memorize is a member in the class Learn-14-2, but this
cannot be used in the one additional frame found in the subclass Learn-14-
2-1. This frame has the syntactic structure Agent V {of about} Topic, which
results in sentences like The president learned of/about a coup. But you can’t
say *The president memorized of/about a coup. Inheritance among verb classes
thereby involve subclasses having all the frames and thematic roles that are
also in their superclasses, but the member verbs are specific for each class.
5.3.3 VerbNet’s Semantic Structures
As seen in the example in section 5.3.1, the semantic structures in VerbNet
consist of various semantic predicates which are used to show the relations
between events and the participants in those events [28, p. 37-41]. These
predicates are joined together using the conjunct symbol & and may also be
negated, by embedding the predicate inside another predicate called NOT.
The arguments appearing inside the semantic predicates may include
the thematic roles specific to each class, an assortment of various universal
constant arguments, such as Forceful and Directedmotion, and finally a few
arguments that are verb specific. The latter argument type depends on the
given verb, so an argument like Form will, for instance, be Broken for the
verb break and Bended for the verb bend. In other words, the Theme ends up
having a broken form in a breaking event, and a bended form in a bending
event. Predicates also typically take an argument which denotes the event
in question, or one of its stages (see below). Events are, as we have seen,
marked with the E symbol.
Every semantic predicate usually takes as one of its arguments a time
function, which specifies when the predicate is true. These time functions
are based on an approach to time established by Moens and Steedman [20],
which is itself based on Vendler’s method of categorizing events [29]. By
their accounts, events are divided into four categories, namely culminations,
points, processes and culminated processes. These are defined depending on
both their length and their outcome. In other words, the events are either
atomic or extended, i. e. they are either instantaneous or last for some
time, and either consequently result in a new state, or not. Following this
principle, culminations are atomic events that lead to a new state, points
are also atomic, but do not lead to a new state, and both processes and
culminated processes are extended events, but whereas the former does not
lead to a new state, the latter does. Separate from events are also the state
category, which VerbNet does not refer to directly. In other words, there is
no use of variables which directly denote states (like an S symbol), but they
are indirectly represented using various semantic predicates which denote
44
states.
Events thereby have a general structure, called a nucleus. This consists
of different stages, namely the starting point, the preparatory process,
which may last for a given time, the culmination, which is an instantaneous
point in time, and the consequent state. The time functions used by
VerbNet returns the selected stages from a given event. They include
the functions START, DURING, END and RESULT, which all take a single
argument (the event variable). The illustration in (5.1) below shows the
structure of an event in VerbNet, where the rectangle represents the whole
event. Note that Moens and Steedman did not refer to a starting point in
their original illustration, but it’s included here since it seems logical in the
VerbNet framework, where the START function may refer to the start of an
event.
Figure 5.1: The event time structure used in VerbNet
In addition, one can also say that an event is true at all times in the
event, by not using any time function. Instead, the event variable is used
directly as the time argument in the given semantic predicate. For an
example of the use of these time functions, the structure for the sentence
Brutus killed Caesar with a knife can be seen in formula (68), taken from the
class murder-42.1-1. Note the use of subscripts on some of the predicate
arguments, which indicate what specific role they occupy.
(68) CAUSE(BrutusAGENT, E) & ALIVE(START(E), CaesarPATIENT) &
NOT(ALIVE(RESULT(E), CaesarPATIENT)) &
USE(DURING(E), BrutusAGENT, KnifeINSTRUMENT)
This structure uses the predicates CAUSE, ALIVE and USE, plus the
NOT predicate to indicate a negation. CAUSE represents the fact that the
sentence is causative, where an Agent is said to cause the given event. This
predicate is very similar to the CAUSE function used by Jackendoff (chapter
3) and the CAUSE predicate used by Parsons (chapter 4). Note the use of
just the E variable in the CAUSE predicate here. This indicates that the fact
that Brutus is the causer is true at all times in the event. ALIVE indicates
that some participant is alive at a given stage in the event, while USE says
that some participant uses some Instrument at some stage in the event.
The START time function used in the ALIVE predicate means that Caesar
was alive at the start of the event, the DURING function inside the USE
predicate means that Brutus used a knife in the preparatory stage of the
event, while the RESULT function used in the ALIVE predicate inside the
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NOT predicate indicates that Caesar was not alive in the consequent state
of the event.
Some event types do not have access to all the stages. Processes do
not have clear start or culmination points, nor a consequent result state,
so they can only refer to the preparatory stage of the event, using the
DURING function. Culminated processes, on the other hand, do have an
end point, so both DURING and END functions can be used. Points can
refer to the end points and the consequent result state (END and RESULT),
while culminations can refer to all stages. It is often unclear when an event
starts, so the START function is most often used when referring to the state
of something at the exact moment an event begins to happen.
ALIVE is an example of a semantic predicate denoting a state, saying
that at some stage in an event, the state of some thing is that of being
alive. Another illustrative state example is shown in (69), where a predicate
curiously called STATE is used to denote the end state of something (the
Patient in this case). Note that the role EndState is a verb specific argument
here, similar to the Form argument mentioned earlier.
(69) a. Bill dried the clothes.
b. CAUSE(BillAGENT, E) &
STATE(RESULT(E), DriedENDSTATE, ClothesPATIENT)
In other words, the result of the event is that the state of the clothes ends
up being dried. The causer of the event is Bill.
There are close to 150 different semantic predicates in the VerbNet
framework and they are all divided into four main categories [23]. These
are the general predicates, the variable predicates, the specific predicates,
and the predicates for multiple events. The general predicates are universal
across all classes, and all languages, and examples include CAUSE and
MOTION. The variable predicates, which include PREP, ADV and PRED,
are all "in a one-to-one relation with a set of words in the language" [28,
p. 39]. This means that they depend on the words used in the sentence in
question. Specific predicates constitute specific verbal meanings, and these
predicates are each shared across a few number of verbs. For example, the
predicate SUFFOCATE involves suffocation, and it is used by a number a
verbs, where suffocate is only one of them.
Finally, the predicates for multiple events relate two variables to each
other. They essentially represent when the events happen according to one
another, so a predicate like BEFORE(E0, E1) would indicate that event E0
happened before the event E1. Other examples include AFTER, which is
the opposite of BEFORE, CONTAINS, which says that one event takes place
inside the time interval of the other event, and EQUALS, which means that
the two events start and end at the same points in time [28, p. 39-40].
5.3.4 VerbNet’s Approach to Inference
Because the semantic structures in VerbNet consist of predicates and
functions put together in a conjunctive fashion, the capturing of verbal
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inference is similar to the approach used in Parsons’ theory. Basically, a
structure entails all other structures that are either the same structure or use
the same predicates (with the same arguments). As an example, consider
the verb kill again, used in the now familiar sentences Brutus killed Caesar
and Brutus killed Caesar with a knife. The semantic structure for the latter
sentence is shown in (68) above, while the structure for the former is the
exact same, but with the USE predicate removed. Because of this, the latter
sentence entails the former.
Another way of capturing entailment is the use the unknown symbol ?
for certain roles. Consider the verb learn, for instance, which is a member
of (among a few others) the class Learn-14.1. The roles available in this
class are the Agent, Topic and Source. The sentence in (70a) is an example
where all of these roles are present, while sentence (70c) shows a sentence
where the Topic is unknown. The structure in (70b) represents sentence
(70a), while structure (70d) represents sentence (70c).
(70) Verbs:
a. Rhoda learned French from an old book.
b. TRANSFER_INFO(DURING(E), Old-BookSOURCE, RhodaAGENT,
FrenchTOPIC) & CAUSE(RhodaAGENT, E)
c. Rhoda learned from an old book.
d. TRANSFER_INFO(DURING(E), Old-BookSOURCE, RhodaAGENT,
?TOPIC) & CAUSE(RhodaAGENT, E)
The structures in (70) make use of a predicate called TRANSFER_INFO,
which constitutes the knowledge of some Topic moving from a Source to
some Agent. Rhoda is the Agent causing the event, an old book is the Source
and the Topic is known to be French in structure (70b), but is unknown
in structure (70d). But if Rhoda learned from an old book, then she did
learn something (the Topic). Essentially, any predicate that has all of its
arguments known will entail the same predicate where one or more of
these arguments are missing. In other words, if Rhoda learned French,
then she did learn something. Because of this, the structure in (70b) entails
the structure in (70c).
In this learn example, the inference happens within one single verb
class, but how does inference work in relation to a verb’s membership in
different classes? The verb learn is a member in both the classes Learn-
14-1 and its sister class’ (Learn-14-2) subclass Learn-14-2-1. These two sister
classes give the verb access to two different frames, which both make use of
the TRANSFER_INFO predicate. The only difference is that in the Learn-14-1
frame, both the Topic and the Source are unknown, while in the Learn-14-2-
1 frame, only the Source is unknown. So will the entailment between these
two structures be captured? If class membership is ignored, and we only
consider the semantic structures, then yes, the entailment is captured (in
the same way as the above example).
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5.4 Other Lexical Resource Databases
This section will introduce three other notable lexical databases, namely
WordNet, PropBank and FrameNet, which are similar to VerbNet in being
lexical databases. All three will have their structure and purpose briefly
explained, and how they are directly related to VerbNet in a linking system
called the Unified Verb Index [22]. This index is an attempt to merge all
of these four lexical databases together, where references between them
have been added in various places. This is then a new framework, using
the original, and separate, databases as starting points, but adding links
between them. Examples of such links will be presented in the coming
sections.
5.4.1 WordNet
The WordNet project was conceived by George A. Miller both to be a kind
of dictionary and thesaurus, and to support data-driven applications, for
use in the field of artificial intelligence, among other things [19] [18]. The
database handles the four main open word classes, namely nouns, verbs,
adjectives and adverbs, storing the two former in their own database and the
two latter in a single one. It covers over 155 000 different word strings, or
lemmas, and lists the possible senses for each of them, organized under the
four classes. This representation is different from the traditional lexicon
approach, where senses are separated into their own lexeme only if they
are homonyms, and polysemous senses are stored under the same lexeme.
In WordNet, however, all noun senses are listed under nouns, all verb
senses under verbs etc., even though the senses under each class may be
homonyms. To illustrate, one noun sense and two verb senses for the
lemma read are shown in examples (71) and (72). Note that each sense has
a particular number attached as a subscript, in order to distinguish it.
(71) Nouns:
a. read1 - Something that is read, as in that was a good read.
(72) Verbs:
a. read1 - Interpret something that is written or printed, as in read
the book.
b. read2 - Have or contain a certain wording or form, as in The
passage reads as follows.
The most important aspect of WordNet are the sets of synonyms, or
synsets, which are collections of lemmas, each having a given sense, that
represent specific lexicalized concepts. For example, the lemmas good12,
right13 and ripe3 (the numbers illustrating the specific sense for each lemma)
all represent the concept of being suitable or right for a particular purpose.
Together they form a synset. In the most recent release, the database has
over 117 000 such unique synsets. Each sense under a lemma points to a
synset, forming a pair. Read1 and read2, for instance, point to two different
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synsets, namely [read1] and [read2, say4], forming the two pointers, or pairs,
(read1, [read1]) and (read2, [read2, say4]), respectively.
The verb synsets are organized in a hierarchy where the links between
them constitute troponymy relations (links between noun relations are
hyponymy relations). All verbs are organized into two different categories,
namely those that denote actions or events, and those that denote states.
These two are further divided into more specific types, such as manner,
perception and contact verbs for events, and abbreviations of be and control
verbs, such as want and succeed, for states.
WordNet considers a selection of other semantic relations between syn-
sets as well, where the most important relation is synonymy. These re-
lations apply to all the member senses. Not all synsets may have all the
relations available, though. The table below shows which relations are
covered and which word class(es) they apply to, plus a few examples. The
hyponymy and troponymy relations are included, as well, which make up
the hierarchical organization of the synsets [19, p. 40].
Relation: Word Class: Examples:
Synonymy All pipe/tube, sad/unhappy, rise/ascend
Hyponymy Nouns maple/tree, tree/plant
Meronymy Nouns brim/hat, ship/fleet
Troponymy Verbs march/walk, whisper/speak
Entailment Verbs divorce/marry, snore/sleep
Causation Verbs kill/die, show/see
Note that the troponymy and the causation relations are also kinds of
entailments. For instance, if someone marches then they also walk, and
if someone is killed, then he also dies. The entailment relation in this
table therefore denotes those entailment relations that are not causative
or instances of troponymy. Note also that there is a difference between
the two entailment examples given here, in that snore entails sleep directly
(while someone is snoring they are also sleeping), while divorce entails that
a marrying event happened at some point in time, not at the same time as
the divorce event.
In addition, WordNet considers some relations that do not operate
on the synsets, but rather between the words, or lemmas, themselves.
This includes antonymy, and the derivationally related forms. The latter
consists of the words that can be created using the morphological word
root gained from the lemma in question. For instance, the verb read has the
derivationally related forms reader, reading and read, which are all nouns.
Verb senses also have a list of the various ways they can be used in
sentences, called the sentence frames. Read1 has the sentence frames shown
below, for example.
(73) Somebody _s. - Example: He reads.
(74) Somebody _s something. - Example: She reads a book.
(75) Somebody _s that CLAUSE. - Example: John read that there was a
robbery.
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In the Unified Verb Index, almost all member verbs in VerbNet classes
refer directly to the relevant synset(s) in WordNet. For instance, the verb
advance, which is a member of the class Escape-51.1, refers to the first sense
of this lemma in WordNet, where it is understood as to move forward, also in
the metaphorical sense. The fact that a member can refer to multiple synsets
illustrates that there is no one-to-one relation between senses in VerbNet
and WordNet; the two databases often have different ways of defining the
senses.
5.4.2 PropBank
In contrast to both VerbNet and WordNet, PropBank, or proposition bank,
covers a corpus, which is a large collection of texts where each sentence
is annotated with semantic information [21] [16, p. 658-659]. PropBank
uses the Penn Treebank, which annotates its sentences with their associated
syntactic tree structures.
When selecting a verb in PropBank, you will find a list of the different
senses available, organized under its possible variations. The verb Read
has three different variations, namely read, read up and read off. Similarly, it
has three different senses, one under each variation, though other verbs
may have more than this. Each sense has a list of roles, or arguments,
that it can assume, as well as some example sentences, all annotated with
their respective role tags. The arguments are numbered as Arg0, Arg1 etc.,
each having a brief description. Although the argument numbers usually
indicate different roles depending on the given sense, Arg0 typically
denotes a volitional agent. Additional arguments which may be present,
such as adverbials, are also annotated in the examples, but are not part of
the core roles described. These have the notation Argm, plus the type of
adverbial. For instance Argm-tmp is used for a phrase like at night, a time
adverbial. The verb used, termed Rel, is also listed. Example (76) shows a
prototypical entry in PropBank, illustrating the first sense of read, using the




Only two roles are realized in this sentence, although the sense has a
total of four listed. The roles that are not mentioned include the benefactive
or direction (Arg2) and the text or content (Arg3). Note that this example
comes from the annotated corpus mentioned above.
Many, though not all, members in verb classes in VerbNet (in the
Unified Verb Index) refer to the senses given to them in PropBank. For
example, the verb construct appears in two different classes in VerbNet,
where both instances refer to the same single sense in PropBank, defined as
to build or make by combining materials or parts. The members may be related
to just a single sense, or to multiple senses, similar to the mapping to the
WordNet synsets. In addition, a verb appearing in many different verb
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classes may, for all the membership instances, refer to the same sense(s) in
PropBank.
5.4.3 FrameNet
The final database that will be discussed is called FrameNet, which is based
on the work by the linguist Charles Fillmore and his frame semantics [1]
[16, p. 659-663]. All the four major open word classes included in WordNet
are also included here. In its most recent form it covers over 13000 different
word senses, and also has about 190 000 different annotated sentences,
which act as valuable training data in the task of semantic role labeling.
The most important elements are the frames (not to be confused with the
frames in the VerbNet classes), of which FrameNet has about 1300. These
act as structures of events, relations or entities, and also include detailed
descriptions of the different participants within them. A word sense is said
to evoke one or more frames, or in other words, a sense that is appropriate
under a specific concept will evoke a specific frame (or frames) that covers
that concept. For example, the frame Reading is evoked by words such as
read, scan and skim. Example (77) shows what a typical frame looks like in
FrameNet, in this case the Reading frame.
(77) a. Definition: The Reader attends to a Text to process its informa-
tion. Sometimes a particular kind of Phenomenon is sought in the
Text. Example: I READ A Tale of Two Cities last night.
b. Core roles: Reader, which is the one who examines a Text
to understand it, and Text, which is the entity that contains
linguistic symbols. The Reader is of the semantic type Sentient.
Non-core roles: Context, which is the context wherein the
Reader reads a particular Text, and Place, which is where
the reading event takes place. Place is of the semantic type
Locative_relation.
c. Frame relations: Inherits from the frame Scrutiny and is
inherited by the frame Reading_aloud.
d. Lexical units: devour.v, pore.v, read.v, reader.n, scan.v, skim.v
Each frame has four main components (a., b., c. and d. in the example).
The first is the definition of the frame, which explains the usage and
relations of its participants in a brief and general way. Second, and perhaps
most important, is the set of elements found in the frame. These are the
participants, or roles, that can be used in the frame and they are organized
under either core or non-core elements. The core elements are typically the
roles that are most often present in a sentence evoking the frame, while the
non-core elements are roles that are rarer. Note that not all non-core roles
are shown in example (77).
In the Reading frame the core elements are Reader, the person who does
the reading, and Text, the text that is read, and the non-core elements
include roles covering such notions as the context in which the reading takes
place, and the time and place of the reading. Each element can also have a
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semantic type attached to it, which acts as a form of selectional restriction
(similar to the approach in VerbNet). Reader must, for instance, have a
Sentient semantic type, since only sentient beings can perform the act of
reading. In addition, frame elements may include an example sentence,
illustrating its use.
The third component lists important frame relations, expressing connec-
tions of various kinds to other frames. Reading has an inheritance relation
to the frame Scrutiny, for instance, meaning that it inherits its properties
from that frame. The fourth and final component is the set of word senses,
also called the lexical units, that evoke the frame. This can include words
in any of the four word classes. Note that a v following a word indicates
that the lexical unit is a verb, while an n indicates a noun.
In the Unified Verb Index, the members in VerbNet classes may often
refer to specific frames in FrameNet. The verb eat, for instance, relates to
a frame called Ingestion in FrameNet. Similar to the mappings to synsets
in WordNet and senses in PropBank, a member verb may refer to multiple





As these three, rather different ways of representing verbal meaning have
now been introduced, the aim of the coming chapters will be to examine
and discuss a variety of entailment phenomena. In doing so, the focus
will be on each theory’s strengths and weaknesses when it comes to the
specific nature of certain verbal situations. How are the wanted entailments
included, or captured, within the representations of the given theory, and
what are the similarities and differences between the three theories, when
it comes to the situations in question?
Such entailment phenomena involve the use of verbs in specific kinds
of syntactic constructions, where the sentences in question may differ from
each other only slightly, or by the use of entirely different verbs altogether.
We have already seen several examples of entailment phenomena in earlier
chapters, for example in sections 2.3 and 3.7. Many of the upcoming
examples will look at only two sentences and the entailment that occurs
between them. A typical example might look at the difference between
the transitive and the intransitive use of a given verb. However, some
examples might also include more than two sentences, so they might vary
a bit in overall complexity.
The choice of the particular verbs, and the sentences they are used in,
were based strongly on each author’s own examination of them. Certain
verbs are more popular to discuss than others, of course, so the ones that
have been examined by both Jackendoff and Parsons, as well as being
represented in the VerbNet database, were the first candidates for inclusion
in this analysis.
However, the choices of verbs are also based on Levin’s list of
prototypical verb classes, which cover a wide range of specific verbal
meanings and have many different, though similar, verbs as members.
These classes are of course the inspiration for VerbNet’s verb classes, and
they provide a fitting way to organize the entailment examples. In the
end, a string of verb examples have been covered and they are neatly listed
under their respective verbal classes, provided by Levin.
Note that Levin originally proposed close to fifty different prototypical
verb classes, so the inclusion of only seven of them in this thesis may seem
to cover much too little. However, because the focus of this analysis is on
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the ways the three different representations cope with various entailment
phenomena, detailed analyses of a few important verbs is more valuable
than a shallow coverage of every kind of meaning. The focus is on
each theory’s strong and weak points, and how they capture kinds of
entailments that may be shared across a wide range of different verbs.
In other words, most of the verbs used in the examples could have been
replaced by verbs with similar meanings, but the semantic structures
would have remained practically the same.
Because this thesis is based on Jackendoff’s and Parsons’ most all-
encompassing works, with regards to the semantic frameworks they stand
behind (Jackendoff [15] and Parsons [25]), it seemed most logical, and
necessary, to include verbal situations that both of them have given final
lexical entries for. Therefore, most of the verbs that will be discussed cover
semantic structures that were taken directly from these works, although
with added specifics of the sentences in question. For instance, although
Jackendoff provides final lexical entries for many verbs, the participants
in those entries are unspecified. But in the coming example sentences, the
participant arguments are obviously included.
However, there are occasions in certain investigations of entailment
phenomena where one author does not provide a clear semantic structure
for the given verb or verbs. The choice of such cases were based on
the great focus they have received in the linguistic literature and on the
fact that the other representation (either Jackendoff or Parsons) provides
a thoughtful analysis that warrants further discussion. Still, both the
conceptual structure theory and the theory of underlying events provide
good enough frameworks, so that the semantic representation of a new
verb is often quite easily formed. These will then be new structures that
will be introduced, though they obviously conform to the rules of the given
frameworks.
When it comes to VerbNet, there is much more coverage. Since the
database provides a list of over 5200 different verb senses, while Jackendoff
and Parsons only lists about a hunded each, it is easy to find the structure
that you need for a given sentence in VerbNet. However, there might
also be instances even with VerbNet where a wanted representation is
not provided. In such cases, new suggestions for structures will also be
proposed, though this will illustrate a weakness in the database, since it’s
supposed to be all-encompassing.
All of the discussions of the various entailment examples will first in-
volve the introduction of the entailment phenomenon itself, then an exam-
ination of each theory’s given structures. The different representations will
be listed in the same alphabetical order as the example sentences, unless
something else is specified. In the end, an overall look at the differences
and similarities of the three representations will be provided, which may
also discuss other important aspects, related to the given issue.
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Chapter 7
Verbs of Contact by Impact
These kind of verbs involve the contact between participants, though differ
from pure contact verbs (such as touch) in that the action is done with
an impact, typically harming one of the participants. This chapter will
examine entailments involving the contact verbs stab and hit, though other
possible verbs include strike, kick and whack, for instance [17, p. 148].
7.1 Stab
This entailment example will be looking at the inclusion and exclusion
of optional prepositional adjuncts, which tend to alter the meaning
somewhat. The example sentences, borrowed from Parsons [25, p. 14], are
all transitive, where a subject and a direct object are both realized. Though
it’s not included here, the intransitive version, where the direct object is
removed, is also possible for the verb stab. However, the focus will be on
the presence or non-presence of prepositional adjuncts here.
The general entailment that we would want a semantic representation
to capture is the fact that a sentence that has, for instance, two optional
adjuncts should entail the same sentence where either one of those adjuncts
is removed, as well as the sentence where both of them are. To illustrate
this, take a look at the the sentences in (78) (some of them are repeated
from section 4.7), which show how the verb might be used in transitive
constructions in the context of a stabbing of Caesar by Brutus.
(78) a. Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back with a knife.
b. Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back.
c. Brutus stabbed Caesar with a knife.
d. Brutus stabbed Caesar.
We see here that the core transitive sentence (78d) contains a subject
(Brutus) and a direct object (Caesar), while the other sentences are variations
of this sentence because of added prepositional phrases. Sentence (78a) has
two such phrases added, namely in the back and with a knife, which gives
additional information about where the stabbing happened on Caesar’s
body and what Instrument Brutus used. In contrast, sentences (78b) and
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(78c) each has one of these adjuncts removed, with sentence (78b) only
using in the back and sentence (78c) only using with a knife.
Sentence (78a) entails sentences (78b) and (78c) because it is both certain
that the stabbing happened in the back, as in sentence (78b), and with
a knife, as in sentence (78c). It also entails sentence (78d) because it is
also certain that Brutus stabbed Caesar, as is the case in sentence (78d) as
well. Sentence (78b), on the other hand, only entails sentence (78d), not
sentence (78c), because it may be that the stabbing was done with some
other Instrument than a knife. Similarly, sentence (78c) does not entail
sentence (78b) because the stabbing might have happened at some other
place than Caesar’s back.
7.1.1 Jackendoff’s Conceptual Structure Representation
Jackendoff has not provided a final structure for the use of the verb stab, so
the conceptual structures given here for the example sentences are only
those that are assumed to be the correct representations, based on his
theory. Basically, we can imagine that a stabbing involves an Agent causing
some Instrument to be at some location, which would typically be a part of
some Theme. For this, the inspiration comes from Jackendoff’s structure
for the verb hit [15, p. 143].
The structures in (79) represent the four sentences. Note that structure
(79a) is more complex, using the AFF+ and BY functions. These have been
excluded from the other structures in order to make them more readable.
Basically, the AFF+ function should be part of all the structures (they can be
thought of as invisible), because it says that the Agent intentionally affects
the Theme. The BY function, on the other hand, should only be part of
structures (79a) and (79c), because they are the only ones that make use of
an Instrument (remember that the BY function represents the relationship
between the Instrument and the other participants).
(79) a. [event CAUSE ([thing BRUTUS],
[event INCH ([state BELOC ([thing KNIFE],
[place AT ([thing BACK PART ([thing CAESAR])])])])
AFF+ ([thing BRUTUS], [thing CAESAR])
[BY [event CAUSE ([thing BRUTUS],
[event AFF+ ([thing KNIFE],
[thing BACK PART ([thing CAESAR])])
AFF+ ([thing BRUTUS], [thing KNIFE])]]
b. [event CAUSE ([thing BRUTUS],
[event INCH ([state BELOC ([thing ],
[place AT ([thing BACK PART ([thing CAESAR])])])])
c. [event CAUSE ([thing BRUTUS],
[event INCH ([state BELOC ([thing KNIFE],
[place AT ([thing PART ([thing CAESAR])])])])
d. [event CAUSE ([thing BRUTUS],
[event INCH ([state BELOC ([thing ],
[place AT ([thing PART ([thing CAESAR])])])])
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Each of the four sentences are causing events where the Agent is Brutus
and the Theme is Caesar. The immediate effect is the inchoative event
resulting from the placement of some thing, which is specified as a knife
in structures (79a) and (79c), by the use of the BELOC function. In all cases,
the place in question is part of Caesar, which is represented by the use
of the PART function. This location is further specified as Caesar’s back in
structures (79a) and (79b). The additional BY function used in the sentences
mentioned above specifies that Brutus causes the affection event between
the knife and Caesar’s back. In this causing event, Brutus also volitionally
affects the knife.
It might be hard to see how the required entailments are captured
by these constructions, so the alternative flat versions might be useful as
illustrations. The structures in (80) show these alternate representations.
Note that the variables e and e2 stand for the causing and inchoative events,
respectively, while the s variable stands for the BELOC state. Also, p is
the place variable used in the BELOC function, the t variable represents
the thing argument to the CAUSE function, t2 the thing argument to the
PART function, t3 the thing argument to the BELOC function, and t4 the
thing argument to the AT function. Finally, note that the AFF+ and BY
functions have been excluded here.
(80) a. [CAUSE(e) & ARG1(e, t) & ARG2(e, e2) & INCH(e2) &
ARG1(e2, s) & BELOC(s) & ARG1(s, t3) & ARG2(s, p) & AT(p)
& ARG1(p, t4) & PART(t4, t2) & BRUTUS(t) & CAESAR(t2) &
KNIFE(t3) & BACK(t4)]
b. [CAUSE(e) & ARG1(e, t) & ARG2(e, e2) & INCH(e2) &
ARG1(e2, s) & BELOC(s) & ARG1(s, t3) & ARG2(s, p) & AT(p)
& ARG1(p, t4) & PART(t4, t2) & BRUTUS(t) & CAESAR(t2) &
BACK(t4)]
c. [CAUSE(e) & ARG1(e, t) & ARG2(e, e2) & INCH(e2) &
ARG1(e2, s) & BELOC(s) & ARG1(s, t3) & ARG2(s, p) & AT(p)
& ARG1(p, t4) & PART(t4, t2) & BRUTUS(t) & CAESAR(t2) &
KNIFE(t3)]
d. [CAUSE(e) & ARG1(e, t) & ARG2(e, e2) & INCH(e2) &
ARG1(e2, s) & BELOC(s) & ARG1(s, t3) & ARG2(s, p) & AT(p) &
ARG1(p, t4) & PART(t4, t2) & BRUTUS(t) & CAESAR(t2)]
The only difference between the four structures is the inclusion or
exclusion of the KNIFE and BACK functions, which represent the fact that
the Instrument used was a knife, and that the place on Caesar’s body
that was stabbed was his back, respectively. Structure (80a) has both of
these, structure (80b) has BACK, but not KNIFE, structure (80c) has KNIFE,
but not BACK, and structure (80d) has none of them. Assuming that a
formula entails another formula if it is made up of the same functions,
similar to how entailments work in Parsons’ theory and in VerbNet (see
sections 4.7 and 5.3.4), then the correct entailments are captured by these
structures (and consequently by the embedded conceptual structures). In
other words, structure (80a) entails the other formulas because they consist
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of the exact same functions, except that KNIFE and BACK are missing in
some of them. Structures (80b) and (80c) entail structure (80d) for similar
reasons.
7.1.2 Parsons’ Underlying Event Representation
In contrast, let’s analyze the way Parsons handles this situation. Because
these example sentences were originally used by Parsons, the structures
shown in (81) below are the exact formulas used in Parsons [25, p. 14],
although they are somewhat altered in order to conform to the rules used
in the final version of the theory (particularly the use of thematic role
predicates, and time variables). Note that Parsons also assumes a meaning
postulate, shown in (81e), which says that all stabbing events involves an
Instrument [25, p. 90]. This results in the fact that there exists an unknown
Instrument in formula (81d) even though the predicate is not present in the
formula. Note that Parsons originally used the predicate With, whereas the
predicate Instrument is used here, as mentioned in section 4.3.
(81) a. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Stabbing(e) &
Agent(e, Brutus) & Theme(e, Caesar) & In(e, Back) &
Instrument(e, Knife)]
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Stabbing(e) &
Agent(e, Brutus) & Theme(e, Caesar) & In(e, Back)]
c. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Stabbing(e) &
Agent(e, Brutus) & Theme(e, Caesar) & Instrument(e, Knife)]
d. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Stabbing(e) &
Agent(e, Brutus) & Theme(e, Caesar)]
e. Meaning postulate: (∃e) [Stabbing(e)→ (∃x) Instrument(e, x)]
The Parsons method is to identify the event in question as a stabbing
event and appointing Brutus as the Agent and Caesar as the Theme. The
additional adjunct modifiers are added as the predicates In and Instrument.
In formulas (81a) and (81b) the location of the stabbing is specified to be in
the Back, and in formulas (81a) and (81c) the Instrument is known to be a
Knife. Formula (81d) lacks any of these adjuncts, though the existence of
an Instrument is verified by the meaning postulate, as mentioned. All the
events happened at some time in an interval before the present time, and
they also culminated at that time.
The only difference between the four sentences concerns the explicit
existence of the predicates In and Instrument. The Instrument predicate is
only present in formulas (81a) and (81c) (though the meaning postulate
does entail that an unknown Instrument exists in the other two), while
the In predicate is only present in formulas (81a) and (81b). As such, the
correct entailments are perfectly captured in these representations because
the structures that are entailed by others contain only predicates present in
those structures.
Formula (81a) has all the predicates in formula (81b), plus an Instru-
ment predicate with a specified second argument, so formula (81a) entails
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formula (81b). For similar reasons, the other entailments are also captured.
Note that formula (81b) does not entail formula (81c), and vice versa, be-
cause each has a predicate that does not exist in the other. Although for-
mulas (81b) and (81d) both have an Instrument according to the meaning
postulate, no wrong entailments are present since the second argument to
the predicate is unspecified, whereas it has the value Knife in formulas (81a)
and (81c).
7.1.3 VerbNet’s Semantic Representation
Finally, let’s look at the way VerbNet represents the meaning of these
sentences. The verb stab is a member of the verb classes poison-42.2, poke-
19 and swat-18.2, which constitute three different senses, as proposed by
VerbNet. To give an illustration of how these three classes behave, the
semantic structures for the sentence in (78d) are shown in (82), where
structure (82a) comes from the poison-42.2 class, structure (82b) is the poke-
19 representation and structure (82c) is the swat-18.2 representation. Note
that the A subscript constitutes the Agent role, I the Instrument, and P the
Patient role.
(82) a. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) & HARMED(DURING(E), CaesarP)
b. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) & MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion,
?Instrument) & MANNER(DURING(E), Forceful, ?Instrument)
& CONTACT(DURING(E), ?Instrument, CaesarP)
c. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) & MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion,
BrutusA) & NOT(CONTACT(DURING(E), BrutusA, CaesarP)) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, BrutusA) & CONTACT(END(E),
BrutusA, CaesarP))
Structures (82b) and (82c) are more similar to each other than structure
(82a), as structure (82a) uses a very simple predicate called HARMED,
which we can assume only signifies that the Patient is harmed during the
event. The other two give more details about the manner of the event and
about the contact between Patient, Instrument and Agent. The difference
between structures (82b) and (82c) is that in structure (82b) the focus is on
an unknown Instrument (which is known in the sentences in (78a)) and
(78c), while in structure (82c) the focus is on the Agent.
In other words, the manner during and at the end the event, which is
a DirectedMotion and Forceful, respectively, is appointed to the Instrument
in structure (82b) and to the Agent in structure (82c). Also, both structures
signify a contact between one participant and the Patient at the end of the
event, but in structure (82b) this participant is the Instrument, while it is
the Agent in structure (82c). In addition, structure (82c) says that there is
no contact between the Agent and the Patient during the event. Structure
(82b) does not say anything about this. Given that it is assumed that there
is an unknown Instrument in sentence (78d) (if Brutus stabs Caesar it is
assumed that Brutus uses some form of instrument, not himself) we can
assume that the most relevant structure here is the one in structure (82b).
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So, this section will be concentrating on the poke-19 class when discussing
the VerbNet representations of the sentences in question.
Note, however, that poke-19 lacks two relevant thematic roles that are
present in swat-18.2, namely a Location and a Result role. The Location role
has, in the swat-18.2 class, a selectional restriction which says that it must be
concrete, and in the one frame where it is used it is also restricted to being a
body part. However, in that frame, which would represent the sentence in
(78b), the Location role is not used in the semantic structure, which seems a
bit strange. The Result role might have been realized with a phrase such as
to death, as in Brutus stabbed Caesar to death. Because these two roles are not
present in poke-19, the section will dedicate some discussion to the semantic
structures in swat-18.2 later, after going through the poke-19 structures.
Finally, note also that the Instrument role has an additional selectional
restriction in the poke-19 class which is not present in swat.18.2. This
restriction says that the Instrument must be pointy (the other class instead
says that the Instrument must be solid), something which feels right given
the sentences under discussion.
The semantic structures (83), coming from the poke-19, represent the
four sentences. Because the class does not consider the location where the
Patient is stabbed, there is only a difference between the structures that
have an Instrument and those that don’t.
(83) a. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, KnifeI) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, KnifeI) &
CONTACT(END(E), KnifeI , CaesarP) &
USE(DURING(E), BrutusA, KnifeI)
b. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, ?Instrument) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, ?Instrument) &
CONTACT(END(E), ?Instrument, CaesarP)
c. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, KnifeI) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, KnifeI) &
CONTACT(END(E), KnifeI , CaesarP) &
USE(DURING(E), BrutusA, KnifeI)
d. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, ?Instrument) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, ?Instrument) &
CONTACT(END(E), ?Instrument, CaesarP)
While the fact that structure (83a) should entail the other sentences, and
the fact that structures (83b) and (83c) should both entail structure (83d) are
captured here, there is an error of entailment between structures (83b) and
(83c). Structure (83c) incorrectly entails structure (83b) because a mapping
of the location is missing in structure (83b). In other words, structure (83b)
is almost identical to structure (83c), except for the specified Instrument,
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but there is no representation of a Location in structure (83b) which would
make it distinct from the other. A solution to this incorrect entailment
might be to add a Location role to the given class, and use it within the
semantic representations where it is realized.
However, because of these wrong entailments, let’s consider the swat-
18.2 class instead, since it does include a Location role. The semantic
structures are shown in (84) below.
(84) a. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, KnifeI) &
NOT(CONTACT(DURING(E), KnifeI , CaesarP)) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, KnifeI) &
CONTACT(END(E), KnifeI , CaesarP) &
USE(DURING(E), BrutusA, KnifeI)
b. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, BrutusA) &
NOT(CONTACT(DURING(E), BrutusA, CaesarP)) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, BrutusA) &
CONTACT(END(E), BrutusA, CaesarP))
c. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, KnifeI) &
NOT(CONTACT(DURING(E), KnifeI , CaesarP)) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, KnifeI) &
CONTACT(END(E), KnifeI , CaesarP) &
USE(DURING(E), BrutusA, KnifeI)
d. CAUSE(BrutusA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, BrutusA) &
NOT(CONTACT(DURING(E), BrutusA, CaesarP)) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, BrutusA) &
CONTACT(END(E), BrutusA, CaesarP))
As mentioned, when the Location role is a part of the syntactic
structure, as is the case for the frames relevant to structures (84a) and (84b),
it does not take part in the semantic structure. Because of this, notice that
structures (84a) and (84c) are exactly the same, which is also the case for
structures (84b) and (84d). This then results in the same entailment errors
we saw with the poke-19 structures. This leads to the conclusion that the
wanted entailments are not captured in the current form of VerbNet.
On a side note, it is interesting how there are two possible ways
to encode the location in VerbNet. One is by using a predicate called
LOCATION and the other is to make use of the thematic role Location. In
the class spray-9.7, for instance, the semantic predicate LOCATION is used
(there is no Location role, although there is a Destination role, which is a
sub-role of Location [24, p. 18]). The predicate denotes the whereabouts
of the Theme in accordance with the Destination role. For example, in
a sentence like John loaded the truck with hay, the location of the hay at
the end of the event is represented by the predicate LOCATION(END(E),
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HayT, TruckD), where the T subscript represents the Theme, and the D the
Destination.
When the location of an event is an adjunct that is not obligatory,
realized as a prepositional phrase in a sentence like Brutus stabbed Caesar
in Oslo, the information is not a part of the semantic structure, because the
phrase does not alter the core meaning of the event. The Location role is, in
other words, only part of a structure in the class swat-18.2 if the participant
occupying the Location role is both concrete and a body-part, and if the
syntactic form of the sentence is NP V NP PP.Location. The question is then,
which was already noted, why the semantic predicate LOCATION, or any
other predicate that may represent the location information, is not used in
the semantics of that frame, as it is in the class spray-9.7, for instance.
7.1.4 Notable Differences and Similarities
Although both Jackendoff and VerbNet treat the intended meaning as a
causative, using the function CAUSE and the predicate CAUSE, respect-
ively, Parsons’ formulas do not directly convey any such meaning. In
other words, rather than including the verb stab in his list of causative-
inchoatives [25, p. 268], he includes it in his list of transitive verbs [25,
p. 266]. Still, Brutus is applied the role of Agent, a role that is defined
as the participant that causes the event or affects the Theme in some way.
So, while the available predicate CAUSE is not used in Parsons’ formula,
the fact that it is Brutus that affects Caesar is still captured (remember
that CAUSE in Parsons’ theory is used to represent a relationship between
events, not between participants and events).
In relation to this, Jackendoff makes use of two events for these
sentences, namely the causative event where Brutus is the causer, and the
effect event, which is an inchoative. The other two representations, on the
other hand, only refer to one event here. However, because the second
event in Jackendoff’s structure is embedded inside the CAUSE event, it
might be appropriate to say that there is only one event overall, and that
the second event is only a smaller part of the bigger event. If we adopt this
view then all three representations refer to only one event here, although
with Jackendoff’s structures another event is part of the structure of the
overall event.
The only information that Parsons provides regarding the nature of
the stabbing is in the Stabbing predicate itself. In other words, there is no
mention of what characterizes a stabbing and what makes it different from
other, similar verbs. What would be the difference be between the formula
for a sentence like Brutus sliced Caesar with a knife and (81c), for instance,
other than the predicates Slicing and Stabbing? And how would the fact
that these are events representing very similar verbs, which both involve
moving some object to cause some destruction, be captured in Parsons’
formula? This seems to be an overall limitation of the underlying event
theory; the fact that there is too little detail in the predicates describing
particular events.
VerbNet, and Jackendoff to a lesser degree, describes in more detail
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what actually goes on within the various stages of the event. When the
knife is present in a sentence, both the fact that it moves in a directed
motion during the event, and is forceful at the end of it, is captured in
VerbNet. The fact that there is no contact between the knife and Caesar
during the event, but there is at the end, is also represented. Such
information is missing in Parsons’ and Jackendoff’s structures, although
Jackendoff does represent the fact that the knife ends up at a place which
is part of Caesar (either his back or something else), with the use of the
locative BE state function.
This brings us to another issue. The fact that it is Caesar’s back that
is stabbed is clearly captured in Jackendoff’s structures, by the use of the
PART function. In Parsons formula, however, there is no predicate that
links the two participants Back and Caesar together. A possible solution to
this might be to change the name of the Back to Caesar’s back, but this change
would really only affect the name of the participant, not the meaning
behind it. So, another solution might be to introduce a predicate that
links the participants, making the back a part of Caesar (perhaps with a
predicate called Part that would take two linked entities). In the VerbNet
structures the fact that the location is Caesar’s back isn’t represented at all
(as mentioned earlier, with the issue of the location not being part of the
semantic structure).
The structures that best represent the tense of the sentences are clearly
Parsons’ formulas. Nowhere in Jackendoff’s or VerbNet’s structures is it
mentioned that the event took place in the past. This shows that there is a
stronger relationship between syntax and semantics in Parsons’ framework
than in the other two, which focus more on the core meaning of the
sentences. So, while there is a difference in the underlying event theory
between a sentence in the present tense and one in the past tense, there is
no focus on such a difference in the other two frameworks.
7.2 Hit
The verb hit can be used in conjunction with an Instrument, which is
typically used by an Agent in order to affect some Theme. A sentence
involving all of these roles can have many different surface realizations, a
typical one being the use of a with-phrase to include the Instrument. In that
case, the Instrument appears as an argument to the prepositional phrase,
while the Theme typically appears in the direct object position. However,
the reverse positioning occurs when the preposition is against instead of
with; the Instrument is then the direct object and the Theme acts in the
prepositional phrase as an argument. Effectively, the two different surface
realizations can refer to the same event, but from different perspectives.
Additionally, hit can be used in a purely transitive sentence without any
prepositional adjuncts. In that case, both the Agent and the Instrument can
act as the subject [17, p. 67].
Consider the examples in (85) below, where sentence (85a) shows the
use of a with-phrase, sentence (85b) the use of an against-phrase, sentence
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(85c) the use of the pure transitive variant with the Agent (John) as the
subject, and sentence (85d) with the Instrument (the hammer) as the subject.
(85) a. John hit the nail with the hammer.
b. John hit the hammer against the nail.
c. John hit the nail.
d. The hammer hit the nail.
Here, the two sentences in (85a) and (85b) both entail the sentence in
(85d), because in both cases it is apparent that it is the hammer that comes
into contact with the nail, and not John himself. If we assume that sentences
(85a) and (85b) refer to the same event, then they also should entail one
another. In sentence (85c), on the other hand, there is no mention of an
Instrument being used, so the logical conclusion is that it is John who
directly hit the nail, by not using any Instrument at all. However, sentence
(85c) could perhaps be understood as there being an obligatory unknown
Instrument that is just not mentioned, similar to the verb stab, discussed in
section 7.1. The Instrument could then just be a part of the Agent’s body,
like his fist, for instance. But if we understand sentences (85a) and (85b) as
there being a contact between the hammer and the nail, with John as the
causer behind it, and sentence (85c) as there being a direct contact between
some body part of John and the nail, then logically the two sentences in
(85a) and (85b) do not entail sentence (85c), though they do, as mentioned,
entail the sentence in (85d).
7.2.1 Jackendoff’s Conceptual Structure Representation
Jackendoff emphasizes that the verb hit can have two different analyses,
namely as a motion verb or as an inchoative [15, p. 109-110, 142-145].
The structures in (86) below show how the pure transitive sentence in
(85d) would look like using these two alternations, one using the GO event
function and the other using the INCH event function.
(86) a. [event GO+C ([thing HAMMER],
[path TO ([place AT ([thing NAIL])])])]
b. [event INCH ([state BE+C ([thing HAMMER],
[place AT ([thing NAIL])])])]
Remember that the +C superscript constitutes that the function involves
contact between arguments, here the contact between the hammer and the
nail. Jackendoff proposes that the structure in (86b) is the correct one for the
sentences in question because the version in (86a) would permit continuous
contact with the nail and not a sudden one. The fact that the motion of the
hammer should culminate when coming into contact with the nail is not
captured directly with structure (86a), but it is with structure (86b) because
it describes a state coming about. Structure (86a) could, for instance, signify
a meaning similar to the sentence The hammer stroked the nail, which is
instead an event with continuous movement.
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In other words, the two structures illustrate two types of contact
meanings, namely moving contact, in structure (86a), and impact contact,
in structure (86b). A third contact meaning type called pure contact is
also possible, which occurs with verbs like touch and contact. This type
is represented simply as a BE state, without a surrounding INCH event (as
in structure (86b)).
So, the inchoative variant should be used for the verb in this case
because the intended meaning (an impact) follows automatically from it.
The fact that it is John who acts as the causing Agent in the first three
sentences is captured by the use of the CAUSE function. In other words,
the sentence in (85b), for instance, can be paraphrased as John caused the
hammer to hit against the nail.
The conceptual structures for the four sentences in question are shown
in (87) below. Notice that only structures (87a) and (87b) include the BY
function, since only those two mention an Instrument. Also, it should
be noted that although the three structures in (87a), (87c) and (87d) were
specifically proposed by Jackendoff [15, p. 143], there is some uncertainty
as to what the structure in (87b) should use as its place function. For now,
let’s that a possible solution is to use the place function AGAINST, since
that is what is used in the sentence.
(87) a. [event CAUSE ([thing JOHN],
[event INCH ([state BE+C ([thing HAMMER],
[place AT ([thing NAIL])])])])
AFF+ ([thing JOHN], [thing NAIL])
[BY [event CAUSE ([thing JOHN],
[AFF− ([thing HAMMER], [thing NAIL])]
AFF+ ([thing JOHN], [thing HAMMER])]
b. [event CAUSE ([thing JOHN],
[event INCH ([state BE+C ([thing HAMMER],
[place AGAINST ([thing NAIL])])])])
AFF+ ([thing JOHN], [thing NAIL])
[BY [event CAUSE ([thing JOHN],
[AFF− ([thing HAMMER], [thing NAIL])]
AFF+ ([thing JOHN], [thing HAMMER])]
c. [event INCH ([state BE+C ([thing JOHN],
[place AT ([thing NAIL])])])
AFF+ ([thing JOHN], [thing NAIL])]
d. [event INCH ([state BE+C ([thing HAMMER],
[place AT ([thing NAIL])])])
AFF− ([thing HAMMER], [thing NAIL])]
Structures (87a) and (87b) are pretty much the same, except for having
two different place functions (AT and AGAINST). In both cases, we have
a CAUSE event where the Agent, John, causes an INCH event that takes a
BE state as an argument. This state involves contact, represented by the
+C superscript. In the state, the Hammer is placed either at or against the
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NAIL. Also in both cases, John volitionally affects the nail, and he does this
by (using the BY function) causing the hammer to involuntarily affect the
nail. In this other causing event, John also volitionally affects the hammer.
The structures in (87c) and (87d) are a bit simpler since they lack the
BY function. They are both INCH events and their structures are basically
the same as the INCH events in structures (87a) and (87b) (plus the AFF
function), except for the different things involved. In structure (87c) it is
John that is placed at the nail, whereas in structure (87d) it is instead the
hammer that is placed there. In both of them, the thing in question affects
the nail, but while this is done volitionally in structure (87c), it is not in
structure (87d) (since a hammer can’t really act on its own intentionally).
Because the INCH function in structure (87d) is exactly the same as in
structure (87a) and the AFF function that is present in structure (87d) is also
present inside the BY function in structure (87a), it is apparent that structure
(87a) entails structure (87d). This is also the case in the relationship between
structures (87b) and (87d), except for the fact that the AGAINST place
function is used instead. However, if we assume that using the AT function
conveys the same meaning; that the structure for the sentence in (85b) is the
same as the one in (87a), then structure (87b) also entails structure (87d).
Still, this does illustrate that it can be hard to know which function one
should use based on the sentence given, and how such different functions
result in entailments not being captured. Additionally, one can see that
structures (87a) and (87b) do not entail structure (87c), since structure (87c)
is not part of any of the other two. So, these representations correctly
capture the wanted entailments.
7.2.2 Parsons’ Underlying Event Representation
Following the template provided by Parsons [25, p. 260], which suggests a
formula for the transitive verb hit [25, p. 266], the resulting representations
for the given sentences are shown in (88). Note that the template says that
when hit is involved, the subject can be either an Agent or a Performer,
where the former acts in formulas (88a), (88b) and (88c), and the latter acts
in formula (88d). Remember that a Performer is something that has no
immediate agency and is not directly controlled by anything, which would
be the case when the hammer is the subject.
(88) a. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Hitting(e) &
Agent(e, John) & Theme(e, Nail) & Instrument(e, Hammer)]
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Hitting(e) &
Agent(e, John) & Theme(e, Hammer) & Against(e, Nail)]
c. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Hitting(e) &
Agent(e, John) & Theme(e, Nail)]
d. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Hitting(e) &
Performer(e, Hammer) & Theme(e, Nail)]
All of these formulas involve a Hitting event that happened in the past,
and they all refer to some Theme taking part in that event. However,
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assuming that the two prepositional phrases in sentences (85a) and (85b)
result in two adverbial predicates called With and Against, respectively, in
Parsons’ theory (remember the use of the predicate Instrument instead of
With), the formulas in (88a) and (88b) are quite different from each other.
Also assuming that the Theme is directly mapped from the direct object in
the sentence, the two formulas differ when it comes to what this Theme is
and in their use of adverbial predicates.
Formula (88c) is basically the same as the one in (88a), except without
the Instrument predicate, while the formula in (88d) is very much the same
as the one in (88c), using, for instance, the same Theme. However, while
formula (88c) appoints John as the Agent, in formula (88d) there is no Agent
but rather a Performer.
If we assume that the formulas are the correct ones for this framework,
none of the wanted entailments are captured. Neither formula (88a) nor
formula (88b) entail formula (88d) because the latter uses a predicate that
is not present in the other two (the Performer predicate). Formulas (88a) and
(88b) are a little too different from each other, considering the fact that the
sentences they represent can be used to refer to the same event, according to
Fillmore [9, p. 75]. In addition, a seemingly incorrect entailment is present
between formulas (88a) and (88c), since both are the same, except for the
present Instrument predicate in formula (88a). However, this entailment
might in fact be correct after all, since John does indeed hit the nail in both
cases (though the Instrument used is known in formula (88a) but unknown
in formula (88c)).
For the correct entailments to be captured, the participants should have
the same thematic roles in all the sentences. John should be the Agent,
the nail should be the Theme and the hammer should be the Instrument.
However, it is unclear how this should come about when the sentences
are mapped to the formulas. How can it be known that the nail is the
Theme when used in an against-phrase, and that the hammer can also be an
Instrument used by some unknown Agent in formula (88d)? A main reason
for why the wanted entailments are not captured is the fact that the hammer
changes its thematic role to Performer when it acts as the subject. If we said
that the hammer is either a Performer in formula (88a), or an Instrument in
formula (88d), then the correct entailments would have been captured. But
in the current framework, the fact that one of those options should be the
case is very much unclear.
7.2.3 VerbNet’s Semantic Representation
The verb hit is a member in six classes in VerbNet, namely bump-18.4,
contiguous_location-47.8, hit-18.1-1, hurt-40.8.3, reach-51.8 and throw-17.1-1.
However, let’s assume the correct class is hit-18.1-1, both because hit is
part of its name, and because it is the only class that permits the syntactic
construction used in (85b), where against is used in conjunction with an
Agent.
In addition, the class contiguous_location-47.8 involves a Theme and a
Co-Theme and no Agent, which does not apply to our sentences. Hurt-
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40.8.3 requires its Patient to be either a body part or reflexive, meaning
that someone or John himself would need to be hurt, which also does not
apply here. Finally, reach-51.8 and throw-17.1-1 represent two quite different
senses all together. However, bump-18.4 does provide a suitable frame for
the sentence in (85b), but without the Agent (resulting in the sentence The
hammer hit against the nail), so this will be considered briefly at the end of
this section.
Using the frames available in the class hit-18.1-1 the semantic structures
for the sentences are shown in (89) below, where A is the Agent, P is the
Patient and I is the Instrument.
(89) a. CAUSE(JohnA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, HammerI) &
NOT(CONTACT(DURING(E), HammerI , NailP)) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, HammerI) &
CONTACT(END(E), HammerI , NailP) &
USE(DURING(E), JohnA, HammerI)
b. CAUSE(JohnA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, HammerI) &
NOT(CONTACT(DURING(E), HammerI , NailP)) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, HammerI) &
CONTACT(END(E), HammerI , NailP) &
USE(DURING(E), JohnA, HammerI)
c. CAUSE(JohnA, E) &
MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, JohnA) &
NOT(CONTACT(DURING(E), JohnA, NailP)) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, JohnA) &
CONTACT(END(E), JohnA, NailP)
d. MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, HammerI) &
NOT(CONTACT(DURING(E), HammerI , NailP)) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, HammerI) &
CONTACT(END(E), HammerI , NailP)
The structures in (89a) and (89b) are exactly the same, even though their
syntactic structures differ somewhat. In both, John (acting as the Agent)
causes the event to happen and he also uses the hammer (acting as the
Instrument) during the event. The manner of which the hammer behaves is
that of directed motion during the event, but forceful at the end of it. Also,
there is no contact between the hammer and the nail during the event, but
there is at the end. Because of these same structures, the fact that they entail
one another is captured.
The structure in (89c) is similar to the two structures above it, except
that the focus is on the Agent and not the Instrument when it comes to
manner and contact. Instead of the hammer being the argument to the
MANNER predicates, John is used. Also, instead of the hammer and the nail
being the two arguments to the CONTACT predicates, John and the nail are
used. Because of these differences, the suggested fact that structures (89a)
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and (89b) should not entail structure (89c) is captured. Also, structure (89d)
consists of the same semantic predicates as in structures (89a) and (89b),
though it lacks the CAUSE predicate. So, structures (89a) and (89b) both
entail structure (89d), which is correct.
The semantic structure provided by the class bump-18.4 for the altern-
ative sentence The hammer hit against the nail, which should be entailed by
the sentences in (85a) and (85b), is shown in structure (90) below. As can
be seen, it is exactly the same as the one in structure (89d) except that the
roles have been changed. The hammer is the Theme instead of the Instru-
ment, while the nail is the Location and not the Patient. Because of these
differences there is no entailment relation present between the frames in
hit-18.1-1 and this frame from bump-18.4, even though the two meanings
here are very much related. Had the names of the roles been excluded,
however, there would have been a relation, since the same participants are
placed in the same argument positions.
(90) MANNER(DURING(E), DirectedMotion, HammerTHEME) &
NOT(CONTACT(DURING(E), HammerTHEME, NailLOCATION)) &
MANNER(END(E), Forceful, HammerTHEME) &
CONTACT(END(E), HammerTHEME, NailLOCATION)
7.2.4 Notable Differences and Similarities
Although John is appointed as the Agent in all three representations for the
sentences in (85a) and (85b), the role he has in sentence (85c) is different in
its given conceptual structure (he is still the Agent in the structures (87a)
and (87b)). In structure (87c), John appears inside the BELOC function, so he
then occupies the role of Theme instead of Agent.
The hammer, on the other hand, is always the Theme in both
Jackendoff’s structures and the VerbNet structures, though there are
significant changes going on in the underlying event formulas. In formula
(88a), the hammer is the Instrument, but in formula (88b) it is the Theme,
and in formula (88d) it is the Performer. This role change between formulas
seems quite unnatural, since these events are very closely related (the
hammer does pretty much the same thing in all).
The nail acts as an argument to a place function in Jackendoff’s
structures, making it the Location or Goal whenever it appears in structure
(87). In VerbNet, the nail is always appointed the role of Patient. However,
while this participant is said to be the Theme in formulas (88a), (88c) and
(88d), it instead acts as an argument to the Against predicate in formula
(88b).
So, VerbNet is the one framework that is most consistent with its
role labeling here, appointing the same roles for each participant in all
structures, while the other two representations juggle between different
roles for some of the participants. This depends, of course, on which
class is chosen for the given sentences, as this choice may lead to different
thematic role labels. This was seen in the alternative structure that bump-
18.4 provides, which appoints rather different roles to the participants.
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So, while it’s typically quite clear what roles the arguments in a sentence
should have in Jackendoff’s and Parsons’ frameworks, this mapping
can prove to be much harder in VerbNet, since it provides a lot more
possibilities. In addition, VerbNet by itself does not know just from the
sentence what the underlying meaning is supposed to be, so a clear, one-
to-one choice of the right semantic structure is not possible in certain cases.
Jackendoff’s conceptual structures represent the idea that either John or
the hammer is placed at or against the nail, and also how the participants
affect each other (either voluntarily or not). The latter information is
missing in VerbNet, though those structures do have even more detailed
descriptions of the event. The underlying event formulas lack any detailed
descriptions of what actually happens in a Hitting event. This is similar to
what was talked about in section 7.1.4, so this section won’t go deeper into
it here.
Both the structures provided by Jackendoff and VerbNet perfectly
capture the wanted entailments here, most importantly the fact that
sentences (85a) and (85b) should not entail sentence (85c), but only sentence
(85d). The underlying event formulas, on the hand, does not capture any
entailments, basically because of the different predicates used and the fact




For these verbs a participant goes from being alive to being dead, either
because of some direct cause (like a killer performing a murder) or
from something unknown. The coming section will be looking at the
related verbs kill and die, though similar verbs, such as murder and slay
are also verbs of killing. Note, however, that Levin lists die under a
verb class involving disappearance (Verbs of Appearance, Disappearance,
and Occurrence), but it’s inclusion here is all because of its apparent
relationship with die [17, p. 230,258].
8.1 Kill/Die
The relationship between the verbs kill and die have been briefly touched
upon before, for instance in section 2.3. Though they do not share the same
lemma they can still be used to describe the same event instance, only
through different perspectives. For kill the subject (in an active sentence)
is the Agent causing the death of some Theme, while for die the subject
is instead the Theme, where the mention of an Agent is typically lacking.
These different forms are also related to the given state of the Theme.
The three sentences in (91) show some uses of these two verbs, how they
might be related to each other and to the adjective dead. Note that sentence
(91a) is a causative sentence, where John is the Agent, sentence (91b) is
an inchoative sentence, where Bill is the Theme (he is also the Theme in
sentence (91a)), and sentence (91c) is a stative sentence describing the status
of a Theme (again Bill).
(91) a. John killed Bill.
b. Bill died.
c. Bill is dead.
Sentences (91a) and (91b) basically describe the same event (if we
assume that Bill died because of John in sentence (91b)), which results in
the state of Bill being dead (sentence (91c)). Logically, sentence (91a) should
entail sentence (91b) because if someone is killed then that someone also
dies. However, the reverse statement may not be true; if someone dies it is
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not certain that they were killed by anyone. Both sentences (91a) and (91b)
should also entail the state in sentence (91c), because if someone dies then
that person will always be in the state of being dead following the dying
event.
8.1.1 Jackendoff’s Conceptual Structure Representation
Assuming that the conceptual structures for these sentences would involve
the state of Bill, and the use of the functions CAUSE and INCH, the
structures in (92) show how Jackendoff’s theory might represent them.
Note that these exact structures were not directly proposed by Jackendoff,
but are rather suggestions that conform well with his given framework.
(92) a. [event CAUSE ([thing JOHN],
[event INCH ([state BEIDENT ([thing BILL],
[place AT ([property DEAD])])])]
b. [event INCH ([state BEIDENT ([thing BILL],
[place AT ([property DEAD])])])]
c. [state BEIDENT ([thing BILL],
[place AT ([property DEAD])])]
To summarize, structure (92a) involves a CAUSE event where John is the
cause and an INCH event is the effect. This INCH event is the same as the
event in structure (92b) which describes the coming about (the inchoative)
of the state of Bill having the property of being dead. This state is again the
same as the state in structure (92c). The entailment is captured perfectly
by the fact that each entailed structure is part of another structure that
leads to it. Structure (92b) is entailed from structure (92a) because it is
itself an argument to the CAUSE function. In addition, structure (92c) is
also entailed from structure (92b) (and consequently structure (92a) as well)
because it is an argument to the INCH function.
Note that Jackendoff also proposes the rather simple function DIE for
a sentence like the one in (91b) [15, p. 299]. The structure would then be
[event DIE([thing BILL])], though let’s assume the structures in (92) for this
example.
8.1.2 Parsons’ Underlying Event Representation
Next, let’s look at Parsons’ formulas. Following his logical form for
causative-inchoative sentences, the resulting formulas for these three
sentences are shown in (93) below [25, p. 268,277].
(93) a. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Agent(e, John) &
(∃e2)(∃t2) [t2 ∈ I & BECOME#(Dead)(e2) & Theme(e2, Bill) &
Cul(e2, t2) & CAUSE(e, e2)]]
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & BECOME#(Dead)(e) &
Theme(e, Bill) & Cul(e, t)]
c. (∃s)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Being-dead(s) & Theme(s, Bill) &
Hold(s, t) & ¬(∃t2) [t2 < t & Hold(s, t2)]]
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Both formulas (93a) and (93b) are very much alike, except that formula
(93a) has a surrounding structure which describes a causing event (e), that
takes place in the same interval as the other event (e2). The added CAUSE
predicate constitutes the fact that e causes e2. The event e in (93b) is then
the exact same event as e2 in formula (93a), except without the CAUSE
predicate. For instance, each has Bill as its Theme. Similar to the use of
the CAUSE and INCH functions in the conceptual structures in (92), the
CAUSE predicate and the BECOME# function represent the causative and
the inchoative sentences, respectively.
Because of the embedded event in formula (93a) it is apparent that it
entails formula (93b), which is what we want to be true. The entailment
between formulas (93b) and (93c) is further established because of the given
meaning postulate that Parsons proposes for inchoative sentences. As
mentioned in section 4.5, a meaning postulate for a dying event would look
like the one in (94) below, which says that if there is a becoming-dead event
with X as its Theme, and it culminates, then there exists a state of being
dead which holds, has the same X as its Theme, and did not previously
hold. Note that the point in time, t, is included here, which was not present
in Parsons’ original structure.
(94) BECOME#(Dead)(e) & Cul(e, t) & Theme(e, X)→
(∃s) [Being-Dead(s) & Hold(s, t) & Theme(s, X) &
¬PREVIOUSLY(Hold(s, t))]
Because formula (93b) has all the prerequisite conditions that appear at
the left side of the arrow in the meaning postulate in (94), the fact that a
being-dead state exists is true. This state is exactly the same as the state
in formula (93c). Note that the last part of the formula, which refers to
the non-existence of a time point that holds before the current time, means
exactly the same as ¬PREVIOUSLY(Hold(s, t)). So, similar to the Jackendoff
approach, all the required entailments are captured by these formulas, plus
the additional meaning postulate.
8.1.3 VerbNet’s Semantic Representation
In VerbNet, the verb kill appears as a member in the classes murder-42.1-
1 and subjugate-42.3, though let’s assume the former class is the correct for
the given sense here, because it involves the semantic predicate ALIVE. The
semantic structures in that other class only say that Bill becomes subjugated
during the event (using the predicate SUBJUGATED), and the event is
caused by Brutus. The verb die, on the other hand, only appears in one
class, namely disappearance-48.2. Using the frames available in these classes,
the resulting semantic structures are shown in (95). Note again that A
stands for the Agent and P stands for the Patient.





The structure in (95a) seems pretty logical. At the start of the event
the Patient (Bill) is alive, but as a result of the event he is not alive. The
cause of the event is the Agent (John). Structure (95b), on the other hand,
uses an entirely different semantic predicate, namely DISAPPEAR, which
seems to give a very different meaning to the event. Other members in the
class include vanish and disappear, giving the impression that the meaning
is not referring to losing one’s life, but rather to someone’s disappearance.
Die points to two different senses in WordNet, namely the typical sense
involving the "loss of all bodily attributes and functions necessary to
sustain life", and disappearance; of "coming to an end" [18].
A more intuitive approach to the verb die would probably have been the
use of the same predicates as in structure (95a), except without the CAUSE
predicate. But because VerbNet does not offer any such alternatives, it
seems appropriate to conclude that the wanted entailment is not captured
in the current state of the database.
However, the fact that structure (95a) entails structure (95c) is captured,
since the ALIVE predicate refers to the state of the given participant (which
is Bill in this case). If the state of Bill not being alive is the resultant state
of the event in structure (95a), then the structure in (95c) is entailed if we
assume that that event follows directly from the the event in structure (95a)
(perhaps by linking them with the AFTER predicate). Note that the E
variable in structure (95c) denotes that the predicate holds at all times in
the event, which is a way of representing states in VerbNet.
8.1.4 Notable Differences and Similarities
Both Jackendoff and Parsons operate with two distinct events here, the first
being the causative event where John is the Theme, and the second being
the inchoative event, where Bill is the Theme. This is represented by the use
of the CAUSE and INCH functions in the conceptual structures, and CAUSE
and BECOME# in the underlying event formulas. Similarly, VerbNet also
makes use of a CAUSE predicate, though it lacks any representation of
an inchoative event, referring instead to one, single event and its various
stages. It also operates with a Patient, rather than a Theme, though these
are very much the same kind of role.
While Jackendoff and Parsons refer to the state of being dead, VerbNet
instead refers to the state of being alive, by the use of the predicate ALIVE.
In other words, they use different primitives when it comes to this state of
being. The VerbNet structures capture the fact that Caesar is alive before
he becomes dead, something which is not represented in Jackendoff’s or
Parsons’ structures. So, in a way, VerbNet captures an inherent condition
that says that for something to die it must first be alive.
Both the conceptual structures and the underlying event formulas
capture the wanted entailment in this example. The VerbNet structures, on
the other hand, does not capture the most important entailment, namely
the fact that if someone is killed then that person also dies. This is because
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Verbs of Putting: Spray/Load
Verbs
Verbs that fall into this category have been chosen (note that Levin lists
spray/load-verbs as a subclass of Verbs of Putting) because they can operate
in an interesting kind of alternation called the "spray/load" alternation [17,
p. 50]. They involve the organization or placement of something in a
location, either all over it or in one particular place. Other verbs of this
kind include splatter, crowd and pile, for instance. Note that the following
section will only be looking at the verb load, since the focus will be on the
entailment involved with the particular alternation mentioned [17, p. 117].
9.1 Load
The verb load can be used in at least two different ways which alter the
overall meaning. Sentences using the verb typically describe events where
something is loaded into or onto some location and the differing meanings
depend on the order of these participants in the syntax. If the thing being
loaded, let’s call it the Theme, is in the direct object position, and the
location is included at the end of the sentence in a prepositional phrase
(starting with onto or into, for instance), then it is not really certain that the
location was completely filled with the Theme. In other words, there is no
sense of "completeness", that the Theme was evenly distributed across the
location [15, p. 106].
If, however, the load sentence uses the location as the direct object, and
the Theme as an argument to a following prepositional phrase (typically
a with-phrase), then the idea of completeness is fully conveyed. It is now
certain that the location is completely filled, or distributed, with the Theme.
Consider the sentences in (96) as illustrative examples, where sentence
(96a) shows a non-distributive version of load, and sentence (96b) shows
a distributed one.
(96) a. Kim loaded bricks onto the truck.
b. Kim loaded the truck with bricks.
Here, it is certain that Kim loaded the truck completely with bricks in
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sentence (96b), but not in sentence (96a), as the truck might only end up
half-full in that sentence. However, it seems logical to imagine that the
sense of load in (96a) involves the same kind of action as in sentence (96b),
except that we don’t know if the goal of reaching a completely filled truck
is ever reached. But the action done in sentence (96b) would still involve
the same kind of action as in sentence (96a); if Kim managed to completely
fill the truck with bricks, then she also loaded bricks onto the truck in order
to do so [15, p. 172]. As such, it seems logical to assume that the sentence
in (96b) entails the one in (96a), and not vice versa.
It is worth noting, however, that WordNet lists these two meanings as
two distinct senses for the verb load [18]. One involves "filling or placing a
load on", which would be the distributive meaning, and the other involves
"putting something on a structure or conveyance", which would instead
be the non-distributive meaning. These synsets do not share any relations
with each other in that database, leading to the idea that there might not
be an entailment here after all. However, before concluding anything,
the following sections will look at the structures proposed by the three
representations under discussion.
9.1.1 Jackendoff’s Conceptual Structure Representation
In Jackendoff [15, p. 171-174], this issue regarding load and similar verbs
is discussed. The author mentions that there are two possible ways that
the two kinds of events might be connected. Both involves representing
the distributive meaning as a causative-inchoative and the non-distributive
as involving locative motion along a path. The first method assumes that
the the core meaning is the non-distributive one and the other meaning is
then simply a more elaborate modification of that core meaning. In other
words, the sentence in (96b) can be paraphrased as "Kim filled the truck
with bricks by loading bricks onto the truck", where the core meaning lies
in the sentence following by. Notice that the word filled is used here instead,
conveying the fact that the truck was completely loaded.
The other method involves the complete opposite. The core meaning is
instead said to be the distributive sentence and the other kind is simply
an elaboration. Therefore, the sentence in (96a) can be paraphrased as
"Kim loaded bricks onto the truck in order to fill the truck with bricks."
In other words, Kim loaded the bricks onto the truck so that the goal of
filling it is completely reached. Jackendoff does not reach a conclusion
as to which of these methods should be applied to his theory. However,
we can assume that the first method is the most proper solution here, as
Jackendoff has conveniently introduced the function BY, which seems to
cover the nature of the first example sentence given above. In other words,
a conceptual structure for the sentence in (96b) would involve the use of the
BY function, which would take as its argument the same event structure as
for the sentence in (96a).
Consider the proposed structures shown in (97) below, which makes
use of the lexical entry that Jackendoff proposes in Jackendoff [15, p. 173].
Notice the use of the superscript +D which, as mentioned in section 3.4,
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conveys the distributive meaning of the place function. Note also the use
of the PL function, which is used to represent the word bricks, a plural (this
was discussed in section 3.5).
(97) a. [event CAUSE ([thing KIM],
[event GOLOC ([thing PL−B,+I ([thing+B,−I BRICK])],
[path TO ([place ON ([thing TRUCK])])])])]
b. [event CAUSE ([thing KIM],
[event INCH ([state BELOC
([thing PL−B,+I ([thing+B,−I BRICK])],
[place ON+D ([thing TRUCK])])])])
[BY [event CAUSE ([thing KIM],
[event GOLOC ([thing PL−B,+I ([thing+B,−I BRICK])],
[path TO ([place ON ([thing TRUCK])])])])]]]
The structure in (97a) says that Kim causes the bricks to go on a
locative path onto (or to on) the truck. This same event structure is used
inside the BY function in structure (97b). In addition, structure (97b)
says that Kim caused the inchoative event where the bricks end up being
evenly distributed onto the truck. In other words, Kim loaded the truck
completely with bricks by doing the same event in structure (97a), namely
by causing the bricks to go onto the truck. Because the structure in (97a) is
embedded inside structure (97b), then the correct entailment is captured.
9.1.2 Parsons’ Underlying Event Representation
Interestingly, Parsons includes the verb load both in his list of transitive
verbs and in is his list of causative-inchoatives [25, p. 266-268]. In the latter
list there are two entries for the verb, which both have the same resulting
adjective state, namely the state of being loaded. So, the only difference
between the two entries comes from the example sentences he provides,
which are load the wagon and load the hay. These appear to convey the same
kind of meaning as the two sentences provided in (96), where the wagon
can be seen as the location and the hay can be seen as the Theme. As such,
one entry seems to convey the distributive meaning, while the other the
non-distributive meaning. After all, there is presumably no way of loading
hay with anything. The question is then what the difference between the
two resulting formulas will be.
In the list of transitive verbs, Parsons also lists two entries for load,
where one is an event and the other is a process. Remember from section
4.4 that a process is still a kind of event, except that it does not culminate,
but rather holds. The sentence in (96a) can be seen as a process that could
have been stopped at any time, even before a goal of perhaps completely
filling the truck was achieved. Such an alternative event would instead
be an accomplishment, where the event would culminate the moment the
truck was finally fully loaded. The example that Parsons provides, which
is load hay in the barn supports this, as that sentence could easily be replaced
by the one in (96a) and still retain the same event type. That sentence can
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be given an alternative progressive form, such as "Kim was loading bricks
onto the truck."
Because of these two listings, this section will be looking at the two
formulas separately, before reaching a conclusion as to which of them
would be the most fitting to use in order to capture the wanted entailment.
Utilizing the template that Parsons provides for a transitive sentence [25, p.
266], the resulting formulas for the sentences in (96) are shown in (98). The
alternative causative-inchoative formulas are shown further below.
(98) a. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Hold(e, t) & Loading(e) &
Agent(e, Kim) & Theme(e, Bricks) & Onto(e, Truck)]
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Loading(e) &
Agent(e, Kim) & Theme(e, Truck) & With(e, Bricks)]
Assuming that the direct object of each sentence maps into the Theme
of the semantic formula, and the following prepositional phrases are each
given their own predicate, the formulas in (98) have many differences that
result in the fact that there is no entailment between them. Although both
are Loading events that took place in an interval in the past, formula (98a) is
a process that held at a point in time within that interval, while formula
(98b) culminated at that time. Also, the Themes are different between
the two, being the bricks in (98a), but the truck in formula (98b). Finally,
the use of the two predicates Onto and With, which represent the adjunct
prepositional phrases, are different between the two formulas. Because
of this, the notion that formula (98b) should entail formula (98a) is not
captured.
As such, let’s look at the alternative causative structures instead and see
what the differences are. These structures are shown in (99) below. Note
that the With predicate used in formula (99a) (and in formula (98b as well)
is not the same as the instrumental With (which was renamed Instrument),
but rather an ornamental With, which says that something is added to the
Theme.
(99) a. (∃e1)(∃t1)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Agent(e, Kim) &
(∃e2)(∃t2) [t2 ∈ I & BECOME#(Loaded)(e2) & Theme(e, Bricks)
& Onto(e2, Truck) & Cul(e2, t2) & CAUSE(e, e2)]]
b. (∃e1)(∃t1)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Agent(e, Kim) &
(∃e2)(∃t2) [t2 ∈ I & BECOME#(Loaded)(e2) & Theme(e, Truck) &
With(e, Bricks) & Cul(e2, t2) & CAUSE(e, e2)]]
Both formulas involve two events, e and e2, where the former is the
causing event, and the latter is the inchoative event. In other words, in both
cases, the Agent (Kim) does something that creates a state of the truck being
loaded (e causes e2). However, formula (99b) has an additional predicate
(With) which represents the fact that what the truck is being loaded with is
bricks. The BECOME# function thereby introduces a state of being-loaded-
with-bricks which has the truck as its Theme. Formula (99a), lacks the With
predicate, but it instead uses the predicate Onto, with Truck as its second
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argument. Also, a different Theme for the e2 event is used in formula (99a)
(the bricks, rather than the truck).
These small inequalities result in some rather subtle differences in
meaning. While formula (99b) focuses on the truck as the Theme, and how
it ends up having the state of Being-loaded-with-bricks, formula (99a), on the
other hand, focuses on the bricks being the Theme, and says that they end
up in a state of Being-loaded-onto-the-truck. In other words, the formulas
seem to represent two distinct senses of the adjective loaded, formula (99a)
saying that the bricks have been loaded onto the truck, and formula (99b)
saying that the truck has been loaded with bricks. While it is correct to say
that the truck is completely loaded in formula (99b), it is likewise correct to
say that the bricks are also completely loaded in formula (99a).
The question is then how the loaded truck is related to the loaded
bricks. How can the fact that the bricks that are put onto the loaded
truck in formula (99b) are also in the state of having been loaded onto the
truck? In the current formulas there is no representation of the fact that
formula (99b) also involves the bricks being loaded onto the truck, which
is represented in formula (99a). Therefore, formula (99b) does not entail
formula (99a), which, as suggested, should be the case. This observation
might, however, suggest that this entailment is incorrect after all, as there
is clearly a difference between loading bricks onto the truck and the truck
itself becoming loaded with bricks.
Still, following the reasoning of Jackendoff’s structures (shown in
structure (97)) it seems logical to assume that for a truck to become loaded
with bricks there must be an event where bricks are actually loaded onto
the truck. But Parsons’ current formulas do not include such a relationship
between the events. If they did, then the formula in (99b) would include
some representation of the fact that the bricks also become loaded (the
structure in (99a)). So, unlike Jackendoff, Parsons proposes that there is
no entailment present between the two sentences here (this is clear from
both the structures in (98) and (99)).
9.1.3 VerbNet’s Semantic Representation
Load is a member of only one class in VerbNet, namely spray-9.7-2. From its
superclass, the thematic roles Agent, Theme and Destination are available,
and the Destination must be both a location and not a region. The subclass
that load is a member of also adds another restriction to the Theme role,
saying that it must be concrete.
Given the frames available, where sentence (96a) has the phrase
structure NP V NP PP.Destination and (96b) has the phrase structure NP V
NP.Destination PP.Theme, the resulting semantic representations are shown
in structure (100), where A is the Agent, T is the Theme, and D is the
Destination. Note that in the original structure for (100a) a predicate
called PREP is used as a placeholder for whatever preposition is used
in the sentence [30, p. 389]. In this case the preposition is onto, so the
predicate ends up being ONTO. PREP is, in other words, a sentence specific
predicate, or variable predicate, and it is added as a subscript when it
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appears.
(100) a. MOTION(DURING(E), BricksT) &
NOT(ONTOPREP(START(E), BricksT, TruckD)) &
ONTOPREP(END(E), BricksT, TruckD) & CAUSE(KimA, E)
b. MOTION(DURING(E), BricksT) &
NOT(LOCATION(START(E), BricksT, TruckD)) &
LOCATION(END(E), BricksT, TruckD) & CAUSE(KimA, E)
The only difference between the two structures is the use of either
the predicate ONTO or LOCATION. The order and thematic role of the
participants remain the same in both; the bricks are the Theme and the
truck is the Destination. Structure (100a) says that the bricks are in motion
during the event because of Kim, and that the bricks are not on the truck at
the start of the event, but are at the end. Structure (100b) pretty much says
the same thing, except for saying that the bricks are not at the location of
the truck at the start, but are at the end of the event.
So, given the fact that two different predicates are used here, there is
no entailment present between the two formulas. If the predicate had
been the same, however, the structures would have entailed one another
(they would be the same), so structure (100a) would incorrectly entail
structure (100b). While the structure in (100a) seems like a logical way of
representing the given sentence, the structure in (100b) seems a little less
natural, because it doesn’t say anything about the state of the truck. The
fact that the truck should end up in a state of being completely loaded with
bricks is not conveyed in the current structure.
A solution might have been to use the predicate STATE and say that
the state of the truck at the end or as a result of the event is of being
loaded. The additional predicate might look like this: STATE(RESULT(E),
LoadedENDSTATE, TruckD), which uses the verb specific argument EndState
(see section 5.3.3). Using this additional predicate in conjunction with the
use of the same predicate (such as LOCATION), the wanted entailment
would have been captured.
9.1.4 Notable Differences and Similarities
All three frameworks appoint Kim as the causing Agent; as the first
argument to the CAUSE function in the conceptual structures, as the Agent
of the causing event in the underlying event formulas, and as an argument
to the CAUSE predicate in the VerbNet structures. Also, in almost all the
structures the Theme is said to be the bricks, while the location or the place
where they end up is the truck. Even though different functions are used
in the core structures in the conceptual structure representation (BELOC and
GOLOC)), the bricks are always used as the first argument, making it the
Theme. In VerbNet, as well, the Theme is always the bricks, even though
the truck acts as the direct object in sentence (96b).
However, in Parsons formula for the second sentence, shown in (99b),
the role of Theme is appointed to the truck instead, while the bricks appear
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as an argument to the With predicate. The reason for this stems from
the mapping from the syntactic structure of the sentence to the resulting
semantic formula. The direct object is said to be the Theme, while any
participants appearing in additional prepositional phrases are added to
corresponding prepositional predicates. Because of this, there is a shift in
focus between formulas (99a) and (99b), where in the former the focus of
the second event is the bricks, while it is the truck in the latter.
The Jackendoff structure in (97a) focuses on the bricks arriving at a
location, by moving along a path. In contrast, the formula that Parsons
provides for the same sentence, seen in formula (99a), instead centers on
the fact that the bricks ends up having the state of being loaded. If the
conceptual structure had approached the matter in the same way, then
the GO function would instead be under the identificational semantic field
(using the IDENT subscript), where the bricks would end up having the
property of being loaded (similar to the way kill and die was handled in
section 8.1). Similar to the Jackendoff approach, the VerbNet structure for
the same sentence (seen in structure (100a)) also focuses on the fact that the
bricks end up on the truck, rather than saying that the state of the bricks is
that of being loaded.
Because the focus in (99b) is on the state of the truck becoming loaded,
there is a difference between that structure and those that Jackendoff and
VerbNet propose. In neither of the latter two representations is there a
mention of the state of the truck, or of it having any sort of property. The
focus is still on the bricks arriving at the location of the truck.
The structures in (97) show how the PL function is used to effectively
represent plurarity, a concept that does not have much focus in the other
two structures. While the only difference between a brick and bricks in
Parsons’ formulas and the VerbNet structures lies in the name of the
participant in question, there is a lot more going on in the conceptual
structures. However, when it comes to the wanted entailment for the
current example there really isn’t any important difference between the
structure for bricks used and just using a thing function called BRICKS
(without the PL function), as long as the names are consistent between the
two sentence structures.
So, while the Parsons’ formulas center on the fact that the state of
either the truck or the bricks ends up as loaded (with the additional
information, such as with-bricks and on-the-truck), the other two structures
instead say that the location or place that the bricks occupy is the truck
(there is no mention of the participants’ identificational states). However,
because of differences between the structures for the two sentences, only
the conceptual structures capture the entailment introduced at the start of
this section, even though the VerbNet structures also come rather close to
capturing it. It seems the underlying event formulas maintain that there
is a clear difference between the two senses of being loaded, while in the
conceptual structures, and in the VerbNet structures (to a lesser degree), a





These verbs involve the consumption of something by some entity. This
chapter be looking at the verb eat, though other similar verbs include
devour, chew and drink. Eat is interesting because it can operate in both
transitive and intransitive sentences (something that devour can’t, for
instance), so the focus will be on the entailment relation between such
sentences involving eat [17, p. 213].
10.1 Eat
Although WordNet proposes that the two different uses of the verb eat
indicate two different senses, namely the notion of "taking in a meal" for the
intransitive and "taking in solid food" for the transitive [18], let’s assume in
this example that these do in fact represent the same sense (VerbNet has
only one class for eat, for instance). The only difference is the fact that
the thing being eaten is known in the transitive use, but unknown in the
intransitive.
Essentially, we would want a semantic representation to capture the
fact that a transitive sentence like the one in (101a) entails the similar
intransitive sentence in (101b) below, but not vice versa.
(101) a. Mary ate a cake.
b. Mary ate.
In other words, if Mary ate a cake, then it is also a fact that she simply
ate, but if she only ate, then it may not be true that what she ate was a cake.
10.1.1 Jackendoff’s Conceptual Structure Representation
In Jackendoff’s framework these two sentences would have the conceptual
structures shown in (102) below [15, p. 253]. Notice the use of a semantic
function called MOUTH-OF, which was not mentioned in the chapter
on Jackendoff’s theory (chapter 3). The function is a sort of body-part
identifier which essentially returns the mouth of some thing. It is similar
to the PART function, which also identifies that a thing is a part of another
thing. So, alternatively, we could have used the structure [thing MOUTH
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PART ([thing MARY])] here instead, although the structure used here is
what Jackendoff originally proposes.
(102) a. [event CAUSE ([thing MARY],
[event GOLOC ([thing CAKE],
[path TO ([place IN
([thing MOUTH-OF ([thing MARY])])])])])]
b. [event CAUSE ([thing MARY],
[event GOLOC ([thing ],
[path TO ([place IN
([thing MOUTH-OF ([thing MARY])])])])])]
These structures are both causative events where Mary is an Agent
causing a locative GO event involving a cake in structure (102a) and some
unknown thing in structure (102b). This thing that was eaten goes on a
path into a place (indicated by the TO and IN functions), where the place in
question is the mouth of Mary. So, the only difference between these two
structures is the fact that the argument to the GOLOC function is known
to be a cake in structure (102a), but is unknown (unspecified) in structure
(102b).
Because of this, it is easy to see that the correct entailment is captured
here, since structure (102b) is the same as structure (102a), except with a
missing specification of the thing argument in the GOLOC function. This
becomes perhaps more apparent if we take a look at the alternative flat
structures, shown in (103). Note that e is the causing event, e2 is the GOLOC
event, t is Mary, t2 is the thing being eaten, t3 is the mouth of Mary, p is
the path the thing being eaten travels, and pl is the place inside of Mary’s
mouth.
(103) a. [CAUSE(e) & ARG1(e, t) & ARG2(e, e2) & GOLOC(e2) &
ARG1(e2, t2) & ARG2(e2, p) & TO(p) & ARG1(p, pl) & IN(pl)
& ARG1(pl, t3) & MOUTH-OF(t3) & ARG1(t3, t) & MARY(t) &
CAKE(t2)]
b. [CAUSE(e) & ARG1(e, t) & ARG2(e, e2) & GOLOC(e2) &
ARG1(e2, t2) & ARG2(e2, p) & TO(p) & ARG1(p, pl) & IN(pl)
& ARG1(pl, t3) & MOUTH-OF(t3) & ARG1(t3, t) & MARY(t)]
Again, there is only one difference between the two structures, namely
the presence of the function CAKE(t2), which indicates that the thing being
eaten is a cake. This is missing in structure (103b), but present in structure
(103a). Because structure (103b) is made up of the exact same conjuncted
functions as structure (103a), except that it is missing one, structure (103a)
entails structure (103b), but not vice versa.
10.1.2 Parsons’ Underlying Event Representation
In the theory of underlying events, the two sentences have the formulas
shown in (104) [25, p. 260,265].
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(104) a. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Eating(e) &
Agent(e, Mary) & Theme(e, Cake)]
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Eating(e) &
Agent(e, Mary)]
Here, the sentences are both understood as Eating events, which
culminated at a point in time that happened in some time interval in the
past. Also in both, the Agent of the event is Mary. However, formula (104a)
is different from formula (104b) because it has an additional predicate that
specifies what the Theme of the event is, namely a Cake. This predicate is
of course missing from (104b). Because the formula in (104b) is the exact
same as the one in (104a), but without the Theme predicate, formula (104a)
entails formula (104b), and formula (104b) does not entail formula (104a).
As such, the correct entailment is captured in Parsons’ framework.
10.1.3 VerbNet’s Semantic Representation
As mentioned, the verb eat is only a member of a single class in VerbNet,
namely eat-39.1-1. This class allows both the transitive and the intransitive
use of the verb, represented by two frames that have the phrase patterns
NP V NP and NP V, respectively. These two frames also make use of the
same semantic predicate when representing the meaning. The structures
are shown in (105) below, where the A subscript constitutes the Agent, and
P the Patient.
(105) a. TAKE_IN(DURING(E), MaryA, CakeP)
b. TAKE_IN(DURING(E), MaryA, ?Patient)
We can assume the TAKE_IN predicate represents the fact that one
participant (the Patient in this case) is consumed by (or taken in by) some
other participant (the Agent here). There is only one difference between
the two structures, namely the specification of the Patient role. In structure
(105a) it is known to be a cake, but in structure (105a) it is unknown.
Following the approaches VerbNet has concerning verbal inference, the
correct entailment is perfectly captured. In structure (104b) the Theme is
simply removed, so an Eating event, in that case, seems to involve only
Mary, not any unknown Theme.
10.1.4 Notable Differences and Similarities
In all three representations, Mary is the Agent, while the cake is the Theme
or Patient. Also in all three, the only difference between the two structures
is the fact that the thing being eaten is a cake in the transitive sentence,
and unknown in the intransitive sentence. Consequently, the wanted
entailments are captured by all three representations.
However, while the conceptual structures and the VerbNet structures
both indicate that there is certainly a thing present that is being eaten
(constituted by the empty thing function in structure (102b) and the
unknown Patient in structure (105b)), there is no mention of this thing
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in the underlying event formula in (104b). This illustrates how the total
removal of predicates in Parsons’ formulas result in there not being any
implied unknown participant (in this case, the thing being eaten).
This is related to the issue of empty participants, where a possible eat-
sentence might be Mary ate nothing, for instance. Is this still an event of
eating, except without any thing being eaten, or is it not an event at all?
Because no Theme is mentioned in formula (104b), is seems that the former
case is possible in Parsons’ theory, and not in the other two, because they
require a thing being eaten. In other words, an event of eating requires a
thing being eaten in Jackendoff’s theory and in VerbNet, but not in Parsons’
framework.
Structure (102) mentions the fact that the cake enters through Mary’s
mouth, a notion that is missing in the other two representations. VerbNet,
on the other hand, uses the more general predicate TAKE_IN, which does
seem to constitute the same kind of meaning, though the Theme need
not specifically enter through the mouth. However, that is where eating
takes place, so the MOUTH-OF function in Jackendoff’s structures is still





Many verbs involve the motion of some entity, which is either moved by
some force or other entity, or by itself. Section 11.1 below will be looking
at the verb jump for the former case, a verb that can be used in either a
transitive or an intransitive sentence. For the latter case (section 11.2), the
example verb will be climb, which can also be used either transitively or
intransitively. A notion of interest here is whether or not we know where
the thing moving starts or ends up, or if it just stays in relatively the same
place. Other verbs of motion include, for instance, run, escape and dance [17,
p. 263].
11.1 Jump
The verb jump is allowed in both a transitive and intransitive construction,
as mentioned. In an intransitive use it is the subject that undergoes the
action, i. e. the one who does the jumping. But in an active transitive use it
is instead typically the direct object who does this action. It can also mean
that the subject jumps over the direct object, but the focus in this section
will be on the former case. When it is the direct object that performs the
jumping the subject acts as an "instigator" [15, p. 151], the participant who
initiates the jumping. The question is then whether or not this instigator,
or causer, also performs the jumping action along with the direct object.
Consider the sentences in (106), which involves the two participants Tom
and the horse.
(106) a. Tom jumped the horse.
b. Tom jumped.
c. The horse jumped.
The sentence in (106a) seems to have two different interpretations.
Either Tom caused the horse to jump by simply standing still (not following
the action and doing the same jump movement) or he is actually riding
the horse, in which case he would also be jumping along with it. In other
words, (106a) either only entails the sentence in (106c), or it entails both
sentences (106b) and (106c).
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Adding credibility to this, WordNet proposes, among a list of fifteen,
two relevant verb senses for jump, one described as "moving forward by
leaps and bounds" and another as "cause to jump or leap" [18]. The latter of
these senses has a cause relation to the former, indicating that a transitive
sentence using jump, involving a direct object, would entail the alternative
intransitive construction where the direct object instead acts as the subject.
However, there is still the question of whether or not the causer (Tom in
this case) moves along in the action or not.
Example sentences used for the cause to jump or leap synset in WordNet
include The trainer jumped the tiger through the hoop, where the trainer would
typically not move along with the tiger, but the sentence The men jump the
horses across the field is also included, which seems to most logically involve
both the men and the horses jumping across the field. It seems, therefore,
that this sense should be further divided into two more distinct senses; one
where the causer and the direct object moves in unison, and the other where
only the direct object moves.
Assuming sentence (106a) has a meaning resulting in the movement of
both Tom and the horse, it entails both sentences (106b) and (106c), but, on
the other hand, assuming a meaning where only the horse moves, sentence
(106a) entails only sentence (106c). A semantic framework representing the
verb jump should take this distinction into account, namely the fact that it
can have two different senses, and that this results in different entailments.
11.1.1 Jackendoff’s Conceptual Structure Representation
When jump is used as a causative (as it is in sentence (106a)), Jackendoff
proposes the use of the CAUSE function, where Tom would be the causing
Agent and the effect would be the jumping of either both participants, or
the horse only [15, p. 151]. In Jackendoff [15], however, there is no clear
lexical entry for the verb jump, so there is some uncertainty here as to what
the final conceptual structures should look like. However, assuming that
jump has a similar meaning to other verbs of motion that does not involve
a specific path, like dance, wiggle and wave, for instance, the correct function
to use here seems to be MOVE [15, p. 88-89]. As explained in section 3.2.1,
the function simply takes a single argument, which is the thing doing some
movement.
Note, however, that if we added a prepositional phrase to the sentences
in (106), such as The horse jumped across the field, the meaning would
instead involve a locative GO function specifying a path, represented by
the function ACROSS. This would result in the structure shown in (107) for
the sentence mentioned.
(107) [event GOLOC ([thing HORSE], [path ACROSS ([thing FIELD])])]
We could, then, perhaps assume that a pure use of the verb jump (such
as the sentence in (106b)) have this same structure, but with an unspecified
path. This would entail that the thing undergoing the action ends up at a
different place than what it originally was, however, a notion that might not
always be the case when someone is jumping (they may end up in the exact
90
same place at the end of it). Even so, both these alternatives (using either
MOVE or GOLOC functions) will be considered for this example, in order to
see if one is better than the other in capturing the wanted entailment.
At the same time, the idea that both participants might be performing
the jump action would intuitively involve the conjunction of two jump
events as the effect of the CAUSE function. This would be done in a similar
fashion to the conjunction of the TO and FROM functions for specifying a
path, seen in the example in (36b), in section 3.3.
Also, if the function MOVE is used, there is the question of how such
a structure would differ from other structures which involve the use of
other kinds of verbs. How, for instance, would the difference between
someone dancing and someone jumping be captured if only the function
MOVE is used to represent both of them? The solution is probably to use
an additional manner function in conjunction with MOVE, as Jackendoff
has done with the lexical entry for the verb wiggle, for instance [15, p. 274].
In that example, though, it was used primarily to represent an adverb, such
as in wiggle fast. However, assuming this is a way to make the movement
verbs distinct, a manner function such as JUMPINGLY might be used in
this case.
Structures (108) and (109) show two kinds of conceptual representations
that one can assume for the given sentences, based on Jackendoff’s
provided framework. Structure (108) uses the GOLOC function, while
structure (109) uses the MOVE function in conjunction with a JUMPINGLY
manner function. Note that for both sets of structures, there are two
different structures for the same sentence in (106a), representing the two
distinct senses mentioned. These are shown as a.1 and a.2, respectively.
(108) a.1 [event CAUSE ([thing TOM],
[event GOLOC ([thing HORSE], [path ])])]
a.2 [event CAUSE ([thing TOM],
[event GOLOC ([thing HORSE], [path ])]
GOLOC ([thing TOM], [path ])] )]
b. [event GOLOC ([thing TOM], [path ])]
c. [event GOLOC ([thing HORSE], [path ])]
(109) a.1 [event CAUSE ([thing TOM],
[event MOVE ([thing HORSE])
[manner JUMPINGLY])]
a.2 [event CAUSE ([thing TOM],
[event MOVE ([thing TOM])
MOVE ([thing HORSE])
[manner JUMPINGLY])]
b. [event MOVE ([thing TOM])
[manner JUMPINGLY])]
c. [event MOVE ([thing HORSE])
[manner JUMPINGLY])]
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There doesn’t seem to be any difference between the two variations
with regards to entailment. Structure (108a.1), which represents the
meaning where only the horse goes on a locative path, correctly entails only
structure (108c.) and not structure (108b.), because structure (108c.) is the
same as the effect event in structure (108a.1). Similarly, structure (109a.1),
which represents the idea that only the horse moves, entails structure
(109c.) for the same reason; the latter structure is used as an argument
to the former. In addition, structure (108a.2) entails both structures (108b.)
and (108c.) because both of those structures are part of structure (108a.1), as
a conjuncted event using two GOLOC functions. Likewise, structure (109a.2)
entails structures (109b.) and (109c.) because the latter two also take part
in the more complex structure (109a.1). So, assuming that one of the sets of
structures is the correct to use for the sentences in question, the entailments
are indeed captured in Jackendoff’s theory.
11.1.2 Parsons’ Underlying Event Representation
Although Parsons does not include jump in his list of verbs in Parsons [25,
p. 264-268], let’s assume the intransitive variant has a similar meaning
to the verb move, which is included in his list of intransitive verbs. For
that verb, the subject in question is proposed to be either a Theme or an
Agent-Theme. We can also further assume that the transitive variant of
jump represents a causative event which brings about the existence of the
jumping event represented by the intransitive use. As such, the underlying
event formulas for the sentences in (106) are shown in (110) below. As in
the conceptual structures, a.1 and a.2 both represent the sentence in (106a),
while b. and c. represent the other two sentences
(110) a.1 (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Agent(e, Tom) &
(∃e2)(∃t2) [t2 ∈ I & Cul(e2, t2) & Jumping(e2) & Theme(e2, Horse)
& CAUSE(e, e2)]]
a.2 (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Jumping(e) &
Agent-Theme(e, Tom) & (∃e2)(∃t2) [t2 ∈ I & Cul(e2, t2) &
Jumping(e2) & Theme(e2, Horse) & CAUSE(e, e2)]]
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Jumping(e) &
Theme(e, Tom)]
c. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Jumping(e) &
Theme(e, Horse)]
There are a couple of differences between formulas (110a.1) and (110a.2).
While both include two events, e and e2, where e2 is a Jumping event with
Horse as its Theme, and both say that e caused e2, there is a difference in
what kind of event e is and what role Tom plays. Although it seems logical
to say that Tom is the causing Agent in formula (110a.1) that brings about
the existence of e2, the fact that both of the participants must undergo a
jumping movement seems a little harder to convey in formula (110a.2). In
formula (110a.1), Tom does not jump, so he is simply the Agent, and the
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nature of e is left unspecified. Formula (110a.2), on the other hand, must
take into account that Tom also jumps.
We can assume that the correct way is to say that e is a jumping event
as well, similar to e2, where Tom is the Theme as well as the Agent. In
other words, Tom causes himself to jump, as well as causing another
event where the horse also jumps. So, formula (110a.2) has an additional
predicate saying that e is a Jumping event, in addition to a predicate that
says that Tom is an Agent-Theme (he has the features of both an Agent and
a Theme). The formulas in (110b.) and (110c.), on the other hand, are not as
complex, consisting instead of only one event, and differing only in their
specification of what the Theme is.
Given these representations, it is clear that formula (110a.1) correctly
entails formula (110c.), because formula (110c.) is exactly the same as the
inner formula in (110a.1). In other words, event e in formula (110c.) is
the same as event e2 in formula (110a.1). The fact that formula (110a.2)
entails both formulas (110b.) and (110c.) is a little harder to see, however.
Although formula (110c.) is entailed because of the exact same reason
why formula (110a.1) entails it, formula (110b.) uses a different predicate
for Tom than what is used in formula (110a.2). Because of this, it seems
at first that the wanted entailment is not captured here. However, if we
assume that Agent-Theme(e, Tom) means basically the same as Agent(e, Tom)
& Theme(e, Tom), the correct entailment is indeed captured. The e event
in formula (110b.) is exactly the same as the e in formula (110a.2), except
that it does not include a predicate saying that Tom is also the Agent. So,
assuming these are the correct formulas, Parsons’ theory also captures the
wanted entailments in this example.
11.1.3 VerbNet’s Semantic Representation
VerbNet lists two classes that have jump as a member, namely calibratable_cos-
45.6-1 and run-51.3.2-2-1. However, let’s assume that the latter class is
the correct for the meaning in question, since the other class represents a
sense where some attribute moves along a scale (it changes its value rather
than physically moving). Run-51.3.2-2-1 uses an animate Theme that might
move in a concrete Location, caused by some animate Agent. Jump is also
used in most of the example sentences given for the frames, and they all
carry the same kind of meaning as the sentences discussed in this chapter.
In fact, the sentences in (106) were borrowed from this class in VerbNet.
The frames available in the run-51.3.2-2-1 class, and its superclasses,
result in the semantic structures shown in (111), where T is the Theme
and A is the Agent. Note, however, that there are two possible frames
available for the transitive sentence in (106a), which has the phrase
structure NP V NP. Both frames come from the superclass run-51.3.2-2, and
there is no difference between their syntactic structures (both use Agent V
Theme). Their semantic structures differ quite a bit, though, and these two
structures are shown in (111a.1) and (111a.2), respectively. The structures
for the other two sentences are shown in (111b.) and (111c.), using a frame
available in the superclass run-51.3.2.
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(111) a.1 MOTION(DURING(E0), HorseT) & CAUSE(TomA, E0) &
EQUALS(E0, E1) & MOTION(DURING(E1), TomA)
a.2 MOTION(DURING(E), HorseT) & CAUSE(TomA, E)
b. MOTION(DURING(E), TomT)
c. MOTION(DURING(E), HorseT)
Since there is no difference in syntax between the two frames used
in structures (111a.1) and (111a.2) it is a little hard to see which version
should be chosen, based solely on the sentence given. It seems the frame
must be chosen depending on what the intended meaning is; whether both
participants moves or only the Theme. In structure (111a.1) there are two
distinct events (E0 and E1), and in each of these one of the participants is in
motion during the event. In E0 it is the horse that is moving, and in E1 it is
Tom. These two events are said to take place at the same time, represented
by the EQUALS predicate. Also, Tom causes E0.
Structure (111a.2) is very similar to structure (111a.1), but it only
involves a single event, which is also caused by Tom, and where the horse
moves in its during stage. So, in contrast to structure (111a.1), only the
horse moves, not Tom, but he is still the causer of the event. Structures
(111b.) and (111c.) are the same, except that the Themes are different. In
both cases the Theme moves during the event.
The predicate used in structure (111c.) is also present in structure
(111a.2) (with the same arguments), so the latter entails the former. The
predicates in structures (111b.) and (111c.) are also present in structure
(111a.1), so structure (111a.1) also correctly entails structures (111b.) and
(111c.). There is still the issue of how the intended meaning is chosen
based on the given sentence, but assuming that the two structures in
(111a.1) and (111a.2) represent the two different senses discussed, the
correct entailments are captured in VerbNet.
11.1.4 Notable Differences and Similarities
For the sentence in (106a), when the sense involves only the movement
of the horse, Tom is said to be the Agent in all the three representations
(in the a.1 structures). In structures (108a.1) and (109a.1), Tom acts as the
first argument to the CAUSE function, making him the cause or Agent,
while in formulas (110a.1) and (111a.1), Tom is directly appointed the role of
Agent. In every structure given, except the ones representing the sentence
in (106c), the horse acts as the Theme, as it is the first argument to either
the GOLOC function or the MOVE function for the conceptual structures in
(108) and (109), and is specified as this role in both Parsons’ and VerbNet’s
structures, seen in (110) and (111), respectively. So, every time the horse
appears, it occupies the role of Theme.
Tom, on the other hand, acts as both the Theme and the Agent in the
structure representing the sense of the sentence in (106a) involving the
movement of both participants. This is at least the case in the structures
provided by Jackendoff and Parsons, where Tom is both an argument to
the CAUSE and the GOLOC functions in the former, and is specified as
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an Agent-Theme in the latter. This dual labeling of roles is not present
in the structure given by VerbNet, as Tom is still only the Agent, while
the horse is the Theme, in structure (111a.1). In addition, Tom also acts
as just the Theme in the structures for the sentence in (106b), in all the
three representations. In other words, he either acts as the argument to
the GOLOC or MOVE functions in the conceptual structures, or is directly
specified as the Theme in Parsons’ and VerbNet’s formulas. So, while
Jackendoff and Parsons pretty much agree on the thematic roles given to
the participants in these example sentences, the VerbNet structures does
not say that Tom is the Theme in structure (111a.1), even though he is
also said to be moving. This illustrates both the fact that participants can
only occupy one role in VerbNet, but also the fact that thematic roles can
appear in any predicate. So, even though the Theme is typically the role
that undergoes an action or is changed or moved somehow, the fact that
this can also happen with an Agent is possible in VerbNet, exemplified
by the fact that the Agent appears in the MOTION predicate in structure
(111a.1). In other words, the predicates provide no restrictions on what role
the arguments must occupy.
For the conceptual structures representing the sentence in (106a),
Jackendoff says that the overall event is a causative, which involves either
one or two embedded GOLOC event or events. Parsons, on the other hand,
says that both the possible senses for that sentence involve two separate
events, where the first causes the other. In contrast, VerbNet proposes that
there is only one event if only the horse moves, but two distinct events
if both participants move. These two events are said to take place at the
same time, a notion that is not present in the given conceptual structures or
underlying event formulas. Though Parsons’ formulas say that the two
events took place in the same time interval, they culminate at different
points in time (t and t2). Because Jackendoff does not refer to any concept of
time in his structures, there is no mention of whether or not the events took
place at the same time or not. So, for VerbNet’s structure it is clear that what
Tom did to cause the horse to jump, and the horse’s jumping movement,
took place at the exact same time. This may not have been the case for the
other two representations. For those structures, what Tom did might have
taken place prior to the horse jumping, for instance. However, Parsons’
structures could have conveyed the same information as in the VerbNet
structures, if t and t2 were said to be the same points in time. Then, the
two events would have taken place within the same interval of time, and
would have culminated at the same time. The point in time when both of
them started would be unclear, however.
The fact that one or both of the participants move is captured in all
three representations, if we assume that a Theme is said to be moving in a
Jumping event in Parsons’ theory. The idea is conveyed much more directly
in Jackendoff and VerbNet’s structures, however, where the former either
says that the participant goes on a locative path, or simply moves, while the
latter says that during the event the participant is in motion. However, the
fact that an event of jumping should be different from an event of hopping,
for instance, would be captured in Parsons’ theory, through the use of
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the predicates Jumping and Hopping to describe the event. The structures
that Jackendoff and VerbNet provide are much more general, capturing a
meaning shared by many kinds of verbs. Though the conceptual structures
do have the manner option available (as used in structures (109), VerbNet
does not include any such specifics. In other words, while the underlying
event theory makes all events, specified by different verbs, distinct, the
other two theories focus on the generality of their structures, in order to
capture the fact that many verbs involve the same kind of meaning.
11.2 Climb
For this example, the focus will be on a kind of diathesis alternation
where one participant either appears as a direct object or as part of a
prepositional adjunct. This is also called the preposition drop alternation
[17, p. 43]. The subject is the same throughout and the other participant
is then the entity that is climbed. Consider the examples in (112), where
sentence (112a) is a standard transitive version, sentences (112b) and (112c)
use different prepositional phrases, while sentence (112d) is the simple
intransitive variant. In all cases the subject is Jane and the other participant
(the thing being climbed) is the mountain.
(112) a. Jane climbed the mountain.
b. Jane climbed up the mountain.
c. Jane climbed down the mountain.
d. Jane climbed.
In sentence (112a) it is clear that Jane completely climbed the mountain,
and thereby reached the top of it, but this may not be the case in the
other sentences. In sentence (112b) she might only reach halfway up the
mountain, while in sentence (112c) she might have started climbing down
the mountain from some midway point (not from the top). Sentence (112d)
doesn’t even mention the mountain, so the activity can have been done
anywhere.
However, in sentence (112a) it is also clear that in order for Jane to have
climbed the mountain, she must also have done the same activity as in
sentence (112b), namely climbing up the mountain. The idea that she also
climbed down the mountain need not be the case; she could have climbed
straight up to the mountain top. So, effectively, sentence (112a) entails
sentence (112b), but it does not entail sentence (112c). In addition, the three
sentences in (112a), (112b) and (112c) all involve the activity of climbing,
meaning that they all entail the sentence in (112d). As such, a semantic
framework would need to account for the different meanings arising from
the use of the prepositional phrases in sentences (112), and the differences
between the transitive and the intransitive forms.
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11.2.1 Jackendoff’s Conceptual Structure Representation
In Jackendoff [15, p. 76-77] the lexical entry for the verb climb is listed.
According to Jackendoff, the differences between the sentences in (112)
depend on the specifics of the path that the subject goes on, hence all the
sentences are represented as locative GO events. The conceptual structures
for the sentences in (112) are shown in (113) below, where Jane goes on a
locative path. Notice the use of the place function TOP-OF, which is used
to describe the top of the mountain.
(113) a. [event GOLOC ([thing JANE],
[path TO ([place TOP-OF ([thing MOUNTAIN])])])]
b. [event GOLOC ([thing JANE],
[path UP ])]
c. [event GOLOC ([thing JANE],
[path DOWN ])]
d. [event GOLOC ([thing JANE],
[path ])]
Jackendoff maintains that when climb is used with a direct object the
fact that the top of this object is reached is true, so the structure in (113a) is
the correct to use. However, when climb is used with a prepositional phrase
instead (as in sentences (112b) and (112c)), the place reached is unknown.
As such, the path function is given no argument (which would be the place
that was reached, if it was known), though the name of the path function is
still specified. For the intransitive sentence, the path climbed is unknown
altogether, so the name of the path function is left unspecified. However, it
is still true that someone goes on some path when they climb.
The fact that the three structures in (113a), (113b) and (113c) should
entail structure (113d) is achieved, because structure (113d) is embedded
inside them. This is perhaps more apparent when looking at the flat
structures, shown in structures (114). Here, all the conjuncted functions
that are present in structure (114d) are also present in the three other
structures, resulting in the wanted entailment. Note that e is the overall
event, t is Jane, p is the path, pl is the place, and t2 is the mountain.
(114) a. [GOLOC(e) & ARG1(e, t) & JANE(t) & ARG2(e, p) & TO(p) &
ARG1(p, pl) & TOP-OF(pl) & ARG1(pl, t2) & MOUNTAIN(t2)]
b. [GOLOC(e) & ARG1(e, t) & JANE(t) & ARG2(e, p) & UP(p)]
c. [GOLOC(e) & ARG1(e, t) & JANE(t) & ARG2(e, p) & DOWN(p)]
d. [GOLOC(e) & ARG1(e, t) & JANE(t) & ARG2(e, p)]
However, because of the different path functions used in the first three
structures (which are TO, UP and DOWN), structure (114a) does not entail
structure (114b), as it should. In other words, the function describing
the path in structure (114b) is not present in structure (114a). The fact
that structure (114a) should not entail structure (114c) is captured, on the
other hand, because of the same reason. This could be an indication that
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Jackendoff wishes to imply that structure (112a) does not entail structure
(112b) after all, as there might be a situation where Jane goes to the top of
the mountain without actually climbing up the mountain.
But this seems to equate the meaning of sentence (112a) with that of
reaching the top of the mountain, which is incorrect. To reach a mountain top
you can, for instance, go on a locative path across a ladder from a helicopter
directly to the top of the mountain. But to climb a mountain the path you
go across must be on the mountain itself. And the top of the mountain can
then only be reached if this path leads from somewhere and to the actual
top, which can really only be captured by the preposition up. So, in a way,
the way you climb a mountain is by climbing up the mountain.
If we follow this view, a solution in the conceptual structures might be
to add a BY function, saying that Jane went to the top of the mountain (the
structure in (113a)) by doing the same activity as in structure (113b). As a
result, the structure for sentence (112a) would be the one shown in (115).
(115) [event GOLOC ([thing JANE],
[path TO ([place TOP-OF ([thing MOUNTAIN])])])
[BY [event GOLOC ([thing JANE],
[path UP ])]]]
If this structure is used, the wanted entailments are captured, because
both structures (113b) and (113d) are embedded inside it, while structure
(113c) is not. Even if this meaning is not what Jackendoff originally
intended, this still illustrates that the conceptual theory can be pretty
dynamic, as new and wanted semantic ideas can be added quite easily.
11.2.2 Parsons’ Underlying Event Representation
Though Parsons does not include climb in any of his lists [25, p. 264-269],
we can imagine that the sentences can be represented as underlying event
formulas quite easily, as they are not causatives or inchoatives. For some
proposed formulas, let’s assume that Jane has the role Agent-Theme here,
as she has both the characteristics of these two roles in these events. She is
the one that moves, and she is also the one instigating this movement.
However, this raises the question of what role the mountain plays in
these events. It seems reasonable that it would be the Goal, though that
contradicts the fact that Jane is actually on the mountain during the event,
not just at the end. Logically, climbing a mountain involves moving from
the bottom of the mountain to the top of it. Therefore, the Source would be
the bottom and the Goal would be the top, and the area between those two
would be the path or trajectory. Since Parsons’ theory does not include any
thematic roles of the latter nature, we can assume the correct role for the
mountain in this case is the Goal. We can also assume that the prepositional
phrases are added to the formulas as predicates, as has been done earlier.
As such, the formulas for the sentences in (112) are shown in formulas (116).
(116) a. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Climbing(e) &
Agent-Theme(e, Jane) & Goal(e, Mountain)]
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b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Climbing(e) &
Agent-Theme(e, Jane) & Up(e, Mountain)]
c. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Climbing(e) &
Agent-Theme(e, Jane) & Down(e, Mountain)]
d. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Climbing(e) &
Agent-Theme(e, Jane)]
All of these formulas are Climbing events that culminated in the past,
where Jane was the Agent-Theme. Because formula (116d) is the same
event as the other three, except without the predicates that they add, the
formulas in (116a), (116b) and (116c) all correctly entail formula (116d).
However, because the mountain appears in two different predicates in
formulas (116a) and (116b), and none of these predicates are shared,
formula (116a) does not entail formula (116b). For this to work, the Up
predicate would need to be part of formula (116a), but that is not obvious
from the surface sentence. Because of this, the entailment in question is not
fully covered in Parsons’ underlying event theory. However, the fact that
formula (116a) does not entail formula (116c) is indeed captured, because
of the different predicates.
11.2.3 VerbNet’s Semantic Representation
The verb classes that have climb as one of their members include
calibratable_cos-45.6-1, escape-51.1-3, meander-47.7 and run-51.3.2. We can ex-
clude the class calibratable_cos-45.6-1 because it implies a meaning where
something goes up and down on a scale, as well as the class meander-47.7
because it involves something occupying the entirety of some location, ex-
emplified by the sentence the river climbed up the mountain.
So, because the other two classes involve the motion of some Theme,
this section will be considering the frames given by both of them. Note
also that in both classes climb refers to the same sense in WordNet, namely
"go upward with gradual or continuous progress", and to the same three
frames in FrameNet [22]. Let’s start by looking at the semantic structures
given by the class escape-51.1-3 for these sentences, shown in (117), where
the T subscript signifies the Theme.
(117) a. MOTION(DURING(E), JaneT) & PATH(DURING(E), JaneT,
?INITIAL_LOCATION, MountainTRAJECTORY, ?DESTINATION)
b. MOTION(DURING(E), JaneT) & PATH(DURING(E), JaneT,
?INITIAL_LOCATION, MountainTRAJECTORY, ?DESTINATION)
c. MOTION(DURING(E), JaneT) & PATH(DURING(E), JaneT,
?INITIAL_LOCATION, MountainTRAJECTORY, ?DESTINATION)
d. MOTION(DURING(E), JaneT) & PATH(DURING(E), JaneT,
?INITIAL_LOCATION, ?TRAJECTORY, ?DESTINATION)
In all four events, the predicates MOTION and PATH are used. The
former says that Jane is in motion during the event, while the latter says
that Jane also goes on a path during the event from some unknown Initial
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location, through some Trajectory and to some Destination. The structures
differ in whether or not they specify the trajectory, which is the mountain
in structures (117a), (117b) and (117c).
Note, however, that there are three different frames available for the
phrase structure NP V PP, which applies to the sentences in (112b) and
(112c). The only difference between those three frames is the fact that
the argument appearing inside the prepositional phrase (the mountain in
this case) is either said to be either the Initial location, the Trajectory or
the Destination. Assuming that none of the two sentences in question
constitute the idea that Jane starts from the mountain or ends at the
mountain, the most probable role is that of Trajectory. This notion is
supported by the fact that the frame for the sentence in (112a) clearly
specifies that the role of the mountain is, in that case at least, the Trajectory.
Although the only thing the frames mentioned say about what the given
preposition must be is that it must constitute a path, it seems natural to
assume that an Initial location is given by the preposition from, while the
Destination is given by to. So again, because the prepositions used in the
example sentences are up and down, not from or to, the most logical role is
that of Trajectory.
Because the structure in (117d) is the same as the other three, except
with the Trajectory left unspecified, the structures in (117a), (117b) and
(117c) correctly entail structure (117d). However, because structures (117a),
(117b) and (117c) are all exactly the same, many wrong entailments exist
here. For example, according to these structures there is no difference
between climbing up a mountain and climbing down it. In addition,
there is no difference between the transitive version, where the mountain
is a direct object, and the prepositional phrase versions. There is also
no representation of the fact that Jane reaches the top of the mountain in
structure (117a).
So, let’s examine the frames available in the class run-51.3.2. Note
that this is the same superclass as the one used in the jump example (see
section 11.1), so the semantic structures may seem quite familiar. However,
there is no frame in this class that represents the phrase structure NP V
NP, which applies to the sentence in (112a). Because of this, let’s look
at the frames available in the subclasses. One frame present, that does
represent the given phrase structure, seems to be the most logical for the
given sentence. The alternative structures for the sentences in question are
shown in structures (118), where structure (118a) is taken from the subclass
run-51.3.2-1.
(118) a. MOTION(DURING(E), JaneT) &
VIA(E, JaneT, MountainLOCATION)
b. MOTION(DURING(E), JaneT) &
UPPREP(E, JaneT, MountainLOCATION)




We see here that the MOTION predicate is again used, as it was used in
the structures in (117). However, whereas those used the predicate PATH,
the structures in (118) use the PREP predicate (also seen in the VerbNet
structures in section 9.1)). Because of this, the different prepositions in
the sentences result in different predicates, though they always take the
same arguments. But again, there is no equality between the predicate
in structures (118a) and (118b), which results in a lack of the wanted
entailment. It would have been present if the sentence in (112b) was instead
Jane climbed via the mountain, though that sentence sounds rather unnatural.
Considering the fact that the semantic structure in (118a) isn’t actually
available for the verb climb (it comes from the subclass run-51.3.2-1), the
entailment proposed is not captured in these structures. And because the
same entailment wasn’t captured in structures (117), the idea that sentence
(112a) should entail sentence (112b) is not included in VerbNet, though the
structures do capture the fact that sentences (112a), (112b) and (112c) all
entail sentence (112d).
11.2.4 Notable Differences and Similarities
Although Jane is appointed as the Agent-Theme in all of Parsons’
structures, seen in formulas (116), she only has the role of Theme in
Jackendoff’s and VerbNet’s structures, seen in structures (113) and (117),
respectively. In the former structures, Jane acts as the first argument to the
GOLOC function, while in the latter, she is directly given the role of Theme
because of her position in the syntactic structure. In other words, she is the
Theme because she is the subject in active climb-sentences.
The mountain, on the other hand, acts in a variety of different predicates
and functions in Parsons’ and Jackendoff’s structures, though it is always
the Trajectory in the VerbNet representations. Following Jackendoff [15, p.
258], the role of the mountain in structure (113a) is most probably that of
Goal, because it acts as an argument to the path function TO. However, note
that it is the place function TOP-OF that is the actual argument to the TO
function, while the mountain is further the argument to TOP-OF. Because
of this, it is the actual top of the mountain that is the Goal, not the whole
mountain. Still, because the argument to a place function must be either
the Source, Goal or Location, the role of the mountain seems to be that
of Location, because only FROM and TO constitute the Source and Goal,
respectively.
So, there are actually, in a sense, three roles in Jackendoff’s structure,
namely that of the Theme, the Location and Goal. In other words, the
sentence in (112a) can be said to involve a Theme (Jane) going to a Goal
(the top of the mountain), which is part of a Location (the mountain). This
notion is missing in the other two representations, which does not include
the fact that the top was reached in sentence (112a). If VerbNet did include
it, though, then the structure in (117a) would say that the Destination is the
Top-Of-The-Mountain, or something of that nature. Similarly, the underlying
event formula would need to say that the Goal is the top of the mountain,
while the area climbed is the whole of the mountain. The current structures
101
do not include this information, however.
Both the structures in (113) and (117) say that Jane goes on a path, which
is specified by different functions in the conceptual structures, and refers
to three different parts in the VerbNet structures, namely the Trajectory, the
Initial location and the Destination. The latter two are said to be unknown
in (117), but are not part of the structures at all in (113). If they were
included, then the path in question would have included the FROM and
TO functions as well, constituting the Source and the Goal, respectively. So,
while VerbNet assumes that there is an understood, but unknown, Initial
location, or Source, and similarly a Destination, or Goal, these are simply
not included in the conceptual structures. This is similar to how it is done
in Parsons’ formulas, where the predicates for the Goal and the Source is
not included, except for the inclusion of the mountain as the Goal in (116a).
However, a more fitting role for the mountain in that case would be either
Location or Trajectory, if we follow the structures given by Jackendoff and
VerbNet. Although such a role is not provided in Parsons [25], it seems
relatively easy to just add it.
One thing that the conceptual structures include, that the VerbNet
structures lack, is the fact that the path is said to be locative. In structure
(117), the nature of the path, or what kind of path it is, is left unspecified.
While a path involving possession, for instance, would be represented
in a conceptual structure by a GO event under the possessive semantic
field, rather than the locative, this kind of path would instead involve a
different predicate all together in VerbNet. This will become clearer in
the next chapter (chapter 12), where the transferring of possessions will
be discussed. However, where Jackendoff and VerbNet operate with a
path that the Theme goes on, the underlying event formulas does not say
anything about this. This is yet another illustration of the fact that the
underlying event formulas do not go into detail as to what happens in a
given event. They only include the name of the event, and the various
arguments included in the surface sentence.
Similar to what was mentioned in section 11.1.4, the fact that Jane is in
motion during the event is explicitly included in the VerbNet structures,
with the use of the MOTION predicate. This fact is less clear in the
other representations, though a GOLOC event does involve the locative
movement of its first argument. Also, a Theme is said to be the thing being
moved or changed (add Reference), so this fact is also present in Parsons’
formulas, though not as direct as in VerbNet.
Although all three representations capture the fact that sentences (112a),
(112b) and (112c) all entail sentence (112d), the idea that sentence (112a)
should entail sentence (112b) is not really captured by any of them. The
use of the alternative conceptual structure seen in (115) does solve this
for Jackendoff’s theory, though such a fix is harder in the other two
representations. The entailment is indeed present in VerbNet, because
the structures are all alike, but this results in the unnatural idea that
climbing up a mountain is the same as climbing down it. If we had
included the fact that the top of the mountain was reached in sentence
(112), resulting in a sentence like "Jane climbed the mountain to the top of
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the mountain", the semantic structure would, hypothetically, have included
both the Trajectory and the Destination, and the structures would then not
all entail one another. However, such a frame is unavailable in the escape-
51.1 class, where only one frame involves more than one part of the path
(namely the Initial location and the Destination).
So, although the entailment between sentences (112a) and (112b) is
captured in VerbNet, many other entailments are also incorrectly included.
The fact that the wanted entailment is not included in Jackendoff’s or
Parsons’ structures indicates that the two authors believe there is no
entailment relation present between the two sentences (though they both
entail the sentence in (112d)). However, arguments provided in this
chapter, particularly in the section on Jackendoff’s structures, illustrate that




Verbs of Change of Possession
Situations described by these kind of verbs involve the exchange of
something between entities, typically a giver or seller and a receiver or
buyer. Example verbs are find, loan and trade, though this chapter will
consider perhaps the most talked about kind of situation, namely one
described by the verbs buy, sell and pay. Though these are three quite
different verbs on the surface, they do seem to be strongly related [17, p.
138].
12.1 Buy/Sell/Pay
Buy, sell and pay are verbs that seem to offer different perspectives on the
same situation. This situation, which can be called a purchase, typically
involves a buyer, a seller, the thing being bought and the amount of money
used in the transaction. For instance, FrameNet proposes three frames
which all involve some sort of commerce, called Commerce_buy, which has
buy as a lexical unit member, Commerce_sell, which has sell as a member,
and Commerce_pay, which has pay as a member. In all three frames, the roles
Buyer, Seller, Goods and Money are available, although there is a difference
between the frames regarding whether these are core or non-core roles
[1]. Consider the example sentences in (119) as an illustration of how a
transaction can be referred to.
(119) a. Keith bought the car from Joel for money.
b. Joel sold the car to Keith for money.
c. Keith payed Joel money for the car
Here, we can assume that Keith is the buyer, Joel is the seller, the car
is the thing being bought or sold, and money is the amount used in the
transaction. Likewise, we might further assume that Keith is the Agent of
the buying event, Joel is the Agent of the selling event, the car is the Theme in
all three sentences, and money has the same role as well in all three, perhaps
as an Asset or Amount. Finally, one could state that the three sentences all
describe the same event, but viewed from different perspectives.
However, Parsons claims that these verbs do in fact describe different
events [25, p. 84]. If the event is the same, Joel would both be the Agent of
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the selling and the buying, and Keith, likewise, would be the Agent of both
the buying and the selling. Another relevant argument to this, according to
Parsons, is the fact that you could add an Instrument to the buying event,
such as a credit card, and it would, in most cases, be false to say that that
Instrument also applies to the selling event. Even though Keith might buy
the car with a credit card, Joel would not sell it with it. Joel might have
used some other Instrument instead, such as a sales pitch, for instance. In
other words, a transaction would typically involve more than one event (a
buying, selling and paying event in this case).
When it comes to the notion of entailment here, it seems logical to think
that all three sentences entail one another. If there is a buying event, then
there must also be selling and paying events, and similarly the other ways
around. As such, let’s assume that sentence (119a) entails sentences (119b)
and (119c), sentence (119b) entails sentences (119a) and (119c), and sentence
(119c) entails sentences (119a) and (119b).
In a way, these verbs are also related to the verb own, as a buying or a
paying event would result in the fact that the buyer or payer owns the thing
he received in the transaction (at least for some time). Likewise, a seller
would not own the thing anymore after a selling event. Therefore, let’s also
assume that the sentences in (119a) and (119c) both entail the sentence in
(120a), and the sentence in (119b) entails the sentence in (120b). For this,
we must imagine that the car represents a particular car in this case, as it is
perfectly possible that Joel might own some other car.
(120) a. Keith owns the car.
b. Joel does not own the car.
In other words, the events that are represented by the sentences in
(119) bring about a state where Keith owns the car, which is represented
in sentence (120a). They also bring about a state where Joel does not own
the car in question anymore (the state in sentence (120b)).
12.1.1 Jackendoff’s Conceptual Structure Representation
Jackendoff [15, p. 191] lists lexical entries for the verbs in question. All
three make use of the functions CAUSE, GOPOSS and EXCH, something
which signifies that Jackendoff wishes to express their apparent similarity.
Actually, all three structures are exactly the same, except for the fact that the
arguments to each function are switched around. The conceptual structures
for the sentences in (119) are shown in structures (121) below.
(121) a. [event CAUSE ([thing KEITH], [event GOPOSS ([thing CAR],
[path FROM ([thing JOEL])
TO ([thing KEITH])])
[EXCH [event GOPOSS ([thing MONEY],
[path FROM ([thing KEITH])
TO ([thing JOEL])])]]]
b. [event CAUSE ([thing JOEL], [event GOPOSS ([thing CAR],
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[path FROM ([thing JOEL])
TO ([thing KEITH])])
[EXCH [event GOPOSS ([thing MONEY],
[path FROM ([thing KEITH])
TO ([thing JOEL])])]]]
c. [event CAUSE ([thing KEITH], [event GOPOSS ([thing MONEY],
[path FROM ([thing KEITH])
TO ([thing JOEL])])
[EXCH [event GOPOSS ([thing CAR],
[path FROM ([thing JOEL])
TO ([thing KEITH])])]]]
As can be seen, the only difference between the three structures are the
arguments to the GOPOSS functions, both the one used as the effect of the
main CAUSE function, and the one used in the EXCH function. Remember
that EXCH signifies something that is done in exchange for some other
action. In (121a) and (121b) this exchange involves the transfer of MONEY
from KEITH to JOEL, while in (121c) the thing being transferred is rather the
CAR, now moving from JOEL to KEITH. In both (121a) and (121b), the thing
being used as the first argument to the GOPOSS function inside CAUSE is
the car, and it moves, logically, from Keith to Joel. In (121c), on the other
hand, this thing is instead the money, and it moves from Joel to Keith.
Although Jackendoff doesn’t present a lexical entry for the verb own,
one can imagine that it also involves the possessive semantic field.
However, since the sentences in (120) represent states, not events (as the
sentences in (119) do), the proper analysis would probably be to use the
inchoative function here. As Jackendoff [15, p. 93-94] argues, some GO
events can be reduced to INCH events if they take a BE function as its
argument (note that there are a few cases where this would be not be
possible). Assuming that this redundancy is applicable to the events in
question, the sentences in (120) would therefore have structures that simply
utilize the BEPOSS function, without the surrounding INCH function. In
summary, the GOPOSS events in structures (121) could have alternative
forms using INCH and BEPOSS, and the structures representing own would
only be the BEPOSS structure used in those. The structures in (122) show
the resulting conceptual structures. Notice the use of the NOT function,
which indicates negation, representing the state that Joel does not possess
(or own) the car.
(122) a. [state BEPOSS ([thing CAR], [place AT ([thing KEITH])])]
b. [state NOT BEPOSS ([thing CAR], [place AT ([thing JOEL])])]
Although it seems fair to suggest that structure (121a) and structure
(121b) entail one another because they are almost the same structure, there
is a difference when it comes to who the causer (or Agent) is. In structure
(121a) it is Keith that is the Agent, but in structure (121b) it is Joel. In
structure (121c) the two GOPOSS events are also present in the other two
structures, except that their positions have been swapped; structures (121a)
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and (121b) use one event as the effect and the other inside the EXCH
function, but in structure (121c), it is the other way around. Aside from
that, the Agent is again Keith, a difference from structure (121b).
So, because of these differences between the structures, it seems logical
to conclude that the wanted entailments are not captured here. However,
these observations may be an indication that the entailments proposed
earlier were in fact false, as Jackendoff clearly aims to make these three
events distinct. Before adopting this point of view, however, the nest
two sections will examine the representations employed by Parsons and
VerbNet.
First, though, let’s examine the own structures. It seems logical to
suggest that the three structures in (121) all entail the structure in (122a),
if we assume that the GOPOSS function can have the alternative structure
mentioned. As such, the correct entailments are, indeed, captured here.
The notion that structure (122b) is also entailed is a little less clear, on the
other hand. The fact that the possessive state should be negated doesn’t
seem to be encoded within the framework. If it was, then it would be clear
that a GOPOSS event that uses FROM as one of its path functions should
entail a state where the thing being own does not belong to the thing
used in the FROM function anymore. However, Jackendoff does not say
anything about this issue, so one can assume that this particular entailment
is also not captured in the current framework.
12.1.2 Parsons’ Underlying Event Representation
Parsons lists the three verbs in question as ditransitive verbs involving both
a direct and indirect object [25, p. 266]. For buy, the indirect object has
the role of Benefactive, while for sell and pay the indirect object is instead
a Goal. Own, on the other hand, is listed as a transitive verb, where the
subject is an Experiencer [25, p. 266]. Utilizing the templates Parsons
provides, the resulting formulas for the three sentences in (119) are shown
in (123), while the formulas for the sentences in (120) are shown in (124).
Note the use of the negation symbol in formula (124b) which indicates that
there is no state where Joel owns the car in question.
(123) a. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Buying(e) &
Theme(e, Car) & Agent(e, Keith) & From(e, Joel) &
For(e, Money)]
b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Selling(e) &
Theme(e, Car) & Agent(e, Joel) & Goal(e, Keith) &
For(e, Money)]
c. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Paying(e) &
Theme(e, Money) & Agent(e, Keith) & Goal(e, Joel) &
For(e, Car)]
(124) a. (∃s)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(s, t) & Owning(s) &
Theme(s, Car) & Experiencer(s, Keith)]
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b. ¬(∃s)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(s, t) & Owning(s) &
Theme(s, Car) & Experiencer(s, Joel)]
Because the events are all of different kinds in formulas (123) (Buying,
Selling, and Paying events, respectively), they do not entail one another.
They also use different thematic roles; the car is the Theme in formulas
(123a) and (123b), but in formula (123c) the money is instead the Theme,
for instance. The Agents also differ between formula (123b) and the
other two. So, similar to Jackendoff, Parsons maintains that there are no
entailments present between the three sentences. This therefore illustrates
further evidence of the idea that the entailments proposed at the start of
this chapter were not correct.
Similarly, there is no relationship between any of the formulas in (123)
and (124), mostly because the latter are Owning events. A possible solution
to this might be to use a meaning postulate which says that if there exists
either one of the events in formulas (123), then there also exists an owning
state where the Theme is the same, and the Experiencer depends on the
given event. However, Parsons has not provided any such postulate,
which leads to the conclusion that he does not agree with the entailments
proposed.
12.1.3 VerbNet’s Semantic Representation
Finding the correct semantic structures for the four verbs in VerbNet
proved to be quite easy, as each one is only a member of a single class.
Buy is a member of the class get-13.5.1, sell is a member of give-13.1-1, pay is
a member of pay-68-1, and own is a member of own-100. Given the frames
available in these classes, the structures for the sentences in (119) are shown
in (125), while the structures for the sentences in (120) are shown in (126).
All classes, except own-100 uses a thematic role called Asset, which applies
to the money used. This role is indicated by the subscript AS. The roles
of Theme and Agent are also used in all the classes. However, while give-
13.1-1 and pay-68-1 make use of a Recipient role, get-13.5.1 lacks this and
instead utilizes a Source and a Beneficiary, both of which are not present
in the other classes. The Recipient is indicated by the R subscript, and the
Source by the S subscript (the Beneficiary is not used here). As before, the
A subscript constitutes the Agent, while T constitutes the Theme. Also, the
HP predicate is an abbreviation of the predicate HAS_POSSESSION.
(125) a. HP(START(E), JoelS, CarT) & HP(END(E), KeithA, CarT) &
TRANSFER(DURING(E), CarT) & COST(E, MoneyAS)
b. HP(START(E), JoelA, CarT) & HP(END(E), KeithR, CarT) &
HP(START(E), KeithR, MoneyAS) &
HP(END(E), JoelA, MoneyAS) & TRANSFER(DURING(E), CarT)
c. TRANSFER(DURING(E), CarT) &
TRANSFER(DURING(E), MoneyAS) &
HP(START(E), KeithA, MoneyAS) &
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NOT(HP(START(E), KeithA, CarT)) & HP(END(E), KeithA,
CarT) & NOT(HP(END(E), KeithA, MoneyAS)) &
VALUE(E, CarT, MoneyAS)
Note that the NOT predicate has been added in to the structure in
(126b), in order to represent the negation.
(126) a. HAS_POSSESSION(E, KeithPIVOT, CarT)
b. NOT(HAS_POSSESSION(E, JoelPIVOT, CarT))
All of these semantic structures use the predicate HAS_POSSESSION,
something which indicates their similarity. Each structure in (125) says that
Keith possesses the car at the end of the event, though the role he occupies
differ. In (125a) and (125c), Keith is the Agent, but in (125b), he is instead
the Recipient. Also, in all three structures in (125), the car is transferred
during the event, using the predicate TRANSFER.
But other than those similarities there are many differences as well.
Structures (125b) and (125c) both represent the fact that the money is also
transferred in the event, from Joel at the start to Keith at the end, by use
of the HAS_POSSESSION predicate. Structure (125a), on the other hand,
doesn’t say anything about this. However, structure (125c) is the only one
that actually specifies that the money is transferred during the event (using
the TRANSFER predicate). Structure (125c) also specifies that Keith does
not possess the car at the start of the event, and that he does not possess the
money at the end of it. In addition, structure (125a) uses a predicate called
COST, which seems to say that the event costs money, while structure
(125c) uses a predicate called VALUE, which says that the car has the value
given by the money. Finally, an interesting observation is that the Recipient
role in the semantic structure for pay (which is Joel in this case) is not used
at all, even though it is part of the syntactic structure.
The own sentences, on the other hand, are much simpler, and they also
make use of the HAS_POSSESSION predicate. Because they are states, the
entire E variable is used as an argument to the predicate. The role applied to
the subject is different from the structures in (125), however, being instead
something called Pivot.
Because of the mentioned differences between the structures in (125)
they do not entail one another, a notion that we should now assume to
be correct, considering the fact that Jackendoff and Parsons also agreed
on it. If we ignore the different labeling of participants, then there do
exist entailment relations to the sentence in (126a), however. All three
structures in (125) entail structure (126a), if we assume this, because they
all include the fact that Keith has possession of the car at the end of the
event. Structure (126b), on the other hand, is not entailed by any of
the structures, though this would have been the case if a predicate like
NOT(HAS_POSSESSION(END(E), JoelS, CarT)) was used, for instance.
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12.1.4 Notable Differences and Similarities
Although there are differences between the various structures as to what
roles the participants occupy, the three representations at least agree that
Keith is the Agent in both sentences (119a) and (119c), and that Joel is the
Agent in sentence (119b). They also agree that Keith is the Goal or Recipient
in sentence (119b), while Joel is the Source in sentence (119a) and the Goal
in sentence (119c). Remember that the Source and Goal are constituted
by the first arguments to the functions FROM and TO, respectively, in the
conceptual structures, while the Agent is the first argument to the CAUSE
function. Although Parsons uses the predicate From, rather than Source, we
can assume that they mean the same thing.
Jackendoff and VerbNet agree that the car is the Theme in all the three
sentences, but while Parsons labels the car as the Theme in formulas (123a)
and (123b), this participant is instead used as an argument to the predicate
For in formula (123c). While VerbNet labels the money as the Asset of the
event, Jackendoff instead says that it is the Theme, because it acts as an
argument to a GO function. This illustrates the fact many participants can
occupy the same role in an event in Jackendoff’s theory, as both the car and
the money are Themes in structures (121). In other words, they are both
arguments to GO functions, one inside the CAUSE event, and the other
inside the EXCH event. However, when the arguments appear inside the
EXCH function, an alternative thematic role name is perhaps more suitable.
For comparison with the other representations, let’s instead call it the Asset.
So, the roles that the car and the money occupy are consistent through-
out Jackendoff’s and VerbNet’s structures, while they differ somewhat in
Parsons’ formulas. The money is used as an argument to the For predicate
in formulas (123a) and (123b), but is labeled as the Theme in formula (123c).
In other words, if we imagine that the For predicate constitute the role of
Asset (in order to compare to VerbNet), Parsons and VerbNet agree that the
money is the Asset in sentences (119a) and (119b), and that the car is the
Theme in these same sentences, but they disagree in the their structures for
sentence (119c). In the latter, Parsons says that the car is the Asset and the
money is the Theme, while VerbNet says the opposite; that the car is the
Theme and the money the Asset.
In addition, Keith and Joel actually occupy up to three different roles in
some of the conceptual structures, because they appear more than once, as
arguments to different functions. This means that Keith is both the Agent,
Goal and Source in structures (121a) and (121c), and both the Source and
Goal in structure (121b). Similarly, Joel is both the Agent, Source and Goal
in structure (121b), and the Source and Goal in structures (121a) and (121c).
This illustrates the fact that participants can also occupy many different
roles in Jackendoff’s theory, a notion that is more or less missing in the
other two theories, though Parsons does include conjuncted thematic roles
(like Agent-Theme etc.). As a final illustration of this runthrough of the
various thematic roles, take a look at the tables below, which show what
roles the participants occupy in each of the three structures given by the
three theories. Note that A is the Agent, T is the Theme, S is the Source, G
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is the Goal, and AS is the Asset.
Jackendoff a. b. c.
KEITH: A,S,G S,G A,S,G
JOEL: S,G A,S,G S,G
CAR: T T AS
MONEY: AS AS T
Parsons a. b. c.
KEITH: A G A
JOEL: S A G
CAR: T T AS
MONEY: AS AS T
VerbNet a. b. c.
KEITH: A G A
JOEL: S A G
CAR: T T T
MONEY: AS AS AS
So, while Keith and Joel are given specific roles in Parsons’ and
VerbNet’s structures, based on the verb event given, they are always
both the Source and the Goal in Jackendoff’s structures. Jackendoff does
differentiate between the events when it comes to what the Agent is,
however. But while it is perfectly clear that the car or the money goes
on a possessive path between Keith and Joel in all the three conceptual
structures, the underlying event formulas only focus on either the Source
or the Goal, plus the Agent and the Theme. This also applies to the VerbNet
structures, which does not mention the fact that the Agent in each event is
also either the Goal or Source. However, the idea of a Goal and a Source is
still conveyed in VerbNet’s structures, by the use of the HAS_POSSESSION
predicate. Though, as mentioned, the VerbNet structures differ in their
inclusion of all the links in the transaction, as Joel is not included at all in
structure (125c), for instance. Parsons, on the other hand, does not in any
way include the fact that the Agent is also either the Goal or the Source.
While Jackendoff seems to focus on the fact that the three verbs in
question are very much related, as evidenced by the use of almost the
exact same structures for each of them, Parsons maintains that the events
represented by the sentences in (119) should be considered separate.
VerbNet does, similar to the structures provided by Jackendoff, focus on the
events’ similarity, evidenced, for instance, by the use of most of the same
predicates, and the same thematic role labels. None of the representations
maintain that there is any entailment relations between the three sentences,
however. Still, there is a difference between sentences describing the same
situation, and sentences that all have some meaning in common. In other
words, while the sentences in (119) may not represent the exact same
situation, or event, because of the different perspectives, there are still
many similarities between them. This is at least the case in Jackendoff’s
and VerbNet’s structures, which, as mentioned, all say that the car moves
to Keith, for instance.
When it comes to the structures for the own sentences, all the
representations agree that the car is the Theme throughout, but disagree on
what the owner (Keith or Joel) should be called. Jackendoff puts the owner
as an argument to the AT function, effectively making it the Location,
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Parsons calls it the Experiencer, while VerbNet calls it the Pivot. Whatever
label used, the name is a least consistent in the two structures given by
each theory. The notion of negation is present in all three theories, so the
sentence in (120b) is easily represented. However, as mentioned, none
of the structures capture the fact that the sentences in (119) should entail





Verbs of Change of State
These verbs describe an entity going from one kind of state to another,
though only one of those states might be represented by a sentence
employing a change of state verb. For instance, it might seem logical to
assume that for a door to close it must be open first, though this might not
always be the case, as a door might also be created to be closed from the
start. In that case, it is true to say that the door became closed when it was
made, though it would be wrong to say that it was open before that. A
verb similar to close is open, which is the verb that will be examined in this
entailment example. Other change of state verbs include clean, darken and
warm, among many others [17, p. 240].
13.1 Open
The verb open can be used in both a transitive and an intransitive
construction. When the transitive form is used, the subject of the sentence
is whatever entity or force that causes the direct object to open. As such,
there would be two participants, where the participant represented by the
direct object would have its state changed to being open. In the intransitive
variant, on the other hand, the subject is replaced by the direct object of the
transitive sentence, though the original subject, which is the causing entity,
might still be a part of the sentence, typically by appearing in a phrase
following the preposition by. This resulting sentence would then be the
passive alternative to the active transitive sentence.
If we assume that the passive and the active sentences both describe the
same kind of event (except with different aspects), both of them should
entail the intransitive sentence, where the causing entity is removed.
Consider the examples shown in (127), where sentence (127a) is the active
transitive, sentence (127b) is the passive version, sentence (127c) is the
intransitive, and sentence (127d) represents the state of the door being
open. Essentially, Mary does something that results in the door opening,
which leads to the state of the door being open.
(127) a. Mary opened the door.
b. The door was opened by Mary.
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c. The door opened.
d. The door is open.
Because this is an example of a causative-inchoative situation (as
we have seen before, for instance in section 8.1), we want a semantic
representation of these sentences to acknowledge the fact that both
sentences (127a), (127b) and (127c) entail sentence (127d), while sentences
(127a) and (127b) also entail sentence (127c). In other words, if Mary
opened the door, as is done in sentences (127a) and (127b), then the door
also opened, as is the case in sentence (127c), and following these events
the door also ends up in the state of being open, as in sentence (127d). Note
that WordNet lists the transitive and the intransitive versions of open as two
separate senses, though they do share a cause relation. This is even evident
in the name of the synset that the transitive variant is a member of, which is
defined as "cause to open or to become open", while the intransitive sense
is simply described as "become open" [18].
13.1.1 Jackendoff’s Conceptual Structure Representation
Although open is thought of as a causative-inchoative verb, Jackendoff does
not make use of the INCH function for his lexical entry of open [15, p. 252].
Instead, the function GOIDENT is used. Thus, the conceptual structures for
the sentences in (127) are shown in (128). Note that structure (128a/b)
represents both the sentence in (127a) and the one in (127b), because the
conceptual theory does not make a distinction between passive and active
forms.
(128) a./b. [event CAUSE ([thing MARY],
[event GOIDENT ([thing DOOR],
[path TO ([place AT ([property OPEN])])])])]
c. [event GOIDENT ([thing DOOR],
[path TO ([place AT ([property OPEN])])])]
d. [state BEIDENT ([thing DOOR],
[place AT ([property OPEN])])]
In both structures (128a/b) and (128c) the door goes on an identific-
ational path to have the property OPEN. The difference between them is
that structure (128a/b) has a surrounding CAUSE function which says that
Mary is the Agent causing the GOIDENT event. However, in neither struc-
ture (128a/b) nor structure (128c) is the state of the door, which is repres-
ented in structure (128d), a part of the structure. This is because the GO
function is used instead of INCH in the former structures. However, be-
cause Jackendoff assumes that the kind of GO event in question can be
reduced to a structure involving the functions INCH and BE, the events in
structures (128a/b) and (128c) do indeed result in a state where the door is
said to have the property of being open. This is essentially the same kind of
situation as we saw for the buy/sell/pay example (see section 12.1.1), where
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a possessive GO event was reduced to a possessive INCH event, taking a
BE function as its argument.
So, given that the shared GOIDENT event that occurs within structures
(128a/b) and (128c) can also have the alternative structure seen in (129),
the wanted entailments are captured. In other words, the state in structure
(128d) is also embedded within structures (128a/b) and (128c) with this
alternative structure, so the latter two correctly entail structure (128d). In
addition, structure (128a/b) entails structure (128c) because the latter is
embedded inside the former. This might become more apparent if we take a
look at the alternative flat structures, shown in (130), where all the functions
that are present in structure (130d) are also present in structure (130c), and
all the functions in structure (130c) are also present in structure (130a/b).
Note that flat structures make use of the INCH and BE functions, rather
than the GO function. Note also that the variable s is the BEIDENT state, p is
the place, p2 is the open property, t is the door, t2 is Mary, e is the inchoative
event, and e2 is the causative event.
(129) [event INCH ([state BEIDENT ([thing DOOR],
[place AT ([property OPEN])])])]
(130) a./b. [BEIDENT(s) & ARG1(s, t) & ARG2(s, p) & AT(p) &
ARG1(p, p2) & DOOR(t) & OPEN(p2) & INCH(e) & ARG1(e, s)
& CAUSE(e2) & ARG1(e2, t2) & ARG2(e2, e) & MARY(t2)]
c. [BEIDENT(s) & ARG1(s, t) & ARG2(s, p) & AT(p) &
ARG1(p, p2) & DOOR(t) & OPEN(p2) & INCH(e) & ARG1(e, s)]
d. [BEIDENT(s) & ARG1(s, t) & ARG2(s, p) & AT(p) &
ARG1(p, p2) & DOOR(t) & OPEN(p2)]
13.1.2 Parsons’ Underlying Event Representation
This thesis has already touched upon a very similar verb to open, namely
close, with regards to the underlying event theory (see sections 4.5 and
4.7). Even though Parsons lists passive templates separate from the active
versions, he still proposes that their structures remain the same as their
active counterparts [25, p. 272-273]. In other words, as was the case with
the conceptual structures, there is no immediate difference in meaning
between the active sentence in (127a) and the passive in (127b). Therefore,
the formula shown in (131a/b) represents both the active and the passive
sentences, while the other two represent the intransitive and the state
sentence, respectively. These formulas are based on Parsons’ template for
causative-inchoative sentences.
(131) a./b. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Cul(e, t) & Agent(e, Mary) &
(∃e2)(∃t2) [t2 ∈ I & BECOME#(Open)(e2) & Theme(e2, Door) &
Cul(e2, t2) & CAUSE(e, e2)]]
c. (∃e)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & BECOME#(Open)(e) &
Theme(e, Door) & Cul(e, t)]
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d. (∃s)(∃t)(∃I) [t ∈ I & I < now & Being-Open(s) & Theme(e, Door)
& Hold(e, t)]
Similar to the treatment of close, the causative-inchoative formula in
(131a/b) consists of two events, where one is embedded within the scope
of the other. The surrounding causing event, e (where Mary is the Agent), is
said to cause the other event, e2 (where the door is the Theme), which is an
inchoative because of its use of the function BECOME#. This latter event
results in the existence of a state of being open, because of the proposed
meaning postulate discussed in section 4.5. This state is then the same
formula as the one in (131d). Because formula (131c) is part of the formula
in (131a/b), the latter entails the former, and because the state in formula
(131d) is the same as the state that results from the inchoative event in
the other two formulas, formulas (131a/b) and (131c) both entail formula
(131d).
13.1.3 VerbNet’s Semantic Representation
In the VerbNet database, the verb open appears as a member in five classes.
However, only three of them seem to be related to the sense in question,
since they are the only ones that refer to the mentioned sense in WordNet
desribed as "cause to open or to become open" [18]. These classes are
crane-40.3.2, spatial_configuration-47.6 and other_cos-45.4. However, only
other_cos-45.4 refers to the second relevant sense in WordNet as well,
namely the one defined as "become open."
Although spatial_configuration-47.6 includes a frame for the intransitive
phrase structure, it does not have a phrase structure that corresponds to
the one in (127a), which is NP V NP. Crane-40.3.2 does not include a frame
for the intransitive sentence, and it also uses semantic predicates referring
to the transferring of information, a meaning that does not seem to apply
here (in addition, it also needs the Patient to be a body part). Therefore,
other_cos-45.4 seems to be the most fitting class here, because it refers to the
state of the Patient in its semantic structures.
So, given the frames for transitive and intransitive sentences in the class
other_cos-45.4, the structure for the sentences in (127a), (127b) and (127c)
are shown in (132a/b) and (132c), respectively. For the structure in (132d),
which represents the sentence in (127d), the frame used comes from the
class seem-109-1-1. This is the only class that has be as its member, which
does refer to the copular sense of the verb in WordNet. In other words, this
frame is the only one available that represents simple state sentences, using
a copula, though the semantic predicate used seems a little strange.
(132) a./b. CAUSE(MaryA, E) &
STATE(RESULT(E), OpenENDSTATE, DoorP)
c. STATE(RESULT(E), OpenENDSTATE, DoorP)
d. SEEM(E, DoorT, OpenATTTRIBUTE)
Note the use of the verb specific arguments ENDSTATE and ATTRIB-
UTE in these structures, where the former refers to the entire state of the
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Patient, while the latter refers to only a single attribute of the Theme. In
structure (132a/b), Mary is the cause of the whole event, which involves
the state of the Patient (the door) ending up as being open, as a result of
the event. In (132c), the CAUSE predicate has been removed, and the door
simply ends up in a state of being open, as a result of the event. The struc-
ture in (132d), on the other hand, uses a different predicate (namely SEEM)
and it also calls it the attribute of being open, not the endstate. Therefore, it
is not entailed by the other two structures. An alternative to this would be
to use the structure in structure (133), which uses the same STATE predicate
as in structures (132a/b) and (132c).
(133) STATE(E, OpenENDSTATE, DoorP)
This structure constitutes the state of the door being open. If we assume
that this is the correct structure for the sentence in (127d), then all the
proposed entailments are captured in VerbNet. In other words, the STATE
predicate used in structures (132), using the result stage of the event as an
argument, brings about the STATE predicate in structure (133), where the
whole of the event is used as the argument. However, because no frame
is available for be which gives this specific structure, then there still seems
like some connection here is missing.
13.1.4 Notable Differences and Similarities
In all three representations, Mary is said to be the Agent (when she is part
of the given sentences), and the door is said to be either the Theme or the
Patient. While Jackendoff refers to the idea of being open as a property,
Parsons uses the adjective in his BECOME# function, which constitutes the
inchoative event where the Theme becomes open. VerbNet refers to open
as an Endstate in structures (132a/b) and (132c), and as an Attribute in
structure (132d), though the latter is, as mentioned, perhaps not the proper
structure to use here.
The conceptual structure in (128a/b) refers to one overall causative
event, involving another embedded inchoative event. This latter event
takes a state as an argument, which involves the door having the property
of being open. Similar to those structures, the underlying event formulas
in (131) also refer to two events (the causative and the inchoative) and
one state, where the inchoative event is embedded within the scope of the
causative event. The state is, on the other hand, not directly part of the
formulas in (131a/b) and (131c), but comes about because of the presumed
meaning postulate. VerbNet, in contrast, refers only to one event here, and
to the fact that the door is in the state of being open as a result of the event.
The cause of the event is included, however, and the fact that a state is in
question is conveyed by both the STATE predicate and the Endstate role.
So, while Jackendoff and Parsons both refer to two events and one state,
VerbNet only refers to one event and the state, not directly mentioning any
inchoative.
Though the three structures appear very different from each other,
they way the entailment relations work is actually quite similar in all
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of them, at least the fact that sentence (127a) entails sentence (127c). In
each representation, the latter structure is either embedded or a part
of the former, resulting in the entailment. In structure (128c), the
inchoative sentence’s structure is the same as the argument used in the
causative sentence’s structure. Similarly, the underlying event formula
for sentence (127c) is embedded inside formulas (131a/b). Though there
is no embedding in the VerbNet structures, the structure in (132c) is also
present in sentence (132a/b). The entailment relation to sentence (127d)
is captured by Jackendoff because of the same embedding nature as in
the other entailment, while a meaning postulate is used by Parsons. The
capturing of this entailment is not present in VerbNet, however, if we
assume the structure used in (132d). Still, the inclusion of the alternative




After examining a number of interesting entailment phenomena and
how the three theories of semantic representation handle each of them,
this chapter will offer a conclusive overview of the various strengths
and weaknesses of the three frameworks. All of them have had cases
where a wanted entailment is not captured, either deliberately, where the
entailment in question may have been thought of as non-existing by the
author, or not.
In the latter case, the entailment is genuinely not included in the
structure provided. However, it should be noted that although the
entailment relation to the sentences given may not be present in one of the
frameworks, other, weaker entailments might still be there. For instance,
underlying event formulas for the hit-sentences (see structure (88)) always
involve a Hitting event, so they all entail the quite simple sentence There was
a hitting. In that case, there is a correct entailment present, even though the
more complex entailments mentioned in that example were not captured.
Considering the detail of the various examples, this chapter will
rather look at broader characteristics of the three frameworks, and how
the mechanisms of each aim to account for and capture the notion of
entailment. This will be done by going through some key points that
are important in a semantic representation, most importantly with regards
to entailment. The chapter will be discussing how the three theories
deals with each specific issue, which will point out their strengths and
weaknesses.
14.1 Coverage
Firstly, the notion of coverage, and the final listing of lexical entries for
verbs, is much more broad in VerbNet than in the Jackendoff’s and Parsons’
frameworks. This stems from the fact that the former presents itself as a
database, aiming to cover as much as possible, while the latter two only
examine the verbs and sentences they deem important. Because of this, it
is hard to know exactly what the two authors’ stances are on some of the
entailment examples discussed. While Jackendoff and Parsons only offer
about 100 final lexical entries in each of their works, VerbNet offers over
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5200, as mentioned.
Of course, the idea of total coverage is impossible, as there are always
new meanings added to a language, though VerbNet’s database at least
tries to include as much as it can. While such a database has not been
created by Jackendoff and Parsons themselves, there does exist an extensive
database that emulates Jackendoff’s theory. This database was created
by Bonnie J. Dorr, and consists of about 11000 verb entries in the latest
version, which are conveniently organized under Levin’s verb classes [7]
[6]. Though the entries are indeed called lexical conceptual structures, and
are based on Jackendoff’s theory, the database has a lot of new additions.
These include new semantic fields, features and functions, for instance a
semantic field that deals with perception. This thesis will not go further
into detail about the database, though it should at least be mentioned,
considering its strong relationship with both Jackendoff and Levin.
14.2 The Mapping from Syntax to Semantics
The way that syntactic constructions, or the sentences given, map to the
resulting semantic structures in each theory is quite different between the
three, at least considering how direct it is. VerbNet includes syntactic
constructions in all of its frames, where the thematic roles are used in
order to represent the mapping from the arguments in the sentence.
While different syntactic constructions typically lead to different semantic
structures, this might not always be the case in VerbNet. For instance,
the structures seen for the sentences in the climb example (see structures
(117)), show how three sentences with quite different syntactic structures
may result in the same semantic representation. In that example, this fact
lead to multiple incorrect entailments being present.
However, mapping in VerbNet also often leads to correct entailments
being captured. For instance, in the transaction example (see structures
(125)), the roles that Keith and Joel are given differ between the three
structures. But regardless of this, they are still used in the pretty much
the same predicates. For instance, while Keith is said to be the Agent in
(125a) and (125c), and the Recipient in (125b), he still acts as an argument
to a predicate that says that he has the possession of the car at the end of
the event. In other words, the predicate HAS_POSSESSION(END(E), Keith,
Car) is present in all the structures, even though the role that Keith occupies
is different in one of them. This captures the relevant similarity between the
three sentences in question.
In Jackendoff’s theory, the way syntax is mapped to semantics is done
both in the lexical entries themselves, and by the use of given linking
rules, or adjunct rules [15, p. 278-282]. The latter gives general conceptual
structures based on specific syntactic patterns, and these are then fused
with the lexical entries. For instance, an adjunct rule capturing a phrase
such as in the air will say that the argument in that phrase corresponds with
the second argument to either a GO or BE function, found in the conceptual
structure for the given verb of the sentence. In other words, a sentence like
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John threw the ball in the air, which has the general phrase pattern [VP Vh
... PPk ... ], corresponds with the general conceptual structure [ ... GO/BE
( ..., [ ]k) ... ]h. This is then fused with the structure for the verb throw
[15, p. 171], resulting in the conceptual structure [CAUSE ([thing JOHN],
[event([thing BALL], [path TO ([place IN ([thing AIR])]k)])]h. Note that k links
the prepositional phrase with the place function IN, while h links the verb
in the sentence verb with the conceptual structure for throw. The latter has
its own rules for linking John and the ball with the Agent and the Theme,
respectively, in the structure.
Mapping in Parsons’ theory involves the templates he provides for
various constructions [25, p. 259-280], where the roles that the subject and
objects occupy depend on the verbs in question. The particular adjective
associated with causative and inchoative verbs are also included. However,
the formulas appear to be mapped more directly in Parsons’ theory, as
prepositions used in sentences are mapped directly to predicates in the
formulas. This has the effect of making them rather unique from each other,
and different syntactic structures most often result in different semantic
formulas, even though they may represent the same kind of event. This was
illustrated in, for instance, the buy example (see structures (123)), which had
quite different formulas for sentences describing the same kind of situation.
Some of the proposed entailments were, therefore, not captured there. This
is related to the issue below, regarding generality.
14.3 Generality versus Specificity
While Jackendoff offers conceptual structures that are typically shared by
many different verbs, because many of the same building blocks are used,
Parsons focuses on the fact that each kind of event or state is distinct. For
instance, Jackendoff’s structure for a jumping event, where a participant
moves across a path, seems to be no different from a running event,
where the same participant also moves across a path (see structures (108)).
Parsons, on the other hand, makes these two events distinct, by using
different predicates (Jumping and Running) to describe them. This makes
it possible to capture the fact that a jumping event does not involve a
running event, and vice versa, unless it is specified. In the conceptual
theory, this distinction isn’t present, though, as proposed, the semantic
category manner is available. Even though Jackendoff doesn’t use this
category in his structures, it might possibly be used to say in what manner
some movement is done, thereby making them distinct.
So, while Jackendoff offers quite general semantic structures, Parsons
offer much more specific ones. This means that conceptual structures
representing different kinds of events may end up entailing one another
because they’re structures are the same. In the underlying event formulas,
on the other hand, notable entailment relations between events, such as the
fact that events or running and jumping both involve movement, are not
captured.
VerbNet, similar to Jackendoff, gives semantic structures that are also
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quite general, where there is often no disctinction between specific verb
events. This lead to incorrect entailments in, for instance, some of the
structures in the climb example. However, the database does occasionally
make use of sentence specific structures, where a given argument or
predicate might depend on the verb, preposition or adjective used in the
sentence. This was seen in, for instance, the open example (see structures
(132)), where the EndState role depended on the adjective given, and also
in the alternative climb structures (118), where a predicate depended on the
given preposition. These specifics capture wanted entailments that only
exists for the given verbs, for instance that open entails the fact that the
Patient ends up in a state of being open. However, it also results in some
entailments not being captured, as different words in the syntax result in
different predicates used. This was seen in the alternative climb structures,
for instance.
14.4 Structure Formats
Jackendoff makes use of embedded structures, where one overall event or
state may further consist of other sematic categories, which are within the
scope of the overall category. Parsons, on the other hand, makes use of
conjuncted predicates in his formulas, though the use of nested quantifiers
may result in events or states being within the range of another event
or state. This can, in a way, be thought of as a sort of embedding. For
instance, the causative-inchoative formulas proposed by Parsons maintain
one overall event (the cause event), which has scope over another event (the
inchoative). Also, representing progressive and perfect aspects in Parsons’
theory involves the embedding of the PROG and PERF functions inside
the Hold predicate. However, the overall underlying event formulas are
conjunctive. VerbNet, similar to Parsons, also makes use of conjuncted
formulas, though a kind of embedding does take place here also. For
instance, when predicates are negated, they are embedded inside the NOT
function (see structures (89), for example).
The effect of embedding is that structures consist of one, single and
overall event or state, while the effect of conjunction is that structures
may consist of multiple events or states, which are related to each other
in various ways. However, as shown, the conceptual structures can be
reduced to flat structures that appear more similar to the conjuncted
structures of the other two theories. This makes it possible to examine
entailment through two different kinds of forms for the conceptual
structure, a feature that is missing for the other two theories. The other way
around, for instance, where Parsons’ and VerbNet’s structures are given the
same embedded forms as in Jackendoff’s theory, seems a lot harder to do.
Because Parsons bases his theory on traditional first order logic, all the
features specified in that system are also available for the underlying event
formulas. This includes, most importantly, the existential and the universal
quantifiers, which can introduce variables for events, states, things and so
on. This makes it easy to distinguish between the different concepts, and
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to relate, for instance, an event to a state. Jackendoff, similarly to Parsons,
also provides an array of different semantic categories, most importantly
the categories event and state. Because of this, both Parsons and Jackendoff
maintains that, in causative-inchoative sentences, there are two distinct
events, plus a state. This can be seen in the structures for the kill/die
sentences, for example, shown in (92) and (93).
Though VerbNet also uses a special variable for given event or events,
the database does not make use of variables for states, nor any other
concept, other than for events. Rather, states are either defined by
the predicate STATE, sentence-specific arguments such as the EndState,
or the use of the entire E event variable, for instance in a predicate
like POSITION(E, Theme, Pos). These three different ways of state
representation, especially the latter one, make it a little hard to distinguish
between events and states, and to relate them to each other. For instance,
in the kill/die example (see structures (95)), VerbNet only refers to one event
for the causative sentence (unlike Parsons and Jackendoff), and the state
seen in structure (95c) is not really included in structure (95a), because
of the RESULT stage function is used in the latter. Although the event
in structure (95a) may lead to the state in structure (95c), as discussed in
the example, it is not that obvious from the representations alone. The
entailment is much clearer in Parsons’ and Jackendoff’s structures, because
of their distinct definitions of events and states.
14.5 Thematic Role Labeling
When it comes to how participants, or the arguments in a sentence, are
given specific roles, there are differences between the theories. While
Parsons represents the thematic roles as predicates, which relate an event
or state to a constant, VerbNet instead uses the thematic roles themselves
as arguments to predicates. For Jackendoff’s theory, the roles are not seen
directly in the semantic structures, but are instead given to instances of
semantic categories based on what kind of functions the they take part in.
Jackendoff’s framework makes it possible for one participant to have
more than just a single role in an event. This was seen, for instance, in
the transaction example (see structures (121)), where Keith had both the
role of Source and Goal in the three events. At the same time, it seems
the same role can be applied to multiple participants in the conceptual
structure theory, as in the same example, both the car and the money acted as
arguments to a GO function, making them both Themes. These features of
the conceptual theory means that certain wanted entailments are captured,
such as the fact that the participants in a transaction always occupy mostly
the same roles (Keith and Joel are at least both the Source and the Goal in
structures (119)).
In the underlying event theory, participants typically only occupy one
single role, though Parsons does offer conjuncted role predicates, like
Agent-Theme and Performer-Theme. This feature captures the fact that
Jane is both the instigator and the thing moving, in the climb example (see
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structures (116)). However, the fact that Keith is also the Goal, in addition
to being the Agent, in structure (123a), is not captured, because Parsons
does not provide a role like Agent-Goal, for instance. Unlike Jackendoff,
Parsons does not allow one role to apply to multiple participants, so there
will only be one Theme, for instance, in a given event.
VerbNet typically doesn’t allow roles to be applied to multiple parti-
cipants, nor does it allow one participant to have more than one role. In
that database, the available roles are included within the given class, and
the individual frames can then only make use of these. However, even
though participants are applied only to one role each, they can still act in
any predicate. So, for instance, the fact that Tom also moves in one the
senses of the sentence in (106a), is captured in VerbNet by including Tom
in the MOTION predicate. So, even though a Theme is typically the thing
that moves or is moved in an event of motion, the idea that the Agent is
also known to be moving can be captured like this in the VerbNet data-
base. Still, some role labels that are used capture the idea that more than
one participant can have the same kind of role. Examples are roles such
as Co-Agent and Co-Theme, which are present in the class exchange-13.6,
for instance. In that class, the roles Agent and Theme are also present, so
the possibility that two participants can both be the Agent (or Agent and
Co-Agent), for example, is achieved. So, while VerbNet technically only
allows role labels to each apply to one participant, the use of such Co-roles
means that multiple participants (or at least two) occupying the same role
is possible.
VerbNet seems to be the most consistent in its labeling of roles across
multiple semantic structures, as participants typically occupy the same role
within all the frames in a class. For instance, in the example involving
hit, the roles never change between the three structures (see structures
(125)). This consistency is not as prevalent in the other two theories, where
different syntactic constructions often result in different role labels, even
though this is not what we want. This can also be seen in the hit example,
where the role that John occupies differ in some of the conceptual structures
(see structures (87)), and where the role that the hammer plays differ in
the underlying event formulas (see structures (88)). This has the effect of
wanted entailments not being captured.
When we have a verb event where one optional participant is left out of
the given sentence, VerbNet typically says that this participant is unknown,
using the ? symbol. Jackendoff, similarly, leaves the argument unspecified,
though still retains the fact that it exists. This can be seen in the eat example,
where the thing being eaten is still part of the structures for the intransitive
sentence (see structures (102) and (105)). For those sentences, Parsons
simply leaves out the missing argument (see structure (104)), which means
that we have an event of eating without the thing being eaten included at
all. So, basically, Parsons can refer to an event of eating that only involves
the eater, while Jackendoff and VerbNet requires that an eating event also
involves a thing being eaten. When it comes to entailment, however, there
really isn’t any difference here, as all three representations perfectly capture
the wanted entailment in the eat example.
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14.6 Semantic Structure Detail
The three representations give various degrees of detail when it comes to
the representation of events or states. While Parsons only includes the
name of the given event, plus the thematic roles, Jackendoff and VerbNet
offer much more specific information as to what actually happens within
the situation. However, there is still a lot of freedom in Parsons’ theory as
to what events or states can be specified as, or what the predicate defining
the situation is called. For instance, the functions CAUSE# and BECOME#
make use of a given event and produces a new and specific event or state,
based on the information applied to the event argument. The BECOME#
function might, for instance, be used to say that there exists a state of Being-
Loaded-Onto-The-Truck (see structures (99)). This does capture entailments
where, for instance, the mentioned state entails a less specific state, such as
Being-Loaded. However, the structures provided by VerbNet and Jackendoff
usually include much more information than this in their structures.
For example, in the structures for the verb hit, VerbNet represents
the fact that the hammer moves in a directed motion, and in a forceful
manner (see structures (89)), while the conceptual structures says that the
hammer ends up at the location of the nail (see structures (87)). None of
this information is present in Parsons’ formulas, which simply says that
there exists an event of hitting, involving three participants. So, because
of this, some wanted entailments are not captured in Parsons’ formulas.
However, while Jackendoff is pretty consistent in his structures, where a
CAUSE event always involves a cause and an effect and a GO event always
involves a thing and a path, for instance, VerbNet is more sporadic in its
level of detail. For example, in the kill/die example, the first structure, (95a),
is quite detailed, referring to many parts of the event, while the second
structure (95b) only makes use of the DISAPPEAR predicate. Also, because
of this difference in predicate use, the wanted entailment between those
sentences is not captured. The semantic predicates are not formally defined
anywhere in the VerbNet database, so it is also a little hard to see what such
vague predicates might involve.
Because VerbNet can include the various stages of an event (the start,
during and end stages, for instance), the state of something before it acts in
an event can be represented. For instance, in the kill/die example, VerbNet
includes the fact that Bill is in the state of being alive at the start of the event,
and that he is not alive at the end of it. The two other theories only include
the latter fact, that the event leads to Bill being dead. In other words, the
focus in Jackendoff’s and Parsons’ structures for events is typically on the
result or culmination, not on the situation before they happen. So, in the
kill/die example, VerbNet captures the fact that entities are alive before they
die, which is not included in the other two representations.
The way that different events and states are related to each other is
quite different in the three theories. In the conceptual representations, the
semantic categories are related because of embedding, where one category
can be said to be a part of some other, more global category. In contrast,
the other two theories relate events and states by the use of predicates,
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though Parsons does, as mentioned, make use of nested quantification. An
example of a predicate relating two events in Parsons’ theory is the CAUSE
predicate, while VerbNet uses predicates such as EQUALS and BEFORE in
order to convey when the events take place in relation to each other. In the
jump example, for instance, VerbNet says that two events take place at the
same time, while the other two representations lack this information.
14.7 Tense and Aspect, and the Representation of
Nouns
As we have seen, the only theory that really takes tense and aspect
into consideration is Parsons’, which has a very detailed and expressive
framework for representing both the past, present and future tenses, as well
as the progressive and perfect aspects. These notions are missing entirely
in Jackendoff’s theory, which does not make any distinction between a past
and present tense sentence, for instance. Jackendoff does, however, include
the aspectual function PERF, which may represent the perfective, but no
other functions of this kind. VerbNet does not represent these two concepts
either, though it does offer the representation of the different stages of an
event. Because of Parsons’ detailed tense representations, the fact that
present tense events does not entail past tense events is captured, while
this would not be in the other two representations.
While Parsons and VerbNet only refer to nouns by name, Jackendoff’s
theory offer a much more detailed representation of the various forms that
nouns can have. This is because of the many functions available for the
semantic concept thing, which includes functions such as PART, PL and
TOP-OF. These also make it possible to relate arguments in a sentence with
each other, representing, for instance, the fact that the back is part of Caesar
in the stab example (see structures (79)). However, because this thesis’ main
focus is on verbs, this issue will not be discussed further here. Still, it
should at least be noted, because it shows how effectively the conceptual




The key points discussed in the previous chapter result in the tables given
below, which illustrate key differences and similarities between the three
theories.

































































Not much detail Inconsistent
detail
Tense No Yes No






Detailed Only by name Only by name
So, Jackendoff’s structures are good at capturing entailments that
are shared across many different kinds of situations, because of how
general they are. In other words, the fact that many events share the
same general meaning can be captured in the conceptual structures easily,
because specific syntactic constructions may result in the same, shared
conceptual representation. Events and states are referred to directly, so
the idea that a causative-inchoative consists of two events and a state,
for instance, is shown clearly in the structures. Because of this, and
the way the structures for such situations are organized in an embedded
format, causative-inchoative event entailments are perfectly captured in
the conceptual structures. Unlike Parsons and VerbNet, Jackendoff’s
structures are consistently quite detailed, meaning that most entailments
related to what goes on within events are captured, without there being
instances of related situations differing too much from each other. In
other words, the same basic functions are always used, while VerbNet, for
instance, makes use of much larger number of predicates, which may result
in meaning not being shared across related events.
The fact that Jackendoff’s theory allows for more than one role for each
verb argument means that many facts (for example that a thing can be
both a Source and the causer of an event) can be applied to one argument.
Similarly, because the theory allows multiple participants to occupy the
same role, the same meaning can be applied to more than one participant.
This means that one can have two Themes, for instance, a scenario that
is very much possible. Finally, Jackendoff offers a very rich framework
for the representation of nouns, which is needed to capture many kinds of
entailments.
Parsons’ theory of underlying events is very good at representing both
tense and different aspects, which is needed to capture certain kinds of
entailments. The formulas always represent specific kinds of events, and
this helps in avoiding incorrect entailments that can occur with more
general structures. Because Parsons bases his theory on first order logic,
all the tools and practices in that system, specifically with regards to
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entailment, are available. The use of quantified variables, especially, makes
it easy to distinguish between events and states, and relate them to each
other, a feature that is very useful for capturing entailment. The use
of double roles also makes it possible to add more than one meaning
to participants, something that is needed in capturing many entailment
phenomena.
Finally, the VerbNet database is the one that has the largest collection
of lexical entries, making it the theory with the most coverage (excluding
the Dorr database). The semantic structures are, typically, very good at
conveying detailed information about events, referring to multiple stages
within them, and to what happens to the arguments. This makes it possible
to capture detailed entailments, which either occur across many different
verbs, or are very specific to given sentences. Also, the hierarchical
nature of the database makes it very flexible, as new classes, adding new
meanings, can easily be added.
As this thesis has shown, these three different theories of representation
each has their own strengths and weaknesses when it comes to the concept
of semantic entailment. While one theory might excel at some particular
key points, another might offer a much better alternative to issues that
occur in the former theory. So, it seems there is really no best choice here.
Further research would need to be devoted to the idea that the best of
these three representations could be joined together, in order to have a solid
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